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Abstract 
 
One aspect of the common ground between the work of Richard Ford and John 
Cheever is their careful depiction of domestic life. It was this attention to the 
middle class suburbs of America that led some of Cheever’s contemporary critics to 
dismiss his work, seeing his subject matter as inappropriate to serious critical 
enquiry. By altering the terms on which Cheever’s work is approached, and reading 
Cheever’s and Ford’s suburban fiction in light of some of the tenets of 
existentialism, post-structuralism, and neo-pragmatism, it is possible to affirm their 
works as central to contemporary concerns surrounding subjectivity, identity, and 
agency.  
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Introduction 
 
 
At certain moments of lucidity, the mechanical aspects of their gestures, their meaningless 
pantomime makes silly everything that surrounds them. A man is talking on the telephone 
behind a glass partition; you cannot hear him, but you see his incomprehensible dumb show: 
you wonder why he is alive. (Camus 15) 
 
 Proposing that there are inescapable limits to the human capacity to know and 
to understand is perhaps not the simplest, best or most convincing way to begin an 
argument. Admitting these limits from the outset is a concession that demands an 
essentially perplexing question: why go on? This apparently senseless need to 
continue in the face of irrelevance is part of the sensation Albert Camus terms 
“absurdity” – a near ineffable state of self-awareness brought about by intense levels 
of self-reflection and provoked by an admission of subjectivity. Absurdity can 
generate a perspective on the world that makes it seem unfamiliar, arbitrary, and 
peopled by bodies divested of value. 
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 Camus’ “dumb show” and “mechanical pantomime” (15) might evoke the 
characterisation of figures from the work of both John Cheever and Richard Ford, 
writers for whom subjective anxiety surfaces in variously depicted scenes of 
alienation, desperation, or comic displays of futility. Some of the most evocative 
moments in their fictions turn on this anxiety and draw their tone from a sense of 
individual aimlessness.  But when Camus asks the question: “is an absurd work of art 
possible?” (96) his discussion of absurdity necessarily extends outward. He invites an 
assessment of the subject-positions of readers and critics who, in perceiving absurdity, 
must bring a certain amount of their own worldview to bear on the text.  
 Camus argues that many philosophers have arrived at the point of absurdity: a 
point where logic finds its limits, where knowledge can extend no further and where 
an assertion cannot be justified without recourse to something unverifiable (9). “The 
real effort,” writes Camus “is to stay there, in so far as that is possible, and to 
examine closely the odd vegetation of those distant regions” (10).  “Staying there” is 
for Camus a suspension of hyper-consciousness that claims only an awareness of how 
little able humans are to extend this state of consciousness any further than their own 
subjectivity can allow. Camus presents absurdity as a mental state difficult to 
maintain because of its instability and its own internal contradiction: it paradoxically 
makes a claim to know, and to pronounce as fact, the position that we do not have the 
ability to know.   
 For Camus, literature is the place in which our “temptation to explain remains 
the greatest” (99) and therefore the art form in which the capacity to maintain 
absurdity struggles hardest against the desire for reason. The order and logic provided 
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by our linguistic habits and our most reassuring narratives appear to contest the 
illogical impetus of absurd awareness. In the years following Camus’s essay, post-
structuralism has assumed a central role in furthering this understanding of language; 
language and discourse are argued to be the central orders by which meanings, values 
and cultural and socio-political identifications are constructed, perpetuated, grounded, 
or reformed. The order of language envelops, inscribes or subsumes utterances into 
its pre-determined system and the logic that underpins it. In this light the notion that 
something as illogical as absurdity could be conveyed through forms of story-telling 
appears increasingly unsound, while desires to conform to the conventions of closure, 
continuity or morality tales further complicate absurdity’s portrayal. 
 Suburban fiction initially presents itself as the last potential field in which to 
locate an example of Camus’ absurd text. For some the traditional image of the 
suburb suggests rigidity, conformity and a lack of socio-political awareness. The 
suburb seems to generate an immediate association with order, or with the temptation 
to explain, to fulfil, to make meaningful, to attain and to satisfy. The contemporary 
currency of this image in popular novels and films relies in part on the subversion of 
just such an original stereotype wherein the suburb’s supposed conformity in turn 
masks and oppresses a seemingly sinister or variously opposed undercurrent.  This 
presumption positions itself according to a long-standing binary perpetuated by 
critics, readers, and social and cultural commentary: the distinction between the 
idealised suburb and the ‘real thing’ lying somewhere beneath or behind an inflexible 
false image of a physically and psychologically ordered landscape.  
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 In the search for the authentic reality supposedly veiled by suburban 
conformity, some critics have denied the complexity of suburban identification and 
rigidly demarcated a potentially unrewarding evaluative model. The critical 
assumption that the suburb represented a state of conformity and a lack of self-
awareness led some to reductively confine their readings of John Cheever’s fiction. 
These critics, while appreciating his style, approached him as a writer who, in 
concentrating so thoroughly on suburban settings, lacked a certain level of serious or 
political content and consequently lacked literary gravity. The assessment of this 
gravity centred on the nexus of authenticity and agency, where authenticity was 
figured as the attainment of a political and social consciousness, and in turn, as the 
necessary constituent of individual agency.  While on this reading the suburb 
represents the unconscious and inauthentic setting of subjectivity and conformity, its 
opposing place – the place figured as outside of the conditions and limitations of 
suburbia – is offered as an authentic, politicised and agential terrain. It is a place 
represented as symbolically urban, as variously cultured, and as refusing the 
supposed simplicities of the middle-class family unit, the house, the gendered roles of 
husband, of wife, of child; the place outside the suburb richly engages the social 
realities and identity issues surrounding class, race, and gender inequality; it assumes 
the place of the desired real, the natural, and the authentic.  
 An alternative model, structured in light of some of the primary tenets of 
existential and post-structural theory, disposes of the desire for essences and the 
pursuit of the real and instead prioritises the question of subjective anxiety and 
identification. Liberating suburban fictions from the confines of a restricted dialogue 
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is partly the task of the critic. It demands, among other things, a rejection of the idea 
that suburban fiction is necessarily all about the suburbs. In fiction by John Cheever 
and Richard Ford, although the setting is suburban, the central suburbanites and their 
identifications and subjectivities are of primary concern. When considering the types 
of reading advocated by existentialists such as Camus, and reading from the 
perspective of post-structuralism, the subjectivity and angst apparent in the works of 
Cheever and Ford assume vital importance. Read from an angle that refuses the 
binary of authentic/inauthentic their fictions emerge as explorations of a subjective 
unease and an individual will to permanently situate identity. Such a reading sheds 
light on the indeterminacy of the suburban image as well as on the limitations 
sustained by any suggestion that these texts are ‘merely’ suburban. The texts emerge 
as acutely concerned with the processes of self-criticism, self exploration and 
subjectivised agency. Their works can thus be used to demonstrate the potential for 
the suburban setting to be read as complementary to a psychological terrain of 
uncertainty and awareness as opposed to conformity and false consciousness.   
 Richard Ford has explicitly identified Cheever as a significant antecedent: 
“the people who really affected me – let me think about this so I say it truly. Cheever. 
A big influence.” (O’Rourke 191). But while Ford and Cheever share common styles 
and subject matter their career-spans fall some fifty years apart.  Ford can be 
considered a descendent of Cheever’s style, but to speak of a ‘development’ from 
Cheever’s work to Ford’s is not to imply that Ford’s work is somehow ‘more 
progressive’ or ‘better than’ Cheever’s simply because it follows after his in a linear, 
historical sense. Rather, the differences in the way that Ford and Cheever have been 
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received by their contemporaries might suggest that critical expectations have 
changed or that Richard Ford finds himself writing in an age in which the 
presumptions that characterised critical approaches to Cheever no longer stand.  
 However, what is seen as a progression in the reading and critical acceptance 
of the style and subject matter of these texts cannot be considered an attempt to offer 
one perspective on them as more correct than another. It cannot be assumed that to 
approach either Ford’s or Cheever’s work from a Marxist perspective on 
consciousness rather than a post-structural or existentialist perspective is in any way 
to present those standpoints as either correct or incorrect ideologies, or as the most 
politically successful models for political engagement or social change. Essentially, 
whether one school of thought offers a greater or more empowering vision of political 
agency than another is not a question that this thesis intends (or has the capacity) to 
answer, and is certainly best left to discussion in wider fields of critical debate. In 
considering the various approaches to Cheever’s suburban short stories and Ford’s 
Sportswriter trilogy my primary intention is simply to refuse a single critical 
perspective on their work. My aim is to propose and perform textual analyses that 
will not grant the presumption that these texts, due to their supposedly limited subject 
matter, are inadequate or uninteresting as objects of critical or political enquiry. The 
method of reading generated by the assumptions that underpin pragmatic, 
existentialist and post-structural concessions to contingency is simply one method of 
establishing and arguing for this textual potential.  
 For existentialists, pragmatists and post-structuralists, one of the key concerns 
raised by the rejection of foundational or essentialists assumptions is how to 
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formulate a sense of agency or how to identify, signify, or communicate while 
continually placing agency, liberty, meaning, or any assumption of value into 
question. While it is important not to overstate allegiances among these critical fields, 
they do share common ground. As one example, their commonality can be 
demonstrated by tracing the impact that existentialist thought had on the work of 
Judith Butler. In turn, Butler’s insistence on a shift away from an interest in essences 
and toward an understanding of inter-subjectivity, performance, process and 
signification, marks out a significant method to approach not only the frustrated 
needs of characters within the texts at hand, but also, the issues faced by critics and 
readers.     
 In fact the major concern motivating my readings of Ford’s and Cheever’s 
work is an interrogation of the kinds of critical and subjective desires that preoccupy 
both the subjects of the fictions at hand, and the critics who have examined them; 
desire is thus positioned as something occurring both inside and outside the text. This 
thesis is as much about the desire to make sense of a text as it is about the characters 
who, within Ford’s and Cheever’s stories, seek to make sense of their own lives and 
situations. The question of how individuals (characters, writers, critics) go on 
narrating, writing, and reading without postulating any claim to a static objective 
truth is the single fault-line along which all my inquiries align. More precisely, the 
critical attention this thesis pays to post-structuralism, existentialism, and neo-
pragmatism engages contemporary debate by demonstrating the apparent overlaps of 
these fields, especially with regard to questions of individual subjectivity and 
political agency. Camus’s question about whether a text can sustain absurdity 
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underlies the textual inquiry and emerges finally as a question that cannot escape 
itself; it is surrendered on the possibility that readings are never objectively verifiable, 
textual interpretation is itself indeterminate, and the modern critic might themselves 
occupy and generate an absurd position.  
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Chapter One: John Cheever 
 
i. Unnecessary Fiction: John Cheever’s Critics 
 
 In 1971, seven years before the publication of John Cheever’s Collected 
Stories, Time magazine commissioned a study on suburbia that aimed to assess its 
trends and the opinions of its occupants. The results of the survey ran in an article 
entitled: “Suburbia: The New American Plurality” and they suggest that the real 
suburbia of those years was more diverse than may have been imagined. The article 
also includes this telling sentence: 
 
“Many people really enjoy living in the community” is a statement that 74% agree with; 67% 
also feel that there is a strong sense of neighbourliness. There is always a possibility that such 
a satisfaction may be feigned, a defense against the anxiety-ridden image of the suburbanite 
in contemporary fiction. ("Suburbia: The New American Plurality").  
 
This comment is indicative of the blurred distinction between the idea of suburbia, 
the life of the suburbanite, and the internal awareness suburbanites might have about 
their image. The writer presumes that any attempt to feign satisfaction would be the 
result of an attempt to improve the image of suburbia, rather than the reality of life 
there. The quote acknowledges that much of the contested ground over dissatisfaction 
in suburbia is one that, at the time, was already occurring in the realm of image, 
representation and discourse.  
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John Cheever’s short stories are regularly considered to epitomise the genre of 
American suburban fiction both because of his choice of material and because the 
development of his writing, in its shifting focus from urban to suburban domesticity, 
mirrored the migration of the American population as it was happening. Cheever 
himself was literally part of this migration; he and his family moved from New York 
to Scarborough in 1951 (Donaldson, Biography 121) and later to Westchester. The 
fictional landscape Cheever created is populated by white American families 
generally living in the commuter areas on the outskirts of New York City. But it is 
not merely Cheever’s subject matter that might be considered to class him as a 
suburban writer. The majority of his stories are narrated by or focalised through a 
white male protagonist who maintains a voice regularly marked by the attitudes and 
tones of someone who sympathises with, understands or even embodies certain 
suburban values.  
Cheever is often quoted as having once said, in an interview for the Saturday 
Review, that he never intended for his work to be considered social commentary: 
“There’s been too much criticism of the middle-class way of life. Life can be as good 
and rich there as anyplace else. I am not out to be a social critic, however, nor a 
defender of suburbia. It goes without saying that people in my stories and the things 
that happen to them could take place anywhere” (Donaldson, Suburban Myth 204). 
Donaldson, Cheever’s biographer and also the author of a much earlier sociological 
work, Suburban Myth – about popular negative misconceptions and portrayals of 
suburbia in politics, journalism, film and fiction – notes that critics specifically 
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ignored Cheever’s statements about his own work and went on to misread it by 
seeking precisely those features his comments had specifically negated (207).  
Some novelists at that time did intend to address the rapid growth of suburbia, 
and the mindsets of the individuals who chose to live in the expanding suburbs. 
Richard Yates’ 1962 Revolutionary Road details the lives of two suburbanites who 
make a plan to relocate to Paris and escape the American middle class. Yates himself 
has said he saw his novel as “as an indictment of American life in the nineteen-fifties. 
Because during the Fifties there was a general lust for conformity over this country, 
by no means only in the suburbs – a kind of bland, desperate clinging to safety and 
security at any price” (De Witt). Novels such as Revolutionary Road and Sloane 
Wilson’s 1955 The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit epitomised an emerging genre of 
suburban fiction in which individuals struggled to negotiate what was depicted as the 
overwhelming power and drudgery of social conformity.  
Many critics, including Catherine Jurca, Mark Clapson and Robert Bueka cite 
David Riesman’s influential 1950 text The Lonely Crowd as a primary academic 
example of the fears that supposedly struck suburbanites and anti-suburbanites during 
the golden era of ex-urbanisation: that the artificiality and the suppression of 
difference in patterned lifestyles facilitated a social practice that limited the personal 
choices of individuals; that people were losing their individuality due to increasingly 
ordered, limited sources of socialisation. Riesman asks: “Is it conceivable that these 
economically privileged Americans will some day wake up to the fact that they over-
conform? Wake up to the discovery that a host of behavioural rituals are the result, 
not of an inescapable social imperative but of an image of society that though false, 
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provides certain “secondary gains” for the people who believe it?” (306). He 
immediately answers this question: “Since character structure is, if anything, even 
more tenacious than social structure, such an awakening is exceedingly unlikely” 
(306).  
 
Resiman’s answer is far from clear. He refers to an “awakening”, which might 
allow the reader to presume that the Americans he writes of are asleep and thereby 
neither conscious nor in control of their lives. Yet Riesman suggests a distinction 
between character and society and thus preserves the idea that the individual is able 
to reflect on their own position. More importantly, Riesman weighs “character 
structure” as the more powerful of the two.  What does Riesman mean by “character 
structure”? Does he mean a character as determined by the individual himself or does 
he imply (perhaps by an inherent sense of ‘contructedness’ in the term ‘structure’) 
that character is formulated by some external force acting on the individual?  He 
refers to the “economic privilege” and “secondary gains” of the subjects in his 
discussion, which can be taken to suggest that the convenience of their situation 
influences the choice they make. In short Riesman’s text does not propose to 
establish the argument that suburbanites are mindlessly conforming, rather it 
establishes the possibility that they choose to conform.  
 Much has been made of the fact that early criticisms of Cheever were 
dismissive. He was perceived as a writer of the New Yorker style. His work was 
considered trivial because it concerned material that lacked the gravity or scope 
necessary to be considered literary. In Francis Bosha’s introduction to a collection of 
 17 
 
reviews and essays on Cheever he notes that of the nearly 200 stories John Cheever 
published, 121 appeared in the New Yorker (xxi). Bosha sees this as “one of the 
factors that seems to have delayed early serious critical response to Cheever” (xxi). 
Cheever was seen, from the date of his earliest reviews in 1943, as bathing “in that 
same municipal pool where all the New Yorker short story-writers swim and 
sink…their characters live in an identical and tidy world which the magazine’s 
editors have laboriously created by a set tone and by an elaborate hierarchy of 
taboos” (Kees 7).  
 Cheever was described as a “short story manufacturer” (Mizener 11) and a 
man who utilised “slick professionalism somewhat at the expense of sincerity and 
psychological interest” (Crews 83). His stories were said to “belong where they are 
usually found, in a thin column in the New Yorker; they comment on the 
advertisements on either side for solid gold taxi whistles…” (Segal 84). Cheever’s 
method of producing stories, and the marketing and publication of those stories was 
incorporated into the assessment of his literary ‘quality’. In effect his dismissals 
sometimes had as much to do with his work as with the presentation of that work to 
an audience. The suspicion directed toward marketing, mass appeal, and post-
industrial ‘manufacture’ in this sense fed into concomitant suspicions about his 
stories having an inauthentic quality about them; figured as written in order to 
conform to a marketing standard and appeal to an audience the stories are positioned 
as functioning inside rather than outside of a social machine. They are seen as 
contributing to reassuring social mechanisms of perpetuation, rather than working 
against this order, or performing serious critiques of social (and market) forces.  
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 Nevertheless Cheever’s early reception was not entirely as negative as some 
critical essays purport. While Scott Donaldson refers in a critical essay to The 
Housebreaker of Shady Hill as a collection that “generated some of the worst reviews 
of [Cheever’s] life” (Donaldson “Suburban Sequence”) it is also true that it was in a 
review of Housebreaker that Richard Gilman coined the famous reference to Cheever 
as the “Dante of Suburbia” (Gilman 31). John Aldridge, in a 1964 review, termed 
Cheever’s stories “grievously underdiscussed” (77), but while Gilman comments on 
Cheever’s “craftsmanship and uncommon satirical gifts” (29) he also dismisses 
Cheever in the familiar anti-suburban judgement that underpins many reviews: 
 
What Cheever’s well-heeled admirers want is what, by an ultimate failure of sensibility, he 
receded into giving them: an exercise in sophisticated self-criticism, together with a way back 
into the situation as before.  
 
… Cheever is portraying a world of adolescent values. In the end he shares them. At least he 
shares them enough so that in these stories sadness never mounts to tragedy or feeling to 
passion. (30) 
 
Gilman makes an assumption that a text of reasonable merit would rely on 
particular values – a morality not defined in the review, but that can be assumed to 
exclude the “adolescent” values of the suburbia that Cheever’s texts are presumed to 
“recede” to; Gilman’s “way back into” appears to stand opposed to an apparent desire 
for the divergent ‘way out’. On Gilman’s reading the acknowledged self-criticism in 
Cheever’s work arrives at a certain point and goes no further, acting to reassure the 
suburban reader of their self-awareness even as they fail to change their situation.  It 
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is characteristic of all of Cheever’s negative reviewers to begin from the expectation 
that real gravity would be realised if Cheever would only provide censure of or 
escape from the suburbia he positions his characters in. Even John Aldridge’s 
essentially positive essay on Cheever, which allows for the peculiarly patronising 
judgement that Cheever’s texts are “more serious than his middlebrow admirers 
would be able to recognise” (Aldridge Brigadier 78) faults Cheever because the 
negative aspects of suburban life that Cheever touches on are “neutralized by some 
last minute withdrawal from the full implications of their meaning, some abrupt 
whimsical detour into palliating fantasy” (80). 
If Cheever’s texts have, as Alridge asserts, a palliating effect they alleviate the 
symptoms of a problem while failing to provide a cure. For Aldridge the texts 
approach some great assertion of value or meaning and then retreat from it; for 
Gilman they allow for an audience of suburban fish to be “let off the hook” (30). 
Aldridge argues that Cheever fails to adequately confront the implications of 
suburban self awareness: 
 
[Cheever] needs to break out of his present mode and rearrange or retool his imaginative 
responses, not only so that he will be able to confront squarely the full implications of his 
vision, but so that his vision can become in fact a vision and not simply a congeries of 
shyness and whimsical glances through a glass darkened by a pessimism not quite his own, 
not quite earned by his imagination. (81) 
 
Aldridge’s bias toward a “vision” – some clear meaning or design for change 
– is clear in this review. Because of his assumptions about what makes a text 
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successful Aldridge fails to read for the possibility that Cheever’s voice intentionally 
abstains from the loaded “full implication of vision” and “square” confrontations 
Aldridge admires. Aldridge’s review is from 1964. His partiality for texts heavy with 
social commentary is evident in this review as well as in his more recent critical work. 
In his 1990 essay “The New Assembly Line Fiction” (which led to the publication of 
a similarly titled book) Aldridge continues to evaluate literature from a similar 
perspective, dismissing many writers who might be considered the stylistic and 
thematic descendants of John Cheever’s short fiction: “Almost everything that occurs 
on television is instantly forgettable, and so are most of the stories of, among others, 
Raymond Carver, Ann Beattie, Jayne Anne Phillips, Bobbie Ann Mason, and Amy 
Hempel” (35). Aldridge declares the works of these writers “bare minimalist 
reproductions of a reality so mundane and so completely unilluminated by language 
or theme that they never become attractive subjects for fiction but remain the raw 
materials for a fiction that is yet to be written” (36). 
At heart Aldridge expects literature to alter and illuminate perspective by 
applying language to the “raw material” (36) of “mundane reality”. Like the Marxist 
critic György Lukács, Aldridge’s taste is for texts that choose to portray objects and 
events in such a way that they specifically engage with social and ideological debate. 
In his essay “Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann?” Lukács considers the relationship 
between ideology and literary style, analysing the difference between social realism 
and modernism.  Lukács asserts that the attitude taken by a writer in choosing which 
objects and events to include and exclude in their work reflects their attitude to the 
social realities of their lives (Lukács 51). If the material a writer deals with “is 
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handled uncritically, the result may be an arbitrary naturalism, since the writer will 
not be able to distinguish between significant and irrelevant detail” (51).  
Aldridge’s 1990 essay dismisses writers whose work might be considered to 
fit Lukács’s term “arbitrary naturalism” in that they are writers who (in Aldridge’s 
view) do no more than arbitrarily reflect reality. According to Lukács “the selection 
and subtraction [the writer] undertakes in response to the teleological pattern of his 
own life constitutes the most intimate link between a writer’s subjectivity and the 
outside world” (55). But for Aldridge the selection and subtraction made by the 
writers he analyses is not satisfactory or appears to deliberately refuse selection and 
subtraction. This deliberate refusal has the potential to be read as an intentional 
reflection of a social reality in which the very idea of valuing some experiences or 
objects as more worthy of literature than others seems tenuous. But Aldridge, like 
Lukács, is intent on the importance of value and vision.  
For Lukács a text always represents a reflection of the subjectivity a writer 
experiences, and the difference between the “bourgeois modernism” Lukács 
questions, and the “bourgeois critical realism” (60) he favours, is that critically realist 
texts at least attempt to offer some form of objective perspective on the world they 
describe.  
 
Objective reality, we found, in the modernist writing we examined, is subjectivised and 
robbed of its historicity, Yet, while chaos and angst are the inevitable consequences of such 
subjectivisation, their specific content, mood and ideological basis are determined by the 
social conditions in which the intellectual finds himself. (69) 
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The above paragraph summarises two of the steps that Lukács’s reasoning 
makes in “Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann?” Firstly, in his definition of modernism, 
modernist texts condemn their characters to a perpetual existential angst because they 
offer nothing other than a subjective perspective. Secondly, this failure to offer any 
objective perspective is not the result of a default existential human condition in 
which people (and writers) are perpetually unable to attain (or illustrate) any 
objective perspective. Instead (true to his Marxist perspective) Lukács sees this angst 
as the result of social forces. Lukács asserts that angst is the result of social 
conditions under capitalism. “We are entitled” Lukács argues, “to guess at a rejection 
of socialism behind the fashionable condition of angst” (64).  
From this basis Lukács concludes that a crucial role of the critic of modern 
literature is to “establish by examination of the work whether a writer’s view of the 
world is based on the acceptance or rejection of angst” (83). The issue lies in 
Lukács’s definition of angst as a social rather than metaphysical product: his 
assumption is first that angst can be rejected, and second, that angst and socialism are 
mutually exclusive terms. For existentialist philosophers rejecting angst is tantamount 
to what Albert Camus terms “philosophical suicide” (Camus 28). Lukács is 
concerned that angst represents the unavailability of an objective perspective. For 
Albert Camus this unavailability is an inevitable universal condition which gives rise 
to a sense of what he terms absurdity: 
 
I don’t know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. But I know that I do not 
know that meaning and that it is impossible for me to know it….these two certainties – my 
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appetite for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility of reducing this world to a 
rational and reasonable principle – I also know I cannot reconcile them. (51)  
 
Camus, articulating an antithetical approach to that of Lukács, asks not 
whether a text can reject angst but whether a text can adequately convey the sensation 
of absurdity and address angst. Absurdity might here be defined as a state of mind 
where objectivity and order are constantly desired, but acknowledged as essentially 
unrealisable; absurdity arises from the plainly illogical persistence of the desire to 
attain objectivity, order, or irrefutable ‘meaning’ in the face of the knowledge that 
this desire is directed toward the impossible.   
As a result of Camus’s analysis of man’s existence, he poses the question “is 
an absurd work of art possible?” (96). Returning to John Cheever’s negative reviews, 
the criticisms directed at his work by Gilman and Aldridge seem to frame the 
question on Lukács’s social terms (does this accept or reject angst?) rather than 
Camus’s existential terms (is this absurd?). Aldridge and Gilman expect social 
judgement; they expect escape from suburban social roles; they expect Cheever’s 
suburbanites to realise, as David Riesman would have it, that they are engaged in an 
elaborate scheme of false socialisation that they ought to “wake up from” (Riesman 
306). Cheever’s texts, however, can be read as deliberately avoiding such conclusions, 
instead utilising forms of narration that resist objective or evaluative conclusions and 
resist the claim that he might be expected to offer any sense of escape from the binary 
of the unconscious suburb/the conscious elsewhere.   
In his 1964 review John Aldridge briefly alludes to Cheever’s “The 
Swimmer”. He suggests that the story contributes to an understanding of the whole 
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suburban experience as one that is detached from an authentic existence, creating a 
link between the protagonist’s act of swimming and what he sees as the illusion of the 
real constituted by the suburban ideal: 
 
… they have all along been swimming from some crazy illusion of the real into some horrible 
hallucination which just happens to be the real, and in which the reassuring image of the four 
beautiful daughters safely at home playing tennis, the popularity enjoyed in the community, 
the affluence and the martini parties, are all revealed to be a lie, part of some fantastic and 
unnameable hoax perpetrated, oddly enough, on themselves, by themselves. (79) 
 
 In “The Swimmer” (Stories 603-612) the central character Ned decides to 
swim home via the swimming pools of various neighbours, constructing, as he does 
so, a “quasi-subterranean stream” (603) which he names after his wife, Lucinda (603). 
During the story the seasons and weather appear to change over the course of the day, 
so although the story begins on “one of those midsummer Sundays” (603) by the 
middle of the story Ned begins to notice leaves falling and the autumnal smell of 
wood smoke (609). The weather can be read as a subjective projection of the physical 
and psychological deterioration Ned undergoes as he begins to tire and as he and the 
reader gradually confront the loss of the suburban happiness he thought he had. On 
arriving at his house Ned finds his family gone, and his house locked and barred. The 
story closes with the line “the place was empty” (612). 
 Because the reader is not part of the story-world they might take an external 
perspective on Ned’s swimming of the Lucinda – able to perceive the discrepancy 
between his evaluation of the task as an heroic river adventure, a “discovery” (603) a 
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“contribution to modern geography” (603) and the relatively safe, limited scope of 
the tame suburban swimming pool. But like Ned, the reader does not begin the story 
with a privileged level of knowledge about the state of his domestic life. The reader 
shares Ned’s limited subjective perspective and is asked initially to ‘believe’ along 
with Ned that his daughters and wife are at home playing tennis and that he is a 
popular neighbour and a financial success.  Ned’s swim models a gradual approach to 
self-awareness. If a reader sees Ned’s swim as patently absurd, comical, or strange it 
is because they accept that the swim is an imaginative act of ordering and conquering 
the landscape that might seem impossible, laughable, or pointless. However the 
reader might entirely fail to question the ordering Ned does in imagining that his wife 
and daughter are at home and that he has a nice house and a life that seems to fulfil 
the requirements for suburban content. If in this act of ordering the suburban ideal is 
not questioned it is because it is not seen as absurd or objectively pointless in the 
same way that swimming the Lucinda might be. 
 Cheever’s text, as Aldridge suggests, conflates the imaginative passage along 
the Lucinda River with Ned’s pursuit of the image of suburbia, establishing both as 
examples of the subjective evaluation and construction humans engage in. But the 
text does more than allow for the reader to perceive the constructed and imagined 
elements of the suburban image. The text implicates the reader in the subjective 
evaluations Ned makes – forcing them to share in his image of himself. If the reader 
can sympathise with Ned’s loss of the ideal wife, family and home, they might just as 
well applaud the achievement he makes in swimming the Lucinda – acknowledging 
that one act of imagining is as worthy (and as absurd) as the other.   In this sense the 
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text might be seen as functioning on more levels than Aldridge acknowledges: it 
plays with the reader’s evaluative judgements of Ned’s position and it confronts 
issues not merely of suburban image and discourse, but of all of the discourses and 
images used by individuals in shaping their lives or establishing themselves as, in 
Ned’s desire, “legendary figures” (603) within their own discourse. 
 This shaping is both subjective, and potentially significant to questions of 
agency and politics. When Lukács assumes an entitlement to “guess at a rejection of 
socialism behind the fashionable condition of angst” (64) he fails to extend Camus’s 
existentialist position to questions of culture, society, and ideology by presuming that 
socialism and angst are mutually exclusive positions that cannot logically be 
reconciled. In doing so Lukács perpetuates a dichotomy that insists upon the logical 
priority of one claim (the socialist imperative to challenge class structures) over 
another (the assertion of absurdity; the rejection of finality); Lukács retains his claims 
to an objective social critique and neglects his earlier acknowledgement of 
subjectivity as an inevitable position for all authors. When he asserts that writers 
always reflect the social realities of the world they experience (64) Lukács in fact 
signals a possible point of agreement between Camus and himself: in “The Myth of 
Sisyphus” Camus rejects the “contradiction of the philosopher enclosed within his 
system and the artist placed before his work” (96) and states that “the idea of an art 
detached from its creator is not only outmoded, it is false” (96). 
 For Camus the writer or artist cannot be severed from the world they depict 
and cannot stand outside of it in order to obtain an objective perspective from which 
to create. Nor can the critic. Lukács insistence on the severing of socialism from 
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angst is problematic because, even at his own admission, subjectivity is always 
positioned as logically prior to any claims to the objective value of socialism: how 
can anyone offer a justifiable political assertion when they acknowledge that 
subjectivity limits their ability to establish perspective? Existentialism acknowledges 
this limitation as it confronts and admits the absurdity of any claims to objective 
value, yet it does not immediately reject the validity of political action. It simply 
acknowledges the sense of perpetual discomfort and insistence on self-critique that 
might come with all claims to the merit of a particular ideology. If socialism and 
angst are conflated, read as able to function mutually, they might reveal texts that 
demonstrate a form of social absurdity. In the passage from existentialism to post-
structuralism, absurdity – the logical impasse that gives rise to sensations of angst – 
assumes a central position in critiques of social practice and discourse, and it is in this 
understanding that Cheever’s work might be reconsidered as material that rehearses 
the difficulties of establishing identity and of associating that identity with a sense of 
social or political agency.  
 
ii. Necessary Fiction: Suburban Subjects  
 
The model of suburbia as an order that positions its subjects and limits their 
consciousness corresponds with an Althusserian model of subject formation. 
Following the theory of Marxist critic Louis Althusser, cultural and social practices 
can be seen to ‘interpellate’ or ‘hail’ individuals to the law, holding them to their 
social roles and giving them a constructed sense of identity (Eagleton 142). This 
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culturally constructed identity is one that might be construed as inauthentic and 
unconscious. One of the problems arising from this conception of subject-positioning 
and identification is the issue of agency and the extent to which individuals might 
choose to resist interpellation. Terry Eagleton discusses what he calls the “imaginary 
relationship” of individuals to the “real conditions of their existence” (142) in light of 
Althusser’s theory of interpellation. He draws attention to the fact that humans might 
have more choice than this model initially seems to allow, in terms of whether they 
respond to social pressures:  
 
What if we fail to recognise and respond to the call of the Subject? What if we return the 
reply: ‘Sorry, you’ve got the wrong person?’ That we have to [in Althusser’s view] be 
interpellated as some kind of subject is clear…But there is no reason why we should always 
accept society’s identification of us as this particular sort of subject. (145) 
 
It is in this distance between material existence and the cultural approach to it that the 
role of discourse and a potential ‘suburban discourse’ emerges as, in theory, either the 
ordering or ordered force of the subject. Catherine Jurca’s recent study on suburban 
fiction concerns precisely this discourse. In White Diaspora: The Suburb and the 
Twentieth-Century American Novel she uses the term Diaspora to suggest “a spatial 
disparity between the place one inhabits and the place somewhere else where one 
imagines one’s real home or homeland to be” (8). In the imagined relationship of the 
suburbanite to their suburb Jurca argues for a form of displacement; the term 
“Diaspora” (8) deliberately refuses to construct the suburban subject as identified by 
their suburb, but sees their identification as a perpetual elsewhere. Jurca’s argument 
 29 
 
alerts readers to the reversal of assumptions about the suburb: where the suburb itself 
might once have been seen as geographically artificial, conformist, and ordered, 
cultural and theoretical debate wrests the critique of the suburb away from its 
material reality – the houses and streets that constitute actual suburbs – and toward an 
interest in the discursive space around the suburb: the language used to describe its 
inhabitants, its portrayal in popular culture, and the impact of individuals as they 
negotiate the extent of their identification with (or against) what has become a 
discursive, psychological territory of supposed artificiality and conformity. 
Cheever’s early critics saw the suburb as a place where consciousness was 
threatened by levels of hyper-conformity, by interpellation into a system of class and 
into capitalist measures of success. The opposition proposed by this critique was one 
between subjective suburban limitation and authentic self-awareness or freedom of 
consciousness – where logically any critique of the ‘mindlessness’ or ‘in-
authenticity’ of the suburb had to propose an alternative to the suburb – a superior 
elsewhere, or an outside where individuals had the ability to ‘be’ their true, authentic 
and conscious selves. Some critics presumed that the ability for a text to offer a 
legitimate social or political message depended on the text’s ability to expose 
suburbia for all of its wrongful suppressions of individual thought, and to propose a 
‘real’ alternative to the false values of suburbia. But if the dichotomy between 
conscious and unconscious behaviour is sustained how might any individual make the 
leap from the inauthentic, conformist, subjective state of mind, to the free, conscious, 
authentic state? In light of theories of interpellation the problem of consciousness 
becomes a problem of agency and insists on the question of what precisely allows for 
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the ‘awakening’ of the individual, or for their escape from interpellation? Where does 
the ability to resist the hail of the law reside? How might an individual arrive at a 
level of consciousness that would allow them to offer Terry Eagleton’s “Sorry, 
you’ve got the wrong person?”  (145) and how might anyone bridge the gap between 
the conscious and the unconscious, the agential, and the automaton? 
What critics really sought in Cheever was a voice that claimed superiority to 
subjective limitations on perspective. What they found was a voice that refused such 
objectivity and in fact rehearsed the anxiety of subjectivity itself. Rather than 
reducing suburbia to a simple model of conformity that could be either resisted or 
rejected, Cheever often created stories that treated the problem of subjectivity and 
identification as one that generated a flux between understanding identity as 
contingent, and sympathising with the angst-heavy desire to discount the implications 
of that contingency. In light of this, any question of the political merits of Cheever’s 
texts might be better understood in terms of post-structuralist theory – where the 
presumption of individual agency being dependant on objectivity is undone by the 
proposition that such a form of agency is inaccessible – if not impossible. The idea 
that leaving, resisting or rejecting the suburb forms a way out of subjectivity is 
negated. On this understanding the suburb provides only one microcosmic example 
of an individual struggle to both resist and rely on the subject positions assumed by 
individuals within the society they inhabit.    
In “The Myth of Sisyphus” Albert Camus acknowledges that the narrating and 
ordering of experience through language functions partially to relieve the sensation of 
angst. Rather than confronting social issues and narrating methods of escape from 
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interpellation, fiction has the potential to subscribe to false objectivity and sustain 
rather than challenge bad faith. Camus sought texts that resisted any such 
assumptions of objective value, arguing that the truly absurd text “will not yield to 
the temptation of adding to what is described, a deeper meaning that it knows to be 
illegitimate” (97). “The absurd work”, he writes “illustrates thought’s renouncing of 
its prestige and its resignation to being no more than the intelligence that works up 
appearances and covers with images what has no reason” (98). In literature Camus 
sees the greatest challenge in maintaining a portrayal of the tension between human 
freedom and the assumption that existence has no objectively verifiable purpose: “I 
should like to speak here of a work in which the temptation to explain remains the 
greatest, in which illusion offers itself automatically, in which conclusion is almost 
inevitable. I mean fictional creation” (99). By depicting the absurd writers apply the 
systematising and reductive order of temporal narration and of language itself. In 
doing so they might be considered to risk reducing absurdity – a thought process that 
resists objective ordering – to the order of language or the reasoned parameters of the 
text. 
In Cheever’s texts the order provided by language (as I will discuss in my 
reading of “The Geometry of Love”) is positioned alongside other variations on such 
an ordering. The temptation to make sense of the world, and the individual’s 
experience of it, is something exhibited by the writer as they organise their narrative. 
As Cheever allows for his characters to fall from the order provided by suburbia (the 
force that might be considered as the stabiliser of their social roles and related 
identifications) he often repositions them within new imaginary orders, such as the 
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imagined success or failure of swimming the Lucinda river or (as in the “The 
Geometry of Love”) the sense of order provided by Euclidean geometry. Multiple 
levels of order arise both inside and outside the texts as characters, narrators, and the 
implied author offer or refuse explanations. As stories like Cheever’s “The Geometry 
of Love” and “Goodbye My Brother” draw attention to the desire to stabilise identity 
within an order, they maintain a self-reflective and ambiguous quality and draw 
attention to the processing done by reader and author as they interpret or manipulate 
language.  
Camus’ insistence on preserving absurdity originates in the existentialist 
definition of consciousness, where consciousness is defined as dependant on a kind of 
perpetual self-negation and self-interrogation. Sartre’s seminal work, Being and 
Nothingness grappled with the definition of individual consciousness – considering 
consciousness to centre on the relation between the human mind and its experience of 
the material world. For Sartre human anguish and angst are the inevitable result of a 
necessarily subjective consciousness. In his formulation of consciousness Sartre 
divided the world into two forms of being: the in-itself and the for-itself (22) (derived 
from terms used by Hegel (Solomon 269)). A being-in-itself has no possibilities and 
is complete: “Being is. Being is in itself. Being is what it is” (22). A table is a being 
in itself, as is a door, an orange, or any object that is unable to alter its own state, or 
understand the potential to change or to differ in the future. It is necessary, Sartre 
argues, “to oppose this formula – being in itself is what it is – to that which 
designates the being of consciousness” (21). In contrast to a being-in-itself a being-
for-itself is has the potential to reflect, to change, to alter its position or orientation – 
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and is thus conscious. Sartre defines being-for-itself, somewhat obscurely, as “being 
what it is not and not being what it is” (21), a definition that has at its heart, the 
notion of displacement. Consciousness, in Sartre’s formulation, relies on absence: 
“Nothingness is the putting into question of being by being – that is, precisely 
consciousness or for-itself” (103). 
For Sartre it is nothingness, the absence of something expected or possible, 
which allows for human consciousness. To know that you could own a house, or 
speak French, or be married tomorrow, is to understand that those things are absent 
today. Nothingness projects a possibility that is not realised. But in order to be always 
conscious, an individual must maintain a perpetual sense of longing for that which 
they are not; in order to sustain the nothingness that confers consciousness an 
individual must be able to perceive a space between what they have and what they 
desire for the future – the distinction between being-for-themselves and beings-in-
themselves: “Nothingness is always an elsewhere. It is the obligation for the for-itself 
never to exist except in the form of elsewhere in relation to itself, to exist as a being 
which perpetually effects in itself a weakness of being” (102). 
The human anguish and angst popularly regarded as the defining 
characteristic of French existentialism stems from the friction between what Sartre 
saw as the conflicting desire that resulted from his metaphysical understanding of 
consciousness – the desire to be both a being-for-itself and a being-in-itself. In Robert 
Solomon’s paraphrasing,  “in his search to escape frustration and nothingness in 
general, man seeks to be in-itself, complete and determined so that his future is not an 
open question…yet man also wishes to remain free, to continue to hope for the 
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future” (Solomon 269). Any attempts to resolve anguish by entirely accepting a 
determined future or stasis, by committing either literal or (Camus’ term) 
“philosophical suicide” (Camus 28) are what Sartre would term “bad faith” (Solomon 
271). 
The insistence on ‘nothingness’ figures instability and indeterminacy as the 
necessary characteristics of consciousness and agency; this is a position markedly 
distinct from the insistence made by Marxist critics that political agency depends on 
the stable acquisition of an external ‘consciousness’. Nevertheless existentialism 
acknowledges, in angst and absurdity, that the maintenance of indeterminacy is both 
the necessary source of agency and the cause of a subjective anxiety. Such a 
subjective anxiety is construed as necessary but it exists in competition with the 
subjective desire for satisfaction. In Cheever’s fiction, the desire to replace one 
collapsed order with another can be read in term of Sartre’s conception of desire: 
order and stasis are at once longed for and resisted. Camus’s interest in the apparent 
conflict between absurdity and literature arises because of the ordering performed 
both in the act of attempting to ‘tell a meaningful story’ (with a beginning, a middle 
and – perhaps most significantly – an end) and in the audience’s will to find the right 
‘meaning’ as they interpret the fiction.     
 In the manner of telling stories or in narrating history any failure in logic, 
causality, or objective valuation might affect the historian or story-teller. They might 
seek to reaffirm legitimacy and stability by manufacturing other sources of 
verifiability. When the emerging school of American pragmatist philosophy began to 
assert the limitations of historical study the American historian Henry Adams 
 35 
 
confronted precisely this problem. In writing The  History of the United States of 
America During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison Adams 
sought to establish causal trends and threads that could adequately serve to explain 
the past, but Patrick Diggins notes that Adams eventually came to realise the 
impossibility of the coherence he sought (70). In response, Adams attempted to apply 
the laws of physics to history in order to find a set of constants that could be applied 
to politics and societal progression in order to better understand the causality and 
process of time as it unfolded: “It is commonly assumed,” writes Diggins, “that 
Adams went off the deep end when he turned to the second law of thermodynamics to 
chart the dissipation of energy and the emerging spectre of entropy.” (Diggins 36). 
While his actions seem desperate, even comical, Adam’s motivation is more 
understandable: he wanted to assert that history could correspond to the kinds of 
truths and knowledge being offered by scientific investigations into the material 
universe.  
Cheever’s “The Geometry of Love” (Stories 594-602) explores a similar 
sentiment on a smaller scale. After learning that his wife has taken a “phantom lover” 
(596) the story’s central character, Charlie Mallory, begins to apply Euclidian 
geometry to help stabilise his relationship to the world. His wife’s lover is a phantom 
in the sense that although she dresses up and takes herself out to restaurants and 
matinees, Charlie believes that she merely engages in behaviours that might give her 
an air of mystery or suggest she might have taken a lover (596). Unhappy, Charlie 
speculates that “if he could make a geometric analysis of his problems, mightn’t he 
solve them, or at least create an atmosphere of solution?” (595). He begins to draw 
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triangles, with lines representing his wife and children, and in calculating the angles 
between them he feels “much less bewildered, happier, more hopeful and 
magnanimous” (596). Mallory’s need for geometry starts to correlate with 
experiences of order and disorder in his life. When he and the family holiday in Italy 
Mallory needs “no Euclid for ten days” (599) whereas when he visits a friend on a 
business trip and is confronted with scenes of domestic difficulty he thinks “Oh 
Euclid, be with me now” (599). He takes out his slide rule on the ride home in the 
hopes of using “the relation between the volume of a cone and that of its 
circumscribed prism” (599) to put his friends’ behaviours into “linear terms” (599). 
But like the progress of Ned in “The Swimmer”, Charlie’s efforts are 
undermined by the logical failures of the system he designs. In calculating a theorem 
for the relation between himself and the landscape of Gary, Indiana (600) Charlie 
suddenly loses perspective: “He went back to his bedroom, a lonely and a frightened 
man. He buried his face in his hands, and, when he raised it, he could clearly see the 
lights of the grade crossings and the little towns, but he had never applied his 
geometry to these” (601). Charlie’s geometry becomes an outrageous and hyperbolic 
analogy for all attempts to maintain order in the face of chaos. Eventually he turns to 
larger and more ambitious equations. Ill in hospital, and following a visit from his 
wife Mathilda, he works out “a simple geometrical analogy between his love for 
Mathilda and his fear of death” (602). Finally, confronting the image of himself in the 
mirror, Charlie uses geometry for a last time:  
 
He tried to equate the veracity of his appetite, the boundlessness of his hopes, and the frailty 
of his carcass. He reasoned carefully. He knew that a miscalculation, such as he had made for 
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Gary, would end those events that had begun when Euclid’s Dry Cleaning and Dyeing truck 
had passed under his window. Mathilda went from the hospital to a restaurant and then a 
movie, and it was the cleaning woman who told her, when she got home, that he had passed 
away. (602) 
  
 The final paragraph recalls, in the mention of the laundry van, the randomness 
of Charlie’s decision to employ the Euclid. The combination of the abstract nouns of 
“hope” and “love” in his calculations, his desire to turn his calculations on himself (a 
practice he earlier acknowledges as “most prone to miscalculations (596)) and the 
“boundlessness” and “veracity” exhaust the capacities of Charlie’s mathematics. 
Finally the story uncharacteristically distances its perspective from Charlie’s and the 
revelation that he is dead is delivered via the story of his wife spending the day with 
her “phantom lover” and learning the news of her husband’s death (602). 
On Charlie’s understanding he dies due to a miscalculation. What is not clear, 
for the reader, is whether it is by coincidence that his death follows his mathematical 
error or whether his geometric system becomes a form of self-fulfilling prophecy – a 
system he so whole-heartedly embraces that the level of its illusion actually begins to 
limit his existence, and assume a kind of factic inevitability. Either way, the collapse 
of his math resonates as an inability to encompass or overcome that which cannot be 
logically assessed. Earlier in the story the close third person narrator notes of Charlie 
that “Geometry served him beautifully for the metaphysics of understood pain” (597) 
– a sentence that makes little sense. What are the metaphysics of pain? In what sense 
is this pain ‘understood’? The narrator, like Charlie, begins to employ the kind of 
language that, although compliant with certain laws (the rules of grammar) and 
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sentimentally, aesthetically pleasing, has no specific control over what it computes, 
considers or presents; “understood pain” is markedly imprecise, conferring an 
ambiguous sense of dissatisfaction, but never specifying who owns the 
‘understanding’, and who shares in it.  
And yet it is clear that the reliance Charlie forms on his Euclid is one based 
on his faith and understanding of his own system. Although “the metaphysics of 
understood pain” seems an imprecise term it clearly functions within Charlie’s 
understanding of his logic. In fact, he contemplates publishing a book entitled 
Euclidean Emotion: The Geometry of Sentiment so as to share his solutions with 
others. While Charlie employs Euclidean terms he re-deploys the significations of 
those terms so that the correspondence of the words, though altered, is not entirely 
made meaningless or incommunicable. Geometric terms, as with words, become the 
signs employed by Charlie to negotiate objects’ (abstract or otherwise) significations.  
The absurdity of Charlie’s usage does not reside in the use of the terms themselves, 
or his redeployment of them, but in the assumption that they might compute in order 
to reveal some truth, or manage their ‘real-world’ referents. Read as an allegory of 
language-use or the act of narration, Charlie’s Euclidean endeavour reveals language 
to be just as spurious in its failure to compute or govern reality – and also, in 
sympathy with Charlie’s convictions, an order which might be understood as ‘serving 
beautifully’ in curbing metaphysical, existential angst or understood pain.   
Camus hazarded that literature is a field in which the desire to explain always 
competes with the existential resistance to illusions (99). As Charlie assumes the 
language of mathematics he exposes its dependence on a self-generated logic, a logic 
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that might serve the subject who applies it, but is an illusion that fails to add up to any 
specifically objective truths. The final paragraph marks a subtle shift in narration. In 
relinquishing the close third person voice the story has utilised throughout, the final 
sentence suggests that the narrator cannot follow Charlie beyond death; the capacity 
to narrate only extends to a certain limit and no further and language, like geometry, 
is revealed to have its own limit for referential capacity. Charlie’s behaviour is absurd 
in that the reader can clearly follow how his mathematical logic is not essentially 
grounded in any objectively verifiable truths; his equations don’t ‘add up’ to anything 
except in a purely subjective sense.  
If the reader grasps that Charlie’s use of math mirrors the use of other orders, 
such as language, the story allows for a potential level of absurdity. In pushing this 
reading to its most extreme limits it can even be argued that the whole process of 
reading the story, and any willingness to either sympathise with or laugh at Charlie’s 
use of Euclid, is in itself an exercise in the “metaphysics of understood pain”. It is 
possible to position the “understood” of this sentence as belonging to an implied 
reader. The reader who has a sense of the pain referred to engages in a moment of 
inter-subjective association with John Cheever’s system of language. The placement 
of this sensation even into the most arbitrary and non-specific linguistic terms serves 
to communicate while simultaneously this communication does nothing, it computes 
nothing, it offers no objectively sustainable evaluations or truths, it makes no claim to 
the superiority or authenticity of its terms. This approach to texts will re-emerge in 
my reading of Richard Ford’s work, where I argue that the desire for objective value 
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is replaced by an emphasis on the importance of inter-subjectivity and where 
communicative capacity assumes a significant potential. 
As in many of Cheever’s stories the impetus for drama in this story is created 
by a form of domestic distress. In “The Geometry of Love” Charlie’s confidence in 
his position as husband falters as he learns of his wife’s phantom lover; in “The 
Chimera” (Stories 473-481) the narrator creates an imaginary woman to relieve the 
dissatisfaction of his marriage; in “The Housebreaker of Shady Hill” (253-269) 
Johnny Hake burgles his neighbours’ houses because he can no longer provide 
financially for his family; in “The Country Husband” (325-346)  Francis falls 
helplessly in love with the babysitter, and then curbs his desperate love by taking up 
woodwork, and in “The Swimmer” Ned is gradually revealed to have lost his family 
and financial security. In each of these stories, in response to a lapse in their ability to 
conform to the suburban order that defines their roles as husband or father the 
characters respond by attempting to relocate themselves in the system; they attempt 
to re-establish their positions and restore a reassuring sense of themselves as 
contingently significant. Often the absurdity of their responses is comic but also 
reveals forms of desperation and comments on the arbitrary nature of evaluative 
models. The characters’ behaviours can be read as absurd because they refuse to 
accept their subject-positions as fundamentally tenuous relations to a system already 
demonstrated to be unstable and uncertain. 
In “The Geometry of Love”, “The Swimmer” and “The Chimera” the new 
orders the central characters create for themselves (the Euclid, the imaginary Lucinda 
River, and the imaginary mistress) eventually escape the control of the central 
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characters so that despite the fact that they are imagined measures, the characters still 
fail to achieve success against them. Some of Cheever’s characters die (as in “The 
Geometry of Love” or “Oh Youth and Beauty!”) or resolve to re-establish themselves 
in their suburban role (as in “The Country Husband” where Francis takes up 
therapeutic woodwork or “The Housebreaker of Shady Hill” where Johnny Hake 
returns what he has stolen). Sometimes as in “The Chimera” or “Goodbye My 
Brother” they choose to perpetuate illusions that function as coping mechanisms for a 
lingering dissatisfaction or doubt. They exhibit a sustained desire to station 
themselves in a system and attain what is inevitably made unavailable to them: stasis, 
or being-in-itself.  
The longing for and displacement of satisfaction and stability that underpins 
existentialist notions of angst and absurdity is primarily a derivative of the 
existentialist conception of consciousness. While in one sense, absurdity and angst 
are an essential aspect of existentialism, consciousness and self awareness are equally 
vital. Relinquishing the assumption that an objective, more ‘real’ or more ‘true’, or 
‘liberated’ level of understanding exists does not by implication necessitate a 
rejection (as Lukács might argue) of agency. However this relinquishment does 
foreground the issue of subjectivity as a seemingly inevitable restraint on human 
agency, and offer resultant anxieties about precisely how to conceptualise freedom of 
consciousness. The existentialist insistence on subjective self-awareness (rather than 
objectivity) has connections to questions of agency, interpellation, the supposed 
instability of the post-modern subject, and the progression of theories of discourse 
through to post-structuralism. 
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The passage from existentialism to post-structuralism and the adaptation of 
existentialist ideas into the field of literary and cultural theory can be traced through 
Judith Butler’s work. For Butler the act of subscribing to a particular determinism or 
of embodying a particular and fixed social essence (specifically, in her example, 
gender) is in many ways reliant on the language used to structure and contextualise 
that role. Existentialism’s insistence on resisting determinism (or resisting the drive 
to become a being-in-itself) formed a critical position from which Butler worked 
toward her post-structural theory of performativity.  But criticisms of Butler’s work 
have centred on the supposed limitations of agency offered by her theoretical model 
(Benhabib 20; Magnus 81; Vasterling 17) and the question of agency continues, in 
her field, to drive the formulation of arguments about identity politics. Most 
importantly, Butler’s attempt to reject the notion of an authentic pre-determined self 
(a self which can somehow be attained but which exists outside of culture and 
discourse) has led to some of the most problematic interpretations and implications of 
her work: while some Marxist critics insist that agency depends on escaping the false 
materiality of capitalist culture and establishing the authentic, Butler seeks to affirm 
individual agency from within the rejection of a pre-discursive and authentic ‘I’. 
 In 1986 Butler published an essay in Yale French Studies that focussed on 
Simone de Beauvoir’s statement “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman”1 
(“Sex and Gender” 35) and began to examine the way Beauvoir severs the factic 
limitations of biological sex from the culturally negotiable category of gender. 
Butler’s essay turns to the work of Sartre in order to consider Beauvoir’s use of the 
word “become” (36). Butler questions Beauvoir’s verb usage in terms of agency; if 
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gender is constructed independently of biological sex, Beauvoir might be considered 
to offer a controversial position in which gender is voluntarily selected by a 
“choosing agent prior to its chosen gender” (37).  This contradicts any assertion that 
conceives of gender as “passively determined, constructed by a personified system of 
patriarchy or phallogocentric language which precedes and determines the subject 
itself” (36). In Beauvoir’s work Butler meets an impasse when confronted by the 
question of subject-formation and the challenge of agency; how can Butler offer 
Beauvoir’s severing of sex from gender while continuing to disavow the existence of 
a pre-discursive subject and continuing to emphasise the power of normalised and 
discursive gendered roles in the construction of subjects?    
In Epistemology of the Closet Eve Sedgwick (who widely employs and 
expands on Butler’s theory of performativity) interrogates the implications of the 
sex/gender binary by arguing that some feminist theory seems to rely on the 
assumption that “the more fully gender inequality can be shown to inhere in human 
culture rather than in biological nature, the more amenable it must be to alteration and 
form” (41). The problem with this assumption, argues Sedgwick, is that it assumes 
that it would be easier to alter the norms if gender is “only” cultural (41) – an 
optimistic assumption given the stringency and pervasiveness of certain cultural 
imperatives. What Sedgwick acknowledges is that by conceding the facticity of 
biological sex, we are not by implication free to assume that cultured gender is 
voluntary. In Gender Trouble Butler also argues that “on some accounts, the notion 
that gender is constructed suggests a certain determinism of gender meanings… 
bodies are understood as passive recipients of an inexorable cultural law…in such a 
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case, not biology, but culture, becomes destiny” (12). The supposed cultural destiny 
of gender is what Butler is interested in untangling, but she is insistent that 
challenging such a destiny is not dependant on positing an ‘escape from culture’, an 
‘outside’ or an ‘authentic’ and ‘pre-discursive’ self. 
 In her early essay on Beauvoir, Butler attempts to read her work as denying 
the possibility of a pre-discursive self, arguing that Beauvoir took Sartre at his “non-
Cartesian best” (38) and that in The Second Sex Beauvoir sought to collapse the 
oppositional relationship between “choice and acculturation” and present gendering 
the self as a choice only made among variable options within a given set of available 
cultural norms. In this reading of Beauvoir Butler begins to argue that there is no 
ideal person who exists independently of culture, but neither is culture a set structure 
under which the subject is a passive and disempowered recipient of a static identity. 
She makes the assertion, later in the essay, that the work of Monique Wittig and 
Michel Foucault offer a “radicalisation” of Beauvoir’s views (46). In her subsequent 
work Butler would go on to pursue the post-structuralist approaches of thinkers such 
as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida and to reject many of her earlier existentialist 
sources.  By the publication of Gender Trouble she had clarified her position on the 
subject: “Despite my previous efforts to argue the contrary, it appears that Beauvoir 
maintains the mind/body [essence/appearance] dualism, even as she proposes a 
synthesis of those terms. The preservation of that very distinction can be read as 
symptomatic of the very phallogocentrism that Beauvoir underestimates.” (17).  
Recently Alan Schrift has reconsidered the debt owed by Butler to 
existentialism and asserts that Butler misread Sartre’s conception of the self as 
 45 
 
allowing for a “doer behind the deed”. Schrift argues that Sartre’s position that 
people construct their identity within the given limits of facticity “is precisely the 
position with which Bodies That Matter begins, as Butler tries to avoid the pitfalls of 
either a humanistic voluntarism or a deterministic constructionism. In a sense, 
avoiding either of these alternatives is what motivated her move from a Foucauldian 
account of discursive practice, to a Derridean account of iterabilty” (20). Schrift’s 
argument is that Butler need not have abandoned existentialism in her attempt to 
resolve the issue of agency; neither Sartre nor Butler are ever able to “account for” 
the “who” and “why” that motivate individual choices on how to respond to cultural 
imperatives (19) because neither of them posit a self that exists outside or apart from 
lived experience.2  
In Being and Nothingness Sartre begins with a dismissal of “dualisms that 
have embarrassed philosophy” (1) – for example the dualism central to a discussion 
of subjectivity: the dualism of appearance and essence. Appearance might be likened 
to the self figured and interpreted through inauthentic society, while essence is 
considered the true and authentic self. He argues that in eliminating any belief in the 
“being-behind-the-appearance… appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is no 
longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the essence of it” (2). This is partly 
how Butler was able to interpret Beauvoir as advocating a perpetual kind of 
appearance which is essence: “Lived or experienced sex is already gendered. We 
become our genders, but we become them from a place which cannot be found and 
which, strictly speaking, cannot be said to exist” (39). Butler sees the body as 
perpetually involved in expression as gender so there is no ‘original’ quality of 
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‘biological’ sex which can be said to predetermine the cultural performance of gender. 
There is in this sense only the existence of an ever-changing, culturally gendered 
body as dependant on a series of available gender roles and potential significations 
which are offered within a framework established in relation to assumptions about 
biological gender. “The Body” writes Butler “is an occasion for meaning, a constant 
and significant absence which is only known through its significations” (46). In 
Cheever’s fiction the implications of Butler’s rejection of an authentic self are traced 
in my reading of “Goodbye My Brother”, a story that pays considerable attention to 
identification and to the potential privileges and limitations of prioritising authentic 
forms of social and historical identification over the supposedly inauthentic.  
Gender Trouble is the work in which Butler most clearly elaborates the theory 
that has its roots in her early essay on Sartre and Beauvoir. In Gender Trouble Butler 
writes: “my argument is that there need not be a “doer behind the deed,” but that the 
“doer” is variably constructed in and through the deed” (143). Butler then explicitly 
notes that this is “not a return to an existentialist theory of the self as constituted 
through its acts, for the existential theory maintains a pre-discursive structure for both 
the self and its acts” (142). What Butler found in the work of Jaques Derrida was the 
capacity to argue for the reliance of gendered identity on culture and context rather 
than individual choice and will. In this sense Butler suggests that what individuals 
‘mean’ or communicate with their bodies relies not on the reality of their physicality 
but on their capability to perform, reiterate, and signify as gendered within a 
discourse that uses comparative and contextualised terms of reference: 
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According to the understanding of identification as an enacted fantasy or incorporation, 
however, it is clear that coherence is desired, wished for, idealised, and that his idealization is 
an effect of a corporeal signification. In other words, acts, gestures, and desire produce the 
effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body, through 
the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organising principle of 
identity as a cause. Such acts are perfomative in the sense that the essence or identity that they 
otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal 
signs and other discursive means. (173) 
 
In this passage the convergence of Butler’s existentialist beginnings and her 
subsequent use of theories of discourse is clear: she begins with the assertion of a 
desire for cohesive identity, and an understanding of that cohesion as imagined, and 
responds to the established issue of subjective identification with a Derridan 
discussion of signification and performativity.  
In reading suburban fiction through Butler’s lens suburban subjectivity 
assumes a level of inevitability while performativity and the renegotiation of subject 
roles is figured as an element of agency. The desire to be made stable reflects an 
early existential sense that subjectivity is the stage of both agency and angst. In 
fictions by both Ford and Cheever the desires Butler speaks of form an essential 
aspect of the tension and conflict I discuss as pertinent to both writers’ fictional 
portrayals of suburban existence. But Butler’s formulations are also closely tied to the 
post-structuralist perspectives on language that further aid in my analysis of the 
narrative styles of both Cheever and Ford. The suburbs are, in these stories, 
constructed entirely through language, and the relations between characters are 
created through dialogue. The instability of language assumes a vital significance in 
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Ford’s work, where the indeterminacy of language, self-identity, and the structure of 
the suburb mirror one another. But even in Cheever’s work some of his more 
imprecise terms, his lack of specificity (particularly with abstract nouns) and the 
ambivalence of some of his phrases form a noticeable stylistic feature.  
In On Deconstruction Jonathan Culler describes how Derrida’s work builds 
on and challenges the work of J.L. Austin. “Austin,” writes Culler, “refuses to 
explain meaning in terms of a state of mind and proposes, rather, an analysis of the 
conventions of discourse” (115). In this sense meaning is seen to reside not in the 
state of mind of an individual, but in how an utterance signifies within a given 
discourse. Derrida goes on to argue that the success of conveying meaning is 
dependant not merely on context, but on the ability of an utterance to conform with 
standards or to be “recognisable as the repetition of a conventional procedure” 
(Culler 119). The potential emptiness of the phrase “the metaphysics of understood 
pain” (597) from “The Geometry of Love” provides one example of communicative 
capacity being contingent on a shared or assumed discourse. The factor that makes a 
given instance of language able to communicate something is not the intention 
motivating its utterance or its relation to the referent (a relation which cannot be 
fixed), but rather, its iterability – its ability to function within a discourse, and to go 
on functioning as it repeated and reiterated. The principle underpinning the work of 
both Austin and Derrida is that “illocutionary force is determined by context rather 
than by intention” (Culler 123); in this sense signs act to communicate by relating not 
directly to their referents, but by relating to other signs within a chain of grammar –  
within a functioning discourse. 
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 The step Derrida takes in furthering this proposition is his argument that it is 
impossible to entirely govern context: “meaning is context bound, but context is 
boundless” (Culler 123). Accordingly, grounding the context of a given utterance is 
impossible, and any attempt to fix meaning by specifying a ‘true’ definition of a 
signifier will always end in the perpetual chasing of the signified through various 
unfolding contexts which in turn will lead to an eternal attempt to contextualise 
context (Culler 96). Consider the idea of a given word immediately correlating to the 
object it describes; it would be difficult for meaning to be conveyed unless that 
word’s signification relied on a series of previously acknowledged given attributes 
for the term, rather than on the specific characteristics of the object at hand. The term 
cannot be fixed to include at once all of the possible versions of the object that might 
exist in the world without artificially suppressing possible differences. Thus 
according to Derrida it would be impossible to fix the meaning of a single sign within 
a discourse, given that context is always changing, never stable. 
 For Butler, the body can never occupy a static place of correspondence to a 
normal or natural ‘meaning’ of gender; the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ can never apply 
to every example of a gendered or sexed individual without suppressing their 
differences.  The Judith Butler of Gender Trouble concludes that “the ‘real’ and the 
‘sexually factic’ are phantasmic constructions – illusions of substance – that bodies 
are compelled to approximate but never can” (186). This compulsion to approximate 
is again the result of a desire to affirm a static identity. She goes on to ask “Does this 
offer the possibility for a repetition that is not fully constrained by the injunction to 
reconsolidate naturalized identities? Just as bodily surfaces are enacted as the natural, 
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so these surfaces can become the site of a dissonant and denaturalised performance 
that reveals the performative status of the natural itself” (186).  Every instance in 
which an individual fails to correspond to the stereotypical assumption of what 
‘male’ or ‘female’ designates, is also a demonstration of the intangibility of the ‘real’ 
or authentic male or female gender. A consideration of gender which situates it as a 
performance not reliant on or corresponding to a static notion of “male” or “female” 
challenges supposed truths and falsities, and challenges the binaries of 
authentic/unreal and original/copy. 
 If the question of gender becomes a question of how to resignify, undermine, 
interrogate and displace the notion of a true gender, Butler allows that the “question 
of agency is reformulated as a question of how signification and resignification 
work” (184). It is no longer a question of escaping or resisting the hail to the law 
from outside the law, but rather, of acknowledging that there is no opportunity to be 
outside of social imperatives. Even if there is an ontologically superior reality, there 
is no way to access that reality. There is only the perpetually limited access granted 
through the subjective lens of discourse. Agency in terms of the argument in Gender 
Trouble is located in Butler’s assertion that it is false to assume that “to be constituted 
by discourse is to be determined by discourse” and in her attempt to collapse the free-
will/determinism binary by asserting that “construction is not opposed to agency; it is 
the necessary scene of agency” (187). 
But (and Butler introduces this as a somewhat under-explored theme in 
Gender Trouble) how might a subject identify if they remain perpetually aware of the 
relative and impossible stability of their identity? The idea of identity assumes a kind 
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of absurdity in that identity would necessarily always be unstable; identity would be 
constantly acknowledged as manufactured rather as reflecting a grounded, authentic 
self. Here the anxieties of Cheever’s text, which I discuss in the levels of uncertainty 
and textual conflict that manifest in “Goodbye my Brother” and “The Worm in the 
Apple” are shown to be logical concomitants of the acknowledged limitations on both 
agency and the notion of essential ‘authentic’ and ‘outside’.  Early on in Gender 
Trouble Butler suggests that interrogating subjective identifications in terms of sex 
and sexual identity might support the inference that “gay is to straight not as copy is 
to original, but, rather, as copy is to copy. The parodic repetition of ‘the original’ … 
reveals the original to be nothing other than a parody of the idea of the natural and 
the original” (41).  Later, Butler briefly refers to Frederic Jameson’s essay 
“Postmodernism and Consumer Culture” as she reconsiders this concept of parody, 
and the assertion that repeated performances, caricatures, or copies of a gender role 
draw attention to the possibility that all such roles are equally a matter of 
performance rather than of ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ being. 
Frederic Jameson has argued that one of the distinctions between the 
modernist and the post-modern aesthetic lies in the issue of authenticity and can be 
seen in the distinction between modernist parody and post-modern pastiche (Jameson 
114).  Parody suggests there is always some “linguistic norm in contrast to which the 
styles of great modernists can be mocked” (114). When the idea of a linguistic norm, 
some pre-figured natural, authentic language is distrusted, there is no norm against 
which to compare and pastiche arises (114). Pastiche is mimicry that mimics past 
styles without comparison to any (now unavailable) ideals; it is parody “without the 
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satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists 
something normal compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic” (114).  
Today, Jameson argues, there is no longer an assertion of an authentic 
individual (115). For Jameson two positions arise in relation to this assertion – one is 
that individual, personal identity once existed (before the onset of capitalism and its 
apparently dehumanising forces) but that it has been gradually masked and obscured. 
The other, “the more radical of the two, what one might call the post-structuralist 
position…adds: not only is the bourgeois individual subject a thing of the past; it 
never really existed in the first place” (115).  In an effort to re-capture the notion of 
the personal, static individual Jameson suggests that today cultural approaches to 
existence locate that stasis in the past. Jameson identifies pastiche in nostalgic films 
in which the past is reified as a place of stability; John Cheever’s nostalgic impulses 
can be read as aligned with Jameson’s formulation of just such a desire. 
Baudrillard somewhat similarly sees nostalgia as the cultural act which masks 
absence or emptiness, the failure of the authentic, the real or the truth (12). For 
Baudrillard, “when the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full 
meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-
hand truth, objectivity and authenticity…there is a panic-stricken production of the 
real and the referential” (12). In this desire for the stability of a known ‘authentic’ or 
true place of identity the re-emergence of an existential approach might be seen. The 
desire to become a “being-in-itself,” to locate oneself in a particular and stable role 
can be seen in this looking back – in the nostalgic desire for an imagined past which 
nevertheless, and somewhat paradoxically or absurdly arises out of the 
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acknowledgement that being is contingent on the way it is performed, signified or 
communicated, rather than on some objective and attainable ‘real’ existence. 
“If there is no pre-existing identity by which an act or attribute might be 
measured; there would be no true or false” (Gender Trouble 180) writes Butler, “the 
postulation of a true gender identity would be revealed as a regulatory fiction” (180).  
In Eros the Bittersweet Ann Carson writes:  
 
We think by projecting sameness upon difference, by drawing things together in a relation or 
idea while at the same time maintaining the distinction between them…In any act of thinking 
the mind must reach across this distinction between the known and unknown, linking one to 
another but also keeping visible their difference. It is an erotic space…The same subterfuge 
which we have called an “erotic ruse” in novels and poems now appears to constitute the very 
structure of human thinking. Where the mind reaches out to know, the space of desire opens 
and a necessary fiction transpires. (171) 
 
Here the crucial terms “necessary” and “fiction” bridge Carson’s spatially 
rendered gap between the known and unknown, and – in conceding the contemporary 
(post-structuralist) approach to knowledge as one that sees knowledge as limited, 
unverifiable, contingent – she renders this gap in terms of the imagined rather than 
the real or verifiable – and locates desire in this imagining. 
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iii. Pornographic Suburb 
 
Just as Butler argues that there is no authentic gender outside of its iteration, 
so Cheever’s texts refuse the possibility that his suburban characters might escape to 
some authentic ‘outside’ of suburbia. And just as Butler began to understand 
identification as an ever-changing engagement with discursive practice, Cheever 
depicts individuals who attempt to establish and function within new or imagined 
discourses. Finally, Butler’s intimation (followed by the work of Baudrillard and 
Jameson) that the displacement of identity might lead to a desire for stasis and a 
nostalgic longing for the simplicity of static selves is exhibited in the nostalgic tone 
of John Cheever’s work. It is a tone Elizabeth Hardwick has identified as peculiar to 
Cheever for its conflicting impulses: “The nostalgia is curiously, and with great 
originality, combined with a contemporary and rootless compulsion to destroy, even 
to crash by repetition, the essence of nostalgia…”(102). In Hardwick’s formulation 
Cheever’s nostalgia bears an inherent futility. Nostalgia has itself, without this 
“crashing by repetition”, a negative implication in that it might signify a loss or even 
a past that cannot be restored. Perhaps what Hardwick terms the “essence of 
nostalgia”, that thing Cheever supposedly destroys, is the notion that anything other 
than longing ever existed. On this understanding nostalgia is the sentiment of 
impossible desire, rather than loss. Whatever is lost to the past, as Jameson might say, 
never existed in the first place.  
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If nostalgia gestures to the essentially unattainable then Cheever’s repetitions 
draw attention to its aimlessness, its lack of sense, its absurdity. The repetition evokes 
Butler’s suggestion in Gender Trouble that “the parodic repetition of “the 
original” …reveals the original to be nothing other than a parody of the idea of the 
natural and the original” (41). In this sense there can be no resurrected originals, only 
copies, and the futile desire to find originals that never existed. Through repetitions of 
longing for the lost and unattainable Cheever’s nostalgic tone is, as Hardwick puts it, 
combined “with a contemporary and rootless compulsion to destroy” (102) and sets 
about undoing the notion that whatever his characters mourn could ever be retrieved. 
Cheever’s complex treatment of the nostalgic impulse is revealed in one of his 
earliest published stories: “Goodbye My Brother” (Stories 3-21). 
The story focuses primarily on two brothers: the narrator and Lawrence. 
Lawrence, an estranged brother, returns after a four year absence to holiday with the 
family at the coastal family home, Laud’s Head, in which each of the members of the 
family have equity.  It is eventually revealed that Lawrence intends to sell his share in 
the house and “say goodbye” to the family (18). The conflict between Lawrence and 
the narrator centres on the perspectives they take on life, where Lawrence is generally 
pessimistic, and the narrator is optimistic. This conflict escalates until the brothers get 
into a fight on the beach and the narrator hits Lawrence over the back of the head 
with a root (19). Although Lawrence is not killed the narrator, on seeing the blood 
rush from his brother’s head, does momentarily wish Lawrence were dead (19).  
In a biographical reading Scott Donaldson analyses the story as one of 
Cheever’s treatments of his own fratricidal impulses toward his older brother Fred 
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(Biography 138). Donaldson argues that the narrator is the person who (perhaps 
unreliably) attributes all of the gloominess to Lawrence (139). Donaldson also notes 
that the character Lawrence was written into the story after a number of earlier drafts 
in which there was no brother (140). Alongside the fratricidal impulse Donaldson 
thus sees the story as one in which the rebuke against pessimism is directed “not only 
at a second party, but at a portion of himself [the narrator] – and the narrator, almost 
surely, spoke of the author” (140).  
 Donaldson’s “almost certainly” is viable if read within the context of his 
much wider argument, in which Donaldson’s careful portrayal of Cheever’s personal 
life is what motivates his readings of Cheever’s texts. But outside of the biographical 
stance the tension Donaldson identifies between the pessimism of Lawrence’s 
character and the narrator’s desire to excise this negativity is apparent within the text. 
While the narrator likes the house at Laud’s Head, Lawrence identifies its faults. He 
reminds the narrator that the house’s shingles were sourced second-hand from nearby 
farms because their father, on building the house, wanted it to look “venerable” (9). 
The doors and window frames of the house have been intentionally scored and treated 
to look old (9). “Imagine spending thousands of dollars to make a sound house look 
wrecked” (9) says Lawrence. In an attempt to make the house feel more authentic the 
family has intentionally re-created those things that supposedly lend it venerability:  
old shingles, doors and window frames are added to the house. But in their re-
contextualised state these items signify (at least for Lawrence) a lack of authenticity. 
They represent the desperate desire to make the house authentic, inevitably testifying 
to what it lacks, rather than what it is.  
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 The narrator recalls: 
 
I had heard [Lawrence] say, years ago, that we and our friends and our part of the nation, 
finding ourselves unable to cope with the problems of the present, had, like a wretched adult, 
turned back to what we supposed was a happier and a simpler time, and that our taste for 
reconstruction and candlelight was a measure of this irremediable failure. (9)   
 
 Later the family in the story attend a costume party at the local boat club. The 
theme is “come as you wish you were” (14). The narrator dresses in his old football 
uniform and his wife wears her wedding dress (14). When they arrive at the dance 
they find that many of the other couples have done exactly the same thing and there 
are “ten brides on the floor” (15).  The traditional, gendered, Americana roles 
communally recognised as images of success are presented as nostalgic identity-roles 
from the past. “The coincidence,” notes the narrator, “this funny coincidence, kept 
everybody laughing, and made this one of the most lighthearted parties we’d ever 
attended” (15). 
  But the narrator is annoyed that Lawrence and his wife fail to participate. 
Lawrence’s wife wears a red dress and is pronounced to be “all wrong” (16) and “not 
in the spirit of the party at all” (16) and Lawrence refuses to wear a costume. The 
final paragraph in the story sounds a note of resignation on the part of the narrator: 
“But what can you do with a man like that? What can you do? How can you dissuade 
his eye in a crowd from seeking out the cheek with the acne, the infirm hand; how 
can you teach him to respond to the inestimable greatness of the race, the harsh 
surface beauty of life; how can you put his finger on the obdurate truths before which 
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fear and horror are powerless? (21). The excess and hyperbole of the narrator’s 
phrasing in this final paragraph can be read multiply, as either a straight appreciation 
of the atmosphere and beauty of the world of the story (and a reprimand against 
Lawrence’s pessimistic resignation) or as a misplaced and wilful ignorance of life’s 
darker undercurrents. In one sense the narrator has already answered the question of 
‘what to do’ with a man like Lawrence in his earlier frustrated desire to see Lawrence 
dead.  
 Even in the atmosphere of the costume party it is Lawrence’s mere presence 
that casts a shadow over the narrator’s enjoyment of the scene. Lawrence only 
gestures at the party and says “Look at that…” (16). The narrator supplies 
Lawrence’s thoughts: “I knew that Lawrence was looking bleakly at our party as he 
had looked at the weather-beaten shingles of our house, as if he saw here an abuse 
and a distortion of time; as if in wanting to be brides and football players we exposed 
the fact that we had been unable to find other lights to go by and, destitute of faith 
and principal, had become foolish and sad” (16). In this sentiment Cheever’s 
narration foreshadows the critical terms by which Baudrillard would address 
nostalgia in 1983 when he wrote that “when the real is no longer what it used to be, 
nostalgia assumes its full meaning…there is a panic stricken production of the real 
and the referential” (12). While Lawrence (and to an extent Baudrillard) potentially 
share the same reservations about the impetus of nostalgia, the narrator appears to 
reject or deny concerns about failure or in-authenticity. For the narrator, the costume 
party is funny because so many people have reproduced a particular standard image. 
For Lawrence the repetition of that image seems a desperate state of conformity and 
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an attempt to re-create lost essences and identities. For the narrator the repetition 
exposes the commonalities amongst the crowd and the crowd understands the 
repetitions to expose their common fantasies and desires, rather than understanding 
the ideals as lost standards they attempt to conform to. In the narrator’s terms the 
repetitions are instances of connection, assurance, and agreement rather than 
moments of desperation.  
 The narrator’s desire to see Lawrence dead is in part a desire to remove the 
self-aware perspective from which the narrator’s perception of his situation 
acknowledges Lawrence’s criticisms. Lawrence is not killed. He survives in this story 
perhaps by necessity, as the distant but eternally accessible vessel of the narrator’s 
displaced dissatisfactions. The narrator’s capacity to critique his (and the crowd’s) 
actions functions only as long as he is able to attribute this perspective to Lawrence.  
The displaced dissatisfactions mark and undercut the enthusiasm of the language used 
in the final paragraph, enabling the reader to see the paragraph as one that envelops 
the perspectives of both brothers in a simultaneous voicing of their opposing 
standpoints. In one sense, the narrator is ridiculous and Lawrence’s criticism offer a 
fair analysis, while on the opposite understanding Lawrence’s criticisms cling to a 
particular notion of what is true and what is not, and in doing so, fail to register the 
striking and most enjoyable aspects of life.  
 The optimistic narrator, by contrast, praises these things, and the beauty of his 
wife and her sister taking a swim forms the story’s closing image: “I saw that they 
were naked, unshy, beautiful, and full of grace, and I watched them walk out of the 
sea” (21). While the narrator’s optimism persists, the story places this contentment in 
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competition with Lawrence’s critical scepticism and what is ultimately an ambiguous, 
equivocal paragraph characterised by self-contradictory statements like “the sea that 
morning was iridescent and dark” (21). The narrator’s elaborate convictions about the 
contradictorily “harsh surface beauty of life” (21) remain haunted by the continuing 
presence of Lawrence and the knowledge and perspective he has brought to the 
narrator’s telling of the story.  
 It could be argued that the story is not ambiguous, that it marks a clear 
disavowal of the narrator’s point of view and that the final paragraph is delivered 
entirely at the ironic expense of the self-deceiving narrator. But this reading ignores 
Cheever’s own appraisal (specifically in his Saturday Review interview) of nostalgia 
and his own dismissal of those who saw the suburban lifestyle as no more than a 
subject worthy of criticism and castigation.  In his preface to The Stories of John 
Cheever he assumes the same tone of nostalgic admiration as that seen in the closing 
of “Goodbye My Brother” and many of his other stories: 
 
These stories seem at times to be stories of a long lost world where the city of New York was 
still filled with a river light…when almost everyone wore a hat. Here is the last of that 
generation of chain smokers who woke the world in the morning with their coughing, who 
used to get stoned at cocktail parties and perform obsolete dance steps like “the Cleveland 
Chicken”…who were truly nostalgic for love and happiness…the constants that I look for in 
this sometimes dated paraphernalia are a love of light and a determination to trace some 
moral chain of being. (vii) 
 
 The preface, I have suggested, supports the argument that Cheever himself 
assumed a positive stance toward nostalgia, connecting it to a “light” and a “moral 
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chain of being” (vii) which he claimed as deliberate motivations for his work. And 
yet there remains within the preface itself – in Cheever’s use of the comically 
unromantic and unsophisticated ‘Cleveland Chicken’ and coughing chain smokers – a 
characteristic undercutting of the inflated and romantic images and language he 
employs. 
 The voice of the narrator of “Goodbye my Brother,” and Cheever’s own 
words, might recall the stance of that iconic figure of American fiction, Jay Gatsby, 
who insists: “Can’t repeat the past?”… “Why of course you can.” (Fitzgerald 88). In 
a review of Cheever’s most recent biography, John Updike writes about Cheever’s 
peculiar sadness, and of the way Cheever’s characters “move, in their fragile 
suburban simulacra of paradise, from one island of momentary happiness to the 
imperilled next” (3). He begins this paragraph with a quote from Cheever’s story 
“The Leaves, the Lion-fish and the Bear”: 
 
“How lonely and unnatural man is and how deep and well-concealed are his confusions”—no 
wonder Cheever’s fiction is slighted in academia while Fitzgerald’s collegiate romanticism is 
assigned. Cheever’s characters are adult, full of adult darkness, corruption, and confusion. 
They are desirous, conflicted, alone, adrift. They do not achieve the crystalline stoicism, the 
defiant willed courage, of Hemingway’s. (3) 
 
 Whether Fitzgerald’s texts are any more or less romantic than Cheever’s 
might be a matter for debate, yet it is interesting to note John Updike’s argument that 
what he perceives as an academic preference for Fitzgerald and Hemingway is the 
result of what he identifies in Cheever: an unrelenting refusal to ultimately embrace 
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the romanticised visions he aspires to, or a kind if incessant resignation to defeat and 
a partial decimation of, or distancing from, any surfacing romantic threads.   
 The multiply available interpretations of the final passage of “Goodbye my 
Brother” exemplify a common trait in Cheever’s work: his employment of an irony 
that fails to specifically posit a comparative norm or ‘truth’ in relation to what is 
being undercut. The irony undercuts some aspect of suburban life but never offers 
any deliberately and specifically superior alternative to it. The incident at the costume 
party in “Goodbye My Brother” forms a kind of parallel to this approach: the 
narrator’s discovery that everyone has chosen to come as a bride or football player 
might lead him to feel depressed about an obvious lack of individuality among the 
guests. The communally acknowledged notion of what people wish they were is so 
common that it suggests a lack of independent thought, as well as a reliance on 
broadly clichéd gendered stereotypes and a longing for the unattainable past – 
suggesting that the commonly idealised selves are hopelessly inauthentic and 
inaccessible. But the narrator’s response is to find the incident amusing and rather 
than taking it as any kind of serious critique of their culture, he chooses to laugh 
about it instead – aware, but amused rather than concerned by the situation’s possible 
implications.  
 Donaldson notes that originally the story “Goodbye My Brother” had only 
one brother, the narrator (140), and Lawrence’s character was only introduced 
subsequently. “The Worm in the Apple” (which appears in the middle of Cheever’s 
collection The Housebreaker of Shady Hill) can be read as an attempt to deliver the 
negativity of Lawrence’s approach to life from within the voice of the narrator. 
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Instead of narrating a confrontation between two brothers each of whom embodies a 
particular point of view, Cheever attempts, in this story, to manufacture the sensation 
of that divide within a single narrative voice – within the potential range of 
signification available in language itself. Instead of exporting the criticisms of the 
narrator out to another character, the story relies entirely on irony and interpretation 
to convey the tension between cynicism and satisfaction.  
“The Worm in the Apple” is a brief story about a couple who seem to be 
entirely satisfied. The real subject of this story is the narrator – a voice incessantly 
attempting to find the “worm” of discontent in the Crutchmans’ supposed façade: 
“Their house, for instance, on Hill Street with all those big glass windows? Who but 
someone suffering from a guilt complex would want so much light to pour into their 
room?” (Stories 285). The story’s tone is overtly, anxiously interrogative. The 
narrator poses questions and then attempts to answer them: “Why did they only have 
two children? Why not three or four? Was there perhaps some break down in their 
relationship after the birth of Tom?” (286).  
 A sense of irony arises from the discrepancy between the narrator’s 
understanding of the Crutchmans’ situation and a potential alternative interpretation 
on the part of the reader – an alternative allowed for specifically by the excesses of 
language and inference employed in the narration. The final line of the story reads 
“[The Crutchmans] got richer and richer and richer and lived happily, happily, 
happily, happily” (288). The excessiveness of the word “happily” in this closing line 
alerts the reader to a potential insincerity or frustration on the part of the narrator. In 
context the sign communicates something other than happiness. It might be read as 
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ironic in the sense that the narrator means, in saying that the Crutchmans are happy, 
that they are not, and that they are over-stating their happiness in order to mask a 
deeper discontent. But Scott Donaldson argues that the “Crutchmans are happy, and 
the irony of repetition is directed at the end…against those Shady Hill observers who 
will not credit the Crutchmans’ contentment” (Donaldson “Suburban Sequence”).  
The story, like “Goodbye My Brother” supports at least two opinions (Aubry 
76): one is that of the narrator who believes that the Crutchmans’ satisfaction is 
unwarranted or feigned, the other resides in the language itself, which by hyperbole, 
suggests that the narrator’s voice is in fact being parodied and undercut by Cheever, 
who here offers a response to the critics who constantly sought to find, in Cheever’s 
stories, a display of disdain for suburban conformity and content. Cheever’s irony 
allows him to assume and ventriloquise the voice of his own critics. In doing so he 
exhibits an ability to alter the significations of the words he utilises; in reshaping the 
relation between the signs he employs and what they signify he demonstrates a self-
aware acknowledgement of the criticism, and an ability to co-opt and redeploy the 
linguistic turns of the critics. Cheever further demonstrates that inasmuch as his 
critics argue that his voice fails to be critical enough of suburbia, their arguments fail, 
like the narrator of “The Worm in the Apple”, to conceive of their own illusions, 
subjectivities, and assumptions.  
It is not the fact that the Crutchmans have an amazing life that bothers the 
narrator of the story. They have their faults: their son fails a year at school (287), Mr 
Crutchman had a potentially traumatising experience during the war (285) and their 
daughter smokes and drinks (287). In fact it seems the narrator must be frustrated by 
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their approach to life. The narrator is not searching for real physical failures, but for a 
failure of enthusiasm – a worry, anxiety, or negative psychological response to their 
situation. The narrator of “The Worm in the Apple” retains a presumption about the 
Crutchmans that relies on a stereotypical suburban motif – an assumption that the 
Cruthchmans even desire to present themselves as entirely satisfied. The presumption 
centres on the binary division between the self-aware figure someplace outside of 
suburbia, and the unconscious automaton who subscribes entirely to the suburban 
way of life by both living in suburbia and by refusing any form of conscious self 
criticism. To be ‘inside suburbia’ is, for the narrator, to present a façade of 
contentment that can be stripped away to reveal the ‘reality’ behind suburbia.  
In this sense it is the narrator who perpetuates assumptions about suburbia. 
The narrator polices the ideal model of suburbia by asking how the Crutchmans do 
and do not conform to its supposed boundaries and standards. While what Cheever’s 
texts have always maintained is that the suburb is both fulfilling and unfulfilling – 
that it has, just as any other geographic space, a population that is satisfied in some 
ways and not in others – his critics  preserve the illusion of the suburb as a static, 
idealised place that, in its stasis, threatens consciousness. In a 1995 essay on hate 
speech and its performative qualities Judith Butler assesses the assertion made by 
Catherine Mackinnon that pornography “constructs the social reality of what woman 
is” (“Burning Acts” 221). Butler suggests that the use of “is” in this context might be 
debateable. She proposes the possibility that pornography “neither represents nor 
constitutes what woman are” (222). Instead it is possible that pornography rehearses 
the “unrealizability” of a certain idealised notion of gender relations (222). 
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“Pornography,” she writes, “is the text of gender’s unreality, the impossible norms by 
which it is compelled, and in the face of which it perpetually fails.” (223). In fact it is 
this very failure of pornographic relations to be constituted in reality that gives 
pornography its “phantasmic power” (223).  
Butler asserts that pornography is in itself dependant on its failure to 
correspond to the actual gender relations in social reality – its appeal is constituted by 
this very lack. Suburbia as Cheever’s early critics saw it did not constitute what 
suburban individuals were but rather, sustained a ‘pornographic’ ideal of the suburb 
as a place of perfection and eternal fulfilment – an ideal in turn criticised for the 
differences it necessarily suppressed in order to preserve this image. Butler’s 
countering of Mackinnon has a very specific and subtle effect 3 : by casting 
pornography as the unrealizable projection of gender, Butler in fact enables a 
potentially wider scope for agency than does Mackinnon. On Mackinnon’s reading a 
woman either does or does not choose to be constituted by the idealised pornographic 
figure; she either does or does not submit to the identity presented to her as the 
‘being’ of woman by the pornographic image she confronts; she either ‘is’ constituted 
by it, or she is not. Mackinnon thus begs for an alternative manner by which to 
conceive of what women ‘is’ by establishing some other model by which ‘woman’ is 
constituted as a gender role. Mackinnon’s perspective is limited because it feeds back 
into the same logical system she claims to be undoing. As long as Mackinnon 
continues to propose an ‘authentic’ woman who existed before or outside the role 
proposed by pornography she instigates a valorised gender role to which women must 
both aspire and comply. 
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On Butler’s reading the impossibility of attaining the phantasmal gender norm 
demonstrated by pornography undermines the notion of any gender to aspire to and 
entirely liberates the conception ‘being women’ from the models presented by 
pornography – or indeed by any alternative to the pornographic as might be posited 
by Mackinnon. “My call as it were,” notes Butler, “is for a feminist reading of 
pornography that resists the literalization of this imaginary scene, one which reads it 
instead for the incommensurabilities between gender norms and practices” (223). 
Here Butler demonstrates the logic of her theory of performativity and again locates 
gender in its practices, in how people live their gender rather than how they do or do 
not conform to an idealised ‘gender’ that is elsewhere. This in turn allows for a wider 
production of possible means of identification – it allows for a process of 
identification that is not limited by the either/or binary of either ‘being’ or ‘not being’ 
a certain role.  
 The binary assumed by Cheever’s critics as they approached his work was the 
‘being’ or ‘not being’ of suburban individuals. But Cheever’s work resists this binary 
and the conformity/non-conformity model is replaced by a refusal to engage with its 
simplicities. Cheever’s texts do not depict a resistance to interpellation by narrating 
the ‘escape’ or the ‘awakening’ of characters from their suburban roles (as previous 
critics might have it). There is no notion in Cheever’s work of an authentic self who 
resides outside the parameters of an indoctrinated suburban self, nor is there a perfect 
and contented suburban self who lacks a conscious or self-reflective character. In 
positing suburban discourse as a non-specific fantasy circulating around what ‘could 
be’ rather than what ‘is’ there might be a recognisable relation to Derrida’s notion of 
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infinitely impossible attempts to fix a signifier within a context: in as much as it is 
never possible to govern context and fix signification it is always impossible to 
specifically define the exact attributes of the suburban life or to realise the 
suppression of difference necessary to do so. This is comically exemplified in the 
joke about the suburban family with the statistical average of an impossible 2.5 
children – where the physical impossibility of having half a child unmasks the 
phantasmal and unrealisable quality of such a place of stasis.  
 Similarly this impossibility is comically put to use in Cheever’s “The Worm 
in the Apple”. The narrator’s frustration stems partly from his inability to place the 
Crutchmans into his model of either the perfect and content suburban family, or the 
angst ridden and dissatisfied individuals who attempt (but fail) to subscribe to an 
impossible suburban norm. As the Crutchmans evade simplistic construction, the 
supposedly external narrator becomes the victim of a desire for stasis. Pornography is 
erotic. It appeals to desires and provides imaginary ideals. To view the suburb as the 
place of the inauthentic, and outside of the suburb as the opposite, is to desire the 
simplicity offered by ideals. The appeal of such a binary has an overwhelming and 
recurrent lure in its simplicity, in its promise of satisfaction, of truth, of political 
legitimacy, of objectively verifiable solutions to human angst. It mirrors the 
existential longing to become a being-in-itself. Many textual analyses aim to close off, 
as much as possible, the multiplicities and the variances of a text’s interpretations; to 
hunt out, get at, unravel the text’s real meaning, the real author, the textual intent. 
Conversely to attempt to establish the failures of the text, to show where it does not 
meet expectations or where the author fails to present meaning, is to measure the text 
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against an ideal. Doing away with these ideals – rejecting the “lateralisation of the 
imaginary scene” (Butler 223) – requires an acceptance of ambiguity. To go on 
reading and participating in criticism even as ambiguity and indeterminacy are 
accepted, is to assume a potentially absurd practice. In the variously available 
interpretations of the ending of “Goodbye My Brother” or in the irony of “The Worm 
in the Apple” Cheever’s texts maintain certain ambiguities, while the suburb itself is 
presented as an indistinct place, neither entirely perfect, nor patently sinister and 
conformist. In fact the longing for suburban perfection manifests in a nostalgic turn to 
an impossible, avowedly imaginary past. This move at once acknowledges a desire 
for the simplicity of the ideal, and an insistence that the simplistic ideal is not being 
offered as available in the present. 
 John Cheever was himself an ambiguous man. Critic Daniel O’Hara has 
argued that Cheever spent much of his life constructing “an elaborate edifice” (208) 
called “John Cheever” and thereby engaging in “a process of fiction making as 
inventive as the creation of his many memorable characters and narrative personas” 
(208). O’Hara asserts that many of the passages from Cheever’s journals demonstrate 
Cheever’s continual awareness of his own identity, and O’Hara sees this as 
functioning partly to mask the alcoholism and bisexuality that Cheever struggled to 
keep apart from his public image (207-208).  
 
As Cheever’s journal entries testify and his stories and novels dramatise, this apparent 
freedom of self-fashioning cannot lead to personal or professional security…what it most 
often leads to in Cheever are self-destructive gestures of apocalyptic disillusionment, from a 
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throwing away of everything from one’s last identity to a final carnival of possible identities 
all of which are discarded ….(215) 
 
Other critics have noted Cheever’s constant and self-aware presentation of his own 
identity and his evasiveness – particularly regarding his family history. Elizabeth 
Hardwick notes that he would often refer to the arrival of the Cheever family to 
America “by way of the passage of Ezekial Cheever on the Arabella in 1630” (104) 
as if lending posterity to their name by intimating old, moneyed family roots.  
In a 1977 Newsweek Interview Cheever’s daughter (then editor at Newsweek) 
asked him: “Did you ever fall in love with another man? I mean, because of the 
homosexuality in Falconer, people are certainly going to ask you that?” (Bailey; 
Letters 326). Cheever’s response to the question was characteristically evasive, 
admitting at once his potential to fall in love with another man and denying his 
comments any level of seriousness. He joked that he had had many homosexual 
experiences, “all of them tremendously gratifying, and all between the ages of 9 and 
11” (Bailey; Letters 326). In Cheever’s collected letters, his son Benjamin Cheever 
remarks on the interview in his editorial comments: 
  
I still don’t quite understand what was going on here, but I think it would be wrong to judge it 
as dishonesty. Literally it was a lie, of course, but in some figurative sense it was true. He 
never considered himself to be a homosexual…it was a word he did not apply to himself, and 
words were frightfully important to him. (326) 
 
Inherent in Benjamin Cheever’s comment is the notion that his father evaded labels, 
choosing instead to operate in what Benjamin calls a “figurative” sense. The 
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distinction here between the literal and figurative functions like a distinction between 
‘reality’ and some ‘imagined’ identity. But underlying Benjamin Cheever’s comment 
is his awareness of his father’s rejection of the simplicity of terms – where although 
Cheever’s joke might be construed as a ‘masking’ of his real identity, it might also be 
considered to in fact embody the very narrative style Cheever so often employed 
himself; the language, the joke, the story inherent in his comment, constitute all of the 
present content of it and there is no absent ‘real’ lurking behind it which Cheever 
intended to mask as the truthful alternative.  
In a wider context O’Hara’s analysis of Cheever’s “mask-play” is used as an 
example, in his book Radical Parody: American Culture and Critical Agency after 
Foucault, of the limitations of contingency theory. For O’Hara contingency theorists 
“condemn themselves to an ever-changing spectacle of cultural conventions” (210). 
He defines contingency theory as: 
 
The  position claiming that since the advanced study of language and culture has finally 
disabused us of  the notion of universals such as humanity or nature as having anything but an 
imaginary or rhetorical existence, we now know for sure that there are no real unchanging 
essences at the basis of the world we see and act in. (209) 
  
O’Hara’s analysis of Cheever raises the spectre of a “carnival of possible 
identities” (215) all of which seem unstable and cannot be taken to offer any form of 
decisive agency. In doing so O’Hara reflects the pervasive desire to re-imagine a 
stable critical perspective, to re-build the binary of objectively true/subjectively 
uncertain. For critics such as Frederic Jameson and Jean Baudrillard it is an absence 
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of stability that gives rise to the nostalgic impulse earlier discussed as apparent in 
Cheever’s work, and for post-structuralists like Judith Butler, this so called 
“apocalyptic disillusionment,” this “throwing away of everything” (O’Hara 215) is 
the very locale of agency, and the necessary acknowledgement of the possibility that 
there are no alternatives to such mask play – that there is no ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ John 
Cheever to be discovered and resurrected as doer behind his deeds.  
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Chapter Two: Richard Ford 
 
i. Perpetual Becoming: The Evolution of Frank Bascombe 
 
“Athletes,” notes Frank Bascombe in The Sportswriter, “by and large, are 
people who are happy to let their actions speak for them, happy to be what they do” 
(59).  For Bascombe athletes are admirably able to shake off “existential dread” (60): 
 
In fact athletes at the height of their powers make literalness into a mystery all its own simply 
by becoming absorbed in what they are doing. Years of athletic training teach this; the 
necessity of relinquishing doubt and ambiguity and self enquiry in favour of a pleasant, self-
championing one dimensionality which has instant rewards in sports. (60)    
 
Frank describes how in his previous career as a fiction writer his failure to 
complete a novel was the result of his inability to establish the stable voice that might 
allow him to “merge into the oneness of the writer’s vision” (61). Frank admires 
athletes because they approach life in a way that guarantees more satisfaction and 
stability than his own vision allows. They are willing to define themselves, rejecting 
doubt in favour of stability and happiness (61). “You can even ruin everything with 
athletes” says Frank, “simply by speaking to them in your own voice, a voice 
possibly full of contingency and speculation” (60). 
The tension between the writer’s singularity of vision or the athlete’s one 
dimensional perspective on life, and Bascombe’s own possible “contingency and 
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speculation” of voice offers one example of a conflict that recurs throughout Richard 
Ford’s Sportswriter trilogy. Frank’s first-person narration and characterisation are 
framed by the resistant forces of permanence and indeterminacy. The resistance 
resonates throughout the novel’s treatment of time, space, history and national 
identity.  Establishing where and to what extent the kind of self-assurance of the 
athlete might translate into a form of self assurance or even happiness for Frank 
Bascombe, is one of Ford’s stated interests. In a New York Times Magazine profile 
piece by Bruce Weber (a former student of Ford) Weber describes part of the origin 
of Ford’s The Sportswriter: “It was Kristina who suggested that he write a book about 
a happy man. ‘Jesus, I hadn't done that up to then,’ he says. ‘And I thought, “What 
would a man do if he were living a happy life? What job would he have? Hell, he'd 
be a sportswriter! What else?” ’ ”. 
In an interview with Gail Caldwell in 1987 Ford says that he and fellow 
writers of his generation such as Raymond Carver and Geoffrey Wolff were “living 
through some kind of existential short hand; darkness for its own sake was the source 
of adequate drama” (42). He goes on to discuss his desire to offer something other 
than darkness: “I just wrote out of that as far as I could write, until it became 
obligatory that I find some next step. And the next step was to find some consolation, 
which I think fuelled The Sportswriter and fuels all the stories in Rock Springs”(42).  
Yet in a more recent interview Ford mentions that while writing the novels he 
grappled with his own difficulties surrounding the idea of a fixed character. He 
claims this difficulty was something he “just externalised and gave to Frank” (Duffy 
338). Ford says he began to suspect “that the whole notion of character per se was a 
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dubious notion, and maybe even in fact a made up notion, that it was a convenient 
notion that our ancestors gave to themselves in an attempt to make them seem 
reliable to themselves and to others” (338). In explaining how he involved this 
concern in his construction of the fictional Frank Bascombe, Ford says he wanted to 
set this concern “into Frank’s life and vocabulary to see what it occasioned me to 
say” and subsequently decided: “one of the things it occasioned me to say was ‘Yes, 
we all experience this lack of moral identity, we all experience this failure of being 
plausible to oneself, and even to others, and that possibility puts us in a position to 
rectify that. As though we could rectify that’ ” (339). The lingering doubt expressed 
in Ford’s “as though we could” apparently rejects the possibility of establishing a 
character that has any form of durable, persistent essence. When asked, in response, 
what does hold individuals together as moral beings and as identities Ford says it has 
to do with a temporal sense of self: “your past, your present, and what you hold as 
possible for your future…we have present awareness, we have a sense of the future. 
That’s what character is to me. As much as anything else character is an awareness of 
this self” (339).  
While Ford’s characterisation of Frank Bascombe demonstrates a primary 
tension between stasis and indeterminacy, the shifting temporal and physical 
suburban locations Ford depicts, the structure of his trilogy, and the language he 
employs all rehearse this form of resistance. The tension between the competing 
forces of indeterminacy and the will for stasis are relevant to issues of collective and 
individual identification, and to the political and social implications and aspirations 
of Ford’s novels. The second part of this chapter concerns the extension of Frank’s 
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personal indeterminate identity to a larger modelling of American nationalism and 
toward a politicised reading of his texts. Frank’s story takes place against the 
backdrop of sprawling New Jersey suburbs, but it is possible to argue that this 
suburban setting functions less as subject matter, and more as an allegorical 
landscape that reflects rather than circumscribes his experiences.  
In the previous chapter I agued that John Cheever’s work could be re-read in 
resistance to his earlier critics and re-interpreted in light of post-structuralism’s 
approaches to the issue of subjectivity. I argued that the reductive approach of some 
of his earlier critics exemplified a stereotypical reading of the suburb as the place of 
overt satisfaction and conversely, as the locale of unconscious and automated 
behaviour.  In refusing to employ a simplistic discourse based around the idea of a 
‘subjective suburb’ and an ‘elsewhere’ I sought to defend Cheever’s work from the 
claim that he refused his characters any capacity to demonstrate agency, self 
awareness, or self-criticism. I further sought to expand the scope for reading Cheever 
by paying attention to the ambiguities that he deploys in terms of his characters’ 
desires and voices. My focus on his work turned to the question of subject-
positioning and order, asserting that Cheever’s characters rehearse the process of 
ordering and its significance in terms of individual desires for simplistic, standing 
measures of satisfaction. 
 While Cheever’s characters and narrators attempt to establish bases for self-
valuation, often the progression of their stories works against their ordering; his 
characters frequently fail to convincingly re-establish themselves in orders already 
demonstrated to be unstable, unverifiable or unsustainable. But these failures or 
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perceived failures have as much to do with the texts themselves as they have to do 
with critical interpretation and the position of the reader. The critical desire for 
Cheever to offer texts that dramatise an escape from the interpellating force of 
suburban socialisation must always be met by disappointment largely because such 
an imaginary figuration of ideal agency is, at the very least in terms of Cheever’s 
fictional worlds, never made available. Readers who willingly extend this 
unavailability beyond the confines of the text and assume an existentialist or post-
structural denial of the possibility of objective, foundational truth might have an 
alternative and less frustrated response to his work than those who demand suburban 
escapism. These terms inform my readings of Cheever’s stories, gesturing to readers 
who might willingly share in an assumption of certain subjective or positional 
constraints and sympathise with the apparently absurd behaviours of Cheever’s 
characters. The angst and nostalgic longings for stability that haunt so many of 
Cheever’s fictional suburbanites are not seen, on this reading, as the result of their 
suburban existence, but instead as a model of the existentially conceived human 
condition where stasis is acknowledged to be something both longed for and 
inevitably denied. 
Cheever’s texts can be read against the background of the post-structural or 
existentialist position that indeterminacy, inter-subjectivity and the unavailability of 
static essences represent all of the available potential for any definition of human 
agency. In this chapter I will extend these presuppositions, arguing that in the new 
suburb of Ford’s fiction, suburban identity is no longer assumed to be conformist and 
essentially unconscious; instead the suburb is read as a place like any other, where 
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agency only extends as far as a process of gradual re-signification. Acknowledged as 
constructed through cultural acts, identity in Ford’s landscape is unhinged, refuses 
stasis, and also potentially suffers from the same effects of instability that Cheever’s 
texts raise. If Cheever’s characters and stories exhibit a flux between the desire to 
(and for) order and the realisation that such ordering has its own limitations, Ford’s 
texts assume and extend this quality of unrest, positioning flux itself as a central 
thematic concern. On one level this flux is part of the continual attempt by Ford’s 
narrator to either resist or embrace his sense of identity, and to unite his sense of self 
with the perspective others have of him. Frank’s evolution is an act not of escape, or 
the attainment of a fixed ideal, but rather a matter of attention to process. On another 
level, the flux is potentially political: the very source of agency and re-signification 
introduced by Butler’s post-structuralist approach to feminism can be identified in a 
political reading of Ford’s treatment of nationhood. 
Judith Butler’s use of certain aspects of existentialist philosophy follows her 
refutation of a fixed essence, or doer standing behind an individual’s actions and 
deeds. The ideal Butler rejects is the notion of a determinate female sexual identity. 
Practically, the application of this theory aims to alter the position of women in 
society by allowing for the assumption that woman are not fundamentally destined to 
identify with a pre-conceived ideal model of what it means to be a woman. Extended 
alternatively, if suburban roles, gender roles, or national identities are conceived of as 
culturally constructed, indeterminate, and not corresponding to authentic ideals, the 
practical implications potentially follow those modeled by Butler: agency is figured 
as the result of a perpetual refusal to permanently situate identity, and also as limited 
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by the often pervasive constraints of discursive availability. In discussions of 
contemporary politics, employing a perpetual inter-subjective re-negotiation of 
statehood reflects the ideals of the American schools of pragmatism and neo-
pragmatism – critical fields that will re-surface throughout this chapter as important 
to my discussion of Richard Ford and his work.  One of the central assumptions 
anchoring any claims to the importance of renegotiation is that individuals and 
communities engage in processes that alter and adjust given norms; thinking of this 
process as a form of ‘evolution’ is one method of arguing for its vitality.  
 In Louis Menand’s history of American pragmatist philosophers, The 
Metaphysical Club, he discusses how the subjects of his biography (Holmes, Pierce, 
James and Dewey) abandoned, in their theory, the idea of a fixed, essential, objective 
truth. He briefly discusses the reception of Darwin’s The Origin of the Species, 
published in 1859, and suggests that the theory of evolution came to coincide with the 
philosophical shifts motivated by pragmatists. He argues that Charles Darwin’s 
theories were controversial at the time not because of the assertion that species 
evolved and changed over time, but because of the assertion that these changes 
occurred by chance (Menand 123). Darwin’s work on the evolution of the species 
might seem distant from the field of literature and literary theory but the point 
Menand makes is that Darwin’s theory demanded a paradigm shift in acknowledging 
the absence of an ideal and constant form – a form which might be likened to the 
‘truth’ or ‘the actual’ or ‘the real’. 
  “A general type”, writes Menand, “is fixed, determinate, and uniform; the 
world Darwin described is characterised by chance, change, and difference – all the 
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attributes general types are designed to leave out” (123). Menand uses the example of 
a finch to describe this aspect of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and if his 
example is read with an awareness of Derrida’s interest in context and signification, 
Menand’s descriptions take on an interesting parallel to the concept of indeterminacy.  
In applying the word ‘finch’ in language, the word is taken to mean a collection of 
general criteria which are seen as comprising the ideal finch, and the word comes to 
exclude the variables and differences (such as the weight, size or colour of each bird) 
that individual finches might present. The inversion of popular logic that Darwin’s 
theory required was an understanding of the inconstant nature of the generalised term 
‘finch’ and the importance of the differences between individual birds as opposed to 
the similarities. According to Menand the most difficult aspect of this theory, for 
Darwin’s contemporaries at least, was an assertion that “No intelligence, divine or 
otherwise, determines in advance the relative value of individual variations, and there 
is no ideal “finch” or essence of “finchness” toward which adaptive changes are 
leading” (122).  
 Menand alerts readers to the fact that the word “finch” suppresses the 
differences that might be exhibited by actual birds in the material world. Darwin 
challenged his contemporaries by showing that the term “finch” was contingent on an 
ideal notion of a finch. This term was designated as fixed or pre-ordained despite the 
fact that individual finches themselves continued to demonstrate variability, to 
change and to fail to conform to the ideal. In what might retrospectively be read as a 
deconstructionist move of inverting a hierarchy Darwin showed that it was precisely 
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these differences, changes, and alterations from the norm that allowed for the 
successful survival of various animals.  
 Dismissing the ideal form of animals (a form other biologists, generally 
relying on theological imperatives, saw as animals evolving toward) subverted the 
ideal(perfect)/individual(differentiated) hierarchy. Darwin’s argument proposed that 
differences among varied species enhanced survivability. Most importantly, Darwin 
shifted the focus of ‘evolving’ from a belief in change toward an achievable fixed or 
given ideal to a focus on the importance of the process of the evolution itself over 
time; this inversion is made clearer by a statement Menand makes: “organisms don’t 
struggle because they must evolve; they evolve because they must struggle” (123). 
Here “struggling” is prioritised over evolution – and the whole ordered notion of a 
fixed destination, a body to aspire to, or a pure form to attain is replaced by the notion 
of process, a perpetual struggle of which evolution is (in a reversal of the presumed 
order) a by-product rather than a purpose. With this metaphor in mind, it is easier to 
understand how a shift in thought away from ideals and truths, toward the vitality of 
process and re-signification, is a viable method of thinking about the vitality of 
languages, cultures, and national identities.  
 In the same way that Derrida, Darwin and the pragmatists demand a shift in 
the projected goals of any discipline, such a demand might also be made of readers as 
they meet the narrator of Ford’s trilogy. The presumption that the text will rehearse a 
full arc for Frank Bascombe toward self-actualisation, maturity, and closure, is 
perhaps best abandoned in light of the various comments Ford has made about his 
character and in light of Bascombe’s narration. In one explicit discussion in The Lay 
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of the Land, Frank draws particular attention to the way his story is told. He is awake 
in his house while his girlfriend Sally has gone to sleep, and he remarks: 
 
 These are the very moments, of course, when large decisions get decided. Great literature 
routinely skips them in favour of seismic shifts, hysterical laughter and worlds cracking open, 
and in that way does us all a grave disservice.  
 What I did while Sally slept in the guest room was make myself a fresh Salty Dog, 
open a can of cocktail peanuts and eat half of them, since a bluefish from Neptune’s Daily 
Catch had become a dead letter. I switched off the lights, sat a while in my leather director’s 
chair, hunkered forward over the knees in the chilly living room and watched the 
phosphorescent water lap the moonlit alabaster beach till way past high tide. Then I went 
upstairs and read the Asbury Press…(339) 
 
Frank goes on to explain precisely what he reads about in the paper, and then to read 
and discuss the Real Estate news. The passage specifically rebuffs any move to 
ignore the minutiae of life in favour of great and seemingly significant pivotal 
moments of transition or epiphany. Frank relates seemingly irrelevant events with a 
compulsive attention to detail while reminding the reader that often these moments 
are as significant as any other.  
 The process of character development Frank undergoes equally denies what 
might be thought of as the traditional pattern of novelistic character development. 
Instead of explicitly maturing and finding closure Frank endeavours throughout the 
novels to unite his sense of himself with the perspectives others have of him, or 
alternatively to evade the truths about himself that he is forced to confront. Even as 
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he envelops the opinions of others into his own sense of self, and goes on narrating, 
Frank continues to chase a perpetually externalised vision of what he might be. 
 If Cheever’s texts displayed a marked desire to re-invent the static reassurance 
of an imagined past, Ford’s Frank Bascombe, it has been argued, exhibits a reverse 
tendency to resist the past and instead construct an imagined and contingent present. 
The critic Brian Duffy sees Frank as spending most of the trilogy avoiding and 
evading his past, preferring instead to attempt living in a limited present. The past, 
writes Duffy, is “the very temporal dimension which Frank’s adult life has been 
dedicated to avoiding. In straining to live in the present he has been running away 
from his past” (158). Duffy’s central argument – an argument that corresponds neatly 
with Richard Ford’s own comments – is that the novels trace Frank’s attempt to 
establish a sense of character: 
 
Franks’ great error has been to seek to conjure up a self within the present alone, a strategy 
that produced only a “series of lives”, a succession of disconnected self-imaginings that cut 
him off from the defining moment of his adult life, the death of his son. Ultimately, Frank 
oscillated in his life between sheer difference (in The Sportswriter) and contrived permanence 
(the Permanent Period), but never found a balance between the two, never understood 
personal identity as a necessary exchange between permanence and change and between past, 
present, and future. (162)  
 
 Perhaps this “necessary exchange” Duffy formulates as the goal of 
characterisation is less a matter of achievable balance than of anxious fluctuation and 
internal debate. It is the notion of oscillation, rather than balance that better expresses 
the absurdity any desire for stasis entails. It is possible to re-position the subject 
 84 
 
matter of Ford’s novel: the material concern of his fiction may not be the end-goal of 
establishing identity, but a dramatisation of the troubled process itself. 
 One of the climactic moments in The Lay of the Land centres on Frank finally 
confronting the death of his son Ralph, the possibility of his own death due to cancer, 
and his ultimate failure to develop a philosophy that might overcome the 
incomprehensibility of mortality. Frank finds himself sheltering in a bar while his 
broken car window is fixed. He gradually realises the bar “has become a watering 
hole for late-middle-passage dykes” (491). He tries to demonstrate how comfortable 
he is, and to show a lack of bias and judgment. He even contemplates telling the 
patrons “My own daughter used to be one of their number” (491) and he claims that 
he “couldn’t be happier than to be here amidst these fellow refugees” (491). On 
leaving the bar and being told not to drive drunk by the bartender, and on finding that 
his car window has not been fixed, and that the shop he has taken it to is closed, 
Frank loses his façade of liberal, congenial inclusiveness. He imagines that if the man 
hired to fix his car had done the job correctly he would have “bought him a shore 
dinner and told him about the things in life he needs to beware of – starting with 
lesbian bars and the false bonhomie of treacherous little coon-arse bartenders” (517).  
 Frank, sitting alone in his car, admits: “I am, in fact, not drunk. Though what I 
am is a different matter” (515). Finally relinquishing his carefully constructed 
acceptance of his son’s death and his own illness, Frank meets a sober crisis-point: 
“Tears and more tears come fairly flooding. Rage, frustration, sorrow, remorse, 
fatigue, self reproach…”. Frank assesses the things he needs to accept as true to 
himself: that his wife has left him, that he has cancer, that his son has died, that he is 
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not a good father, that he has a small life, that he is “an asshole” (521). He concludes 
by identifying what is hardest to accept: 
 
And of course the answer is plain…: that your life is founded on a lie, and you know what 
that lie is and won’t admit it, maybe can’t. Yes, yes, yes, yes. 
 Deep in my heart space a breaking is. And as in our private moments of sexual 
longing, when the touch we want is far away, a groan comes out of me. “Oh-uhh.” The sour 
tidal whoosh the dead man exhales. “Oh-uhhh. Oh-uhhh.” So long have I not accepted, by 
practicing the quaintness of acceptance…Yes, yes and yes. No more no’s. No more no’s. No 
more no’s. (522) 
 
Although he has a sense of himself and his identity, that identity falters when 
confronted. The process of bridging the gap between how the world perceives him 
and how he perceives himself, and of accepting those aspects of his selfhood he has 
previously avoided, requires that Frank constantly pull apart, re-build, and readjust of 
his self-awareness.  
 Frank’s progress is similar to Ned’s passage in Cheever’s “The Swimmer”, 
where both Ned and the reader trace a course toward Ned’s self-awareness. At the 
end of that story Ned’s identity and characterisation have to be adjusted in light of the 
new knowledge that he has lost his wife, wealth and home. The story essentially 
demonstrates a gradual process during which the reader and Ned realise that Ned’s 
sense of self contradicts the actuality of his situation. One of the marked differences 
between Ned’s process and Frank’s is that Frank meets a point of emptiness, 
envisions himself as founded “on a lie” (522) and then continues his story. Ford, as 
noted earlier, said he wanted to write a novel that resisted the kinds of darkness 
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depicted by his fellow contemporary writers, Carver and Wolff (Caldwell 42). The 
Critic Miriam Clark once said of Raymond Carver that it seemed possible that his 
style could never sustain a novel and that his narratives seemed “bound to be short 
stories” because his characters were “choked off by the fear, the impossibility of 
communication”. Part of Richard Ford’s ambition to “write out of that” (Caldwell 42) 
is reflected simply by the continuation of Frank’s story and by the fact that his 
narration continues to overcome the moments of uncertainty, despair and silence that 
Frank frequently encounters.  
 Frank confronts things that contradict his perspective of himself, and also 
absorbs those contradictions back into his self-image. As the novels play out Frank 
does not simply trace an arc from ‘asshole’ to ‘nice-guy’, or from unaware to self-
aware. Nor do the novels depict Frank as ultimately seeking out and embracing a 
final, durable core identity. Instead Frank constantly engages in exchanges with other 
individuals, constantly re-evaluates himself, and constantly has to confront his own 
errors of judgement. In the above passage the collapse of Frank’s sense of self is 
mirrored by a failure in syntax. With the assertion “deep in my heart space a breaking 
is” Frank parallels the failure of his comforting sense of himself with disarrayed 
grammar. Frank only exists in language, and for him to continue to exist in his story 
he has to reclaim the grammar, put the words back into order, and go on narrating and 
communicating.  
  Going on narrating is one of Frank’s most noticeable traits. The text closely 
follows the internal musings of Frank’s character while each sentence carefully 
explains his mental relationship with the world around him. In contrast to Cheever’s 
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reception, the rare negative criticisms Ford has received tend to focus on his style 
rather than on his suburban subject matter; a Wall Street Journal review criticised 
Ford for being part of a so-called “Ruminative School” in which “Such traditional 
forms of literary excitement as plot and character development are presumably 
beneath the dignity of those who have Deep Thoughts to think and fine writing to 
write” (Bowman). Alternatively the absence of plot in Ford’s Bascombe novels might 
be considered an apt representation of the life Bascombe leads, in which causality, 
closure and overt ‘plotting’ read as unrealistic and unfaithful to his first-person, 
generally present-tense depiction of his surroundings.  
When commenting on crafting the crucial moment Frank has sitting in his car, 
when he confronts the death of his son, and the realisation that his life is “founded on 
a lie” (522), Richard Ford said he found the scene problematic. Although he claims it 
as the passage in the book he is “most pleased by” (342) he also has the following 
exchange with the interviewer Brian Duffy, in which he expresses his doubts about 
its quality: 
 
Ford: It took me a while to make it seem permanent in the book because I knew it was one of 
those moments in the book where I was really manipulating the intelligence of the book in a 
way I thought didn’t even seem organic. It was really me pounding down on something that I 
had elected to pound down on… 
Duffy: I see…how would Frank deal with this moment of epiphany, which is one of the 
literary conceits that he sneers at … 
Ford: That’s right. 
Duffy: This is an epiphany. 
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Ford: That’s right. It is an epiphany, but it is, it seems to me, an epiphany of his own 
imagining. 
 
Ford resists the temptation to artificially plot scenes that do not seem to correspond to 
his sense of how Bascombe experiences the world. Even when he admits that this 
moment is one that feels particularly manipulated he strangely suggests that the 
manipulation can be read as something attributable to Frank’s character and not 
Ford’s writing; Frank wants to envision himself as having a moment of epiphany and 
imbue the moment with an imagined importance; on Ford’s account imputing value 
and importance to the scene is a matter of Frank’s desire – a desire that makes sense 
within the scope of Frank’s characterisation. Ford is arguing he chose to depict Frank 
as subjectively orchestrating or attempting to orchestrate the importance of his own 
vital narrative climaxes. 
 Immediately following this comment Ford apologises for “violating my most 
fundamentally held premise about my characters – that I make everything happen” 
(344). As much as Ford might attribute imagination to Frank, Frank is always the 
product of a text orchestrated by Richard Ford, the writer. In this particular novel 
Ford’s comments suggest that his orchestration is paradoxically intended to give the 
impression of a lack of ordering force and to promote the impression that the text 
does not offer the kinds of simplistic and determinate models that other novels might 
be presumed to offer. Ford’s comments support an argument that his texts render 
orchestration as an essential element of his subject matter. 
 Part of Frank’s characterisation is his desire to offer a narrative that makes 
some kind of cohesive sense. And yet the structure of the novels can be read as 
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working against or resisting Frank’s attempts to iterate and establish closure. Ford’s 
work flouts traditional narrative expectations by refusing to offer definitive ends; 
each sequel necessitates a reassessment of the closure implied by the endings of 
previous instalments and any forms of resolution that might be offered by one text 
must be accepted as contingent, unstable, and indefinite because of an established 
pattern of re-negotiability.  Formally, by providing two sequels, the reader has the 
option to interpret the texts as stories where the markers of ‘beginning’ and ‘ending’ 
are presented as the artificial impositions of a traditional notion of plot. Any closure 
offered at the end of The Sportswriter is undone or undermined by the resumption 
and reassignment of Frank’s character to the stories that take place in the novels 
following. As Frank resumes his narration, and fills in the gaps in time (say, in the 
five years lost between The Sportswriter and Independence Day) he engages in a 
process of realignment, disturbing the ‘ending’ of a prior text by recounting how his 
story continued beyond its former limits and progressed to the point of present-tense.  
 In each instance of Frank’s ‘filling in’ or accounting for gaps in time he 
proposes an orchestration or ordering of his own story. In some ways this ordering 
(and re-ordering) demonstrates the necessity to continually re-structure his story in 
order to incorporate and re-incorporate various story ‘events’ back into a consistent 
discourse. And yet the frequent failures Bascombe makes in connecting one event to 
another or in cohesively explaining the causal relations of events in his life are 
failures created by Ford himself. What Ford acknowledges in his “fundamentally held 
premise” (Duffy 344) is his responsibility for constructing Frank. Any mistakes, mis-
readings, errors of judgement or limitations on perspective imposed on Bascombe 
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must be acknowledged as devices that reflect Richard Ford’s refusal to depict 
Bascombe as having the ability to understand or cohesively map the larger causal 
links of his experience. These causal links are something Frank grapples with and 
attempts to identify even as they elude him.  
Lukács, in his essay on realism, argues that all reflections of the world are 
marked by the social realities of the world experienced by the writer (64).  Lukács’s 
argument is that the depiction of a figure who is unable to assume an objective 
perspective on the story-world is no less dependant on the writer’s social reality – the 
writer’s belief about his position in relation to the world around him – than a 
depiction that offers numerous cohesive values or standards by which characters are 
judged to have either succeeded or failed. On this understanding, Richard Ford’s 
portrayal of Frank as relatively unable to piece together the events and experiences of 
his life into a consistent and ‘meaningful’ moral arc – without that arc moving, 
changing, and eluding finality – is not an affliction on the part of the character, but 
rather a manifestation or depiction, by Ford, of his own ability to understand or depict 
the world. Whether this portrayal of perspective proposes a more realistic depiction 
of the ‘real’ world is less important, in the context of this discussion, than the 
question of whether it might model a method of self-awareness or self reflection for 
the reader. 
As noted earlier, Camus and Lukács might be taken to agree on this point in 
Camus’ rejection of the “contradiction of the philosopher enclosed within his system 
and the artist placed before his work” (96) and Camus’ assertion that “the idea of an 
art detached from its creator is not only outmoded, it is false” (96). For both critics 
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the limitations of a writer’s perspective on life always affect his or her ability to offer 
answers within art. In this sense, no text is more ‘realistic’. No text is more authentic, 
or any less limited by the failure of writers to escape their social or philosophical 
subjectivity. No writer is able to more closely depict an objective ‘reality’ by 
escaping or transcending the limitations of their subjectively constructed discourse. 
Camus’ collapse of the distinction between the artist before his work and the artist 
within his work importantly resists the artificial ontological superiority between text 
and author, text and reader, and text and critic. The hermetic seal of the text, the 
divide between the fictional landscape and the real world of the reader, assumes less 
gravity on the presumption that reader, text and author are united by their inability to 
attain, depict, or explain any ‘essential’ truths without having to fashion those claims 
through some engagement with an exiting discourse.   
 If the ‘authenticity’ or ‘truthfulness’ of a text does not rely on the ability of 
the text to more closely resemble the world it depicts, or to transcend the limitations 
of a discourse and establish only the ‘true’ facts of a story, then the possible field of 
difference among texts might lie, instead, in the extent to which texts are willing to 
expose or reject devices that sustain their internal logic. Accordingly, a realist text 
proposes a greater ‘truthfulness’ not because of its direct relation to the objects of the 
world it describes, but because of an implicit rejection of certain devices such as 
overt plotting. In this rejection realist texts rely on exposing, by contrast, the reliance 
of other narratives on certain assumptions or on certain characteristic methods of 
story-telling. Butler proposes that although there is no accessible ‘authentic’ real-
world gender to which the signs male/female refer, there are practices that displace, 
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adjust, and critique the discursive practice in which gender norms are created. Writers 
have the potential to employ styles that function critically by making the issue of 
perspective central to the text, or by exposing the devices that perspective relies on. 
In this sense Ford’s decision to utilise Bascombe’s first person narration might be 
considered a forgone acknowledgement of the limited perspective that prefigures the 
positions offered by the text.  
But the first person narration allows Ford both to assume subjective 
constraints, and to reveal the malleability of perspective. Frank Bascombe meets 
challenges to his point of view and subsequently widens the capabilities of his 
perspective and adjusts his views in order to incorporate and overcome these 
challenges. To assume the voice of a first person narrator is not, at once, to assume a 
voice of defeat or a total failure of agency. Frank’s subject position is not static; it is 
not an identity that fails to stand up to the model of what his identity ought to be. 
Instead Frank is a character continually reconstituted by his ever-changing relation to 
the past and to a future projection of himself. When the opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity is taken to be false, and the concomitant value-
judgements associated with these alternatives are undermined, the orientation of 
inquiry changes (as demonstrated by Butler, Derrida, or Menand’s discussion of 
Darwin). The question turns to the freedoms and agency presented as available within 
an inevitably subjective relation to the world and others.   
 The fact that Frank can never entirely incorporate all the world into his own 
point of view – the fact that he can never overcome the gaps in perspective that give 
rise to so much of the novel’s subject matter – is at once a source of anguish and of 
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motivation. In trying to unite his vision of himself with all other perspectives Frank 
exhibits an existential longing to find closure, to become a ‘being-in-itself’. As 
existentialism and post-structuralism refuse the postulation of objective truths they 
also set anguish and angst as the inevitable by-products of consciousness. The 
following two parts of this chapter address the variously identifiable refusals of 
determinacy in Ford’s work, and argue that a primary theme in Ford’s trilogy is the 
tension between indeterminacy and the desire for forms of stability. The insistence on 
indeterminacy is read largely in political terms, aligning Frank’s effort to gain stasis 
in time, space, and identification with wider questions about American identity. In 
contrast, death is briefly considered as a further force central to the novel, to Frank’s 
dissatisfactions, and to the themes of agency, voice, and resistance.  
 In identifying a confrontation with (and potential acceptance of) contingency 
this reading aims to incorporate and mirror some of the concerns confronted by the 
reader of the text, and to incorporate the position of critics. How to continue to 
engage in criticism and debate without retreating to foundational presumptions and 
without resurrecting the old scaffolding of objective truths is the primary question 
confronting individuals and theorists who have made concessions to the 
contingencies of their subjective perspective.  Demonstrating how Frank persistently 
adjusts and reframes his narrative models the ‘narrative’ structuring and restructuring 
process of reading texts, performing analysis, and engaging in critical debate. An 
attention to Frank’s persistence as a narrator provides an assessment not simply of the 
discomforts, difficulties and conflicts caused by contingency, inter-subjectivity, re-
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negotiation, and irony, but also, of what these frequently unstable features might offer 
given a more optimistic assessment of their potential to promote forms of agency.  
  
ii. Laying the Land: Frank Bascombe in Time and Space. 
 
In his interview with Anthony Byrt Richard Ford declares that the final 
instalment in the trilogy, The Lay of the Land, is designedly political: “I wanted to 
take advantage of the peculiar goodwill I had from the other two books and put it in 
the service of writing a political novel. I looked around myself in America, some 
things seemed worth writing about: the election, the aging population. I felt that 
Thanksgiving weekend after the election of 2000, before the presidency was stolen 
away, to be a time when Americans were literally not paying attention”. While the 
Sportswriter trilogy may have had its beginnings as a character-driven story about 
individual identity, by The Lay of the Land Ford had clearly and deliberately turned 
his eye toward politics. Bascombe is, as Ford states, “put to use” (Byrt) in posing 
questions about American identity and self awareness. The novels filter the 
contemporary American landscape through Frank Bascombe’s point of view and as 
point of view becomes a central element of concern, the wider issues of identity and 
subjectivity play out through Ford’s careful manipulation of perspective. 
 Richard Ford, like Cheever, primarily uses the voice of a white male 
protagonist as narrator. The Sportswriter and its sequels Independence Day and The 
Lay of the Land are narrated in first person. Like many of Cheever’s works these 
novels concern the life of a suburban middle class male. As with Cheever, questions 
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of family and lifestyle are central to the work, and the drama is generally personal 
and domestic. Yet Ford’s critics have not approached his work with any expectation 
of a negative stance toward suburban sensibility. Instead his reviews commonly 
present him as a writer whose voice captures something of an American condition. 
Gordon Burn of the Times Literary Supplement titled his review of Independence 
Day “In Arch Ordinary America” and claimed Ford’s achievement was to “reclaim 
the strangeness of a country which he knows is at least as beguiling as it is wretched”. 
Michiko Kakutani’s New York Times review ran under the title “Afloat in the 
Turbulence of the American Dream” and Anthony Byrt of the New Statesman, in an 
interview on publication of The Lay of the Land called Ford “the dazzling chronicler 
of the real America”.  
 In fact the character Frank Bacombe joins the ranks of white American male 
narrators such as Harry Angstrom of Updike’s Rabbit series, and Phillip Roth’s 
Nathan Zuckerman that have been heralded (though not without the potential for 
debate) as representative, politicised voices of contemporary American literature. 
Reviewers frequently draw such comparisons (reviews of The Lay of the Land from 
the Times Literary Supplement and The Independent provide just two examples 
(Campbell; Kennedy)). The acceptance of Ford as a social novelist has to be 
considered in conjunction with the apparent acceptance of the indeterminacy he 
employs, his suburban setting, and the character he places as the central subject-
matter of his texts. 
Establishing a social and political avenue for reading Ford relies on a 
theoretical backdrop that positions indeterminacy as political. In my earlier 
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discussion of Judith Butler and Albert Camus I introduced the concept of agency as 
not preconditioned by objective or foundational truths, arguing that post-structural 
and existential theoretical perspectives widen the interpretive possibilities Cheever’s 
texts present. Part of the theoretical undertow affecting Ford’s positive reception 
might stem from the growing acceptance of, or familiarity with post-structural and 
neo-pragmatist perspectives on politics and political agency. In a culture increasingly 
aware of the difficulty of positing a singular and objective political or social standard, 
the kinds of critical expectations for cogent dismissals of the conformist suburban 
perspective appear less sustainable. But contingency theory allows for the possible 
importation of politics and social criticism into dialogues that have already 
surrendered their own claims to an objective verifiability. Of particular interest to any 
discussions of Richard Ford’s social novel is the emphasis these theoretical fields 
place on the vitality of conflict and irresolution, as well as on the negotiation of the 
relationship between state and individual. Largely the flexibility of this relationship, 
and the agency attributed to the individual is conceived of as a democratic process 
that emphasises the acceptance of competing individualisms, and evolving nation-
states.  
 Pragmatism, neo-pragmatism, existentialism, and post-structuralism have 
their disagreements and cataloguing them extends beyond the scope of this brief 
discussion. Though at once aware of the risk of over-stating their allegiances, or 
artificially grafting one field onto another, I also do not wish to isolate theories that 
clearly share common threads and make similar theoretical demands. These critical 
fields align in terms of their emphasis on change and contingency. Contemporary 
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discussions regarding the differences between neo-pragmatism and post-structuralism 
(particularly deconstruction) have accentuated the particular vulnerabilities of neo-
pragmatist philosophy. Though still acknowledging the important progress 
pragmatists (particularly Richard Rorty) have made in incorporating some aspects of 
post-structuralism into their neo-pragmatic conception of language and culture, some 
critics contest the apparently optimistic slant of the field.   
 Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity proposes a rejection of claims to 
objective truth while also arguing that this rejection is practiced by an interrogation, 
exploration or persistent rejection of the linguistic terms used to describe selves and 
ideologies. In Rorty’s usage irony operates as a perpetual suspicion toward the 
adequacy or status of language, and in turn, toward assertions of objective truth – 
specifically truths asserted from within the subjective limitations of language itself. 
“Ironists,” writes Rorty, “are afraid that they will get stuck in the vocabulary in which 
they were brought up” (80). As a result, Rorty’s ironists consistently undercut and 
adjust their vocabularies and resist any static significations. For Rorty, vocabulary is 
in a process of constant evolution and this evolution affords changes in the structures 
and assumptions that found social norms.   
 Despite the despair that a rejection of objective truth might appear to entail, 
Rorty insists on a form of optimism that he claims separates his criticism from those 
of deconstructionists: “One difference between Derrideans like [Simon] Critchley and 
Dewyans like myself is that Derrida likes to put things in question, whereas Dewey 
insisted on asking ‘What’s the problem?’ Our attitude is: if it isn’t broken, don’t fix 
it” (Critchley et al, 44). This is an attitude Rorty has been criticised for. His 
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inattention to what is seen by others as the inevitability – even the necessity – of 
persistent conflict appears to deny the essential indeterminacy that underpins any 
notion of the democratic values his pragmatism seeks to establish. Chantal Mouffe 
summarises this point in arguing that “the specificity of liberal democracy as a new 
political form of society consists in the legitimation of conflict and the refusal to 
eliminate it through the imposition of an authoritarian order” (8). Where Rorty 
persists with his claim that Derrida’s private irony has little political effect, and that 
the (uncertainly defined) practice of deconstruction is “not a very efficient way” of 
going about doing something political (44), other critics see Derrida’s insistence on 
indeterminacy as an insistence on the very values that underpin their definition of 
democracy (even if democracy is thus accepted as ‘not a very efficient’ method of 
governance).  
 “Chaos,” writes Derrida in his specific response to Richard Rorty, “is at once 
a risk and a chance, and it is here that the possible and the impossible cross each 
other” (Critchley et al 84). For Mouffe, Derrida, and Laclau, Rorty mistakenly 
presumes that the negotiations and compromises reached through a process of anti-
foundationalist, neo-pragamatic politics would manifest through peaceful process. In 
stating that “in the most reassuring and disarming discussion and persuasion, force 
and violence are present” (83) Derrida preserves a deconstructionist insistence that 
consensus often masks oppression, and that language can suppresses difference and 
delimit the scope of both consciousness and agency. Chantalle Mouffe considers 
Laclau and Derrida’s response to Rorty in her introduction to their combined work, 
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Deconstruction and Pragmatism. She gives an interesting explanation of the 
theoretical impact that Deconstruction might have on his work: 
 
To believe in the possibility of [consensus] even when it is conceived of as an ‘infinite task’, 
is to postulate that harmony and reconciliation should be the goal of a democratic society. In 
other words, it is to transform the pluralist democratic ideal into a ‘self-refuting ideal’ since 
the very moment of its realization would coincide with its destruction. As conditions of 
possibility for the existence of a pluralist democracy, conflicts and antagonisms constitute at 
the same time the condition of the impossibility of its final achievement. (Critchley 11) 
     
Derrida argues that a lack of appetite for conflict, indeterminacy, chaos, and violence 
limit the potential for Rorty’s definition of liberal democracy. Rorty’s work assumes 
that a liberal utopia can be postulated as a place where individuals pragmatically 
negotiate ideologies while keeping in mind the primary goal: to reduce human 
suffering through solidarity. Mouffe alerts us to reductive potential of this vision. A 
deconstructionist approach to democracy attempts to show that indeterminacy, lack of 
agreement, and conflict are both democracy’s essence, and the criteria that necessitate 
its unavailability. As with the inability to fix the attachments of signifiers to what 
they signify, assuming democracy as an unattainable projection – a practice and 
performance rather than a definitive descriptive term – allows for both chaos, and the 
essence of democracy: the freedom to differ.  The bind that Mouffe elaborates 
parallels the existential absurd, where an underlying ideology can extend to a point 
and no further without defeating its own criteria. When Mouffe specifies the 
importance of conflict and antagonism, she aligns herself with Camus’ aversion to the 
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strategy of philosophical suicide – definable as the act of lapsing into the postulation 
of a static objective goal. 
 The image of the determinate suburb, that ideal posited as frighteningly 
artificial and conformist, is a place without conflict. This lack of conflict and 
differentiation grounded the (frequently Marxist) criticism that the suburb is really an 
edifice masking and suppressing individual difference, and a place from which to 
figure escape as the only method of free thought. In my chapter on Cheever I argued 
that the postulation of a real place outside of, underneath, or behind suburbia might 
be considered equally reductive. Both the ideal suburb and its opposite posit some 
objective ideal to surrender to. Mouffe and Derrida mirror this concern as they 
criticize Rorty’s ideal, where conflict is replaced by a democratic process of 
negotiation. However, in sustaining the notion of a perpetually unattainable ideal, 
Rorty importantly acknowledges that human desires and motivations inevitably 
propose goals, even if those goals are acknowledged as contingent. It is this desire 
that makes Rorty’s perspective pertinent to my discussion.  
In conjunction these two critical perspectives – Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and 
Derrida’s deconstruction – permit a reading of Ford that emphasises indeterminacy, 
and the apparent (if insatiable) desire to end such indeterminacy, to close gaps and to 
unite the image individuals have of themselves with any potential external 
perspectives. Though small, often underplayed and comic, conflicts are characteristic 
of all the novels that make up Richard Ford’s Sportswriter trilogy. The presence of 
violence in his texts has not gone unnoticed by critics; in book reviews violence is 
frequently mentioned in passing (Kennedy; Campbell; Byrt). Brian Duffy 
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conscientiously lists all the incidences of violence that occur in Ford’s work and 
remarks that the “Thanksgiving celebration … has inescapable violent associations. 
Frank’s Thanksgiving Day ends in violence and murder…” (168). But more subtle 
instances of conflict or disagreement can be cited as part of the text’s refusal to 
simplistically value one position over another, or to simplistically construct a utopian 
or idealistic vision of either the determinate position of Frank in the world, or the 
position of American as a nation-state.  
Ford’s novels are all set on public holidays. These markers draw attention to 
Ford’s political inquiry into American nationalism, drawing analogies between the 
indeterminate identifications of his central character Frank, and questions of national 
identity. Frank Bascombe filters what Independence Day and Thanksgiving mean to 
Americans through his experiences and perspective. In this filtering Ford 
demonstrates the potential discrepancies and variations in the signification of the 
terms ‘Independence’ and ‘Thanksgiving’, showing that the historical weight of these 
terms can be construed variously. Despite the apparent particularity of the dates, their 
specific temporal location, or the supposed unity of the nation-state in experiencing 
them, the days are exposed as sometimes indeterminate, flexible, individually imbued 
and inevitably unsuited to bearing the weight and suppressing the variances of a 
multitude of alternatively identified citizens. Nevertheless, Bascombe insists on 
observing the holiday. His desire to participate exposes a continuing will to engage 
with the predominant sense of national identity, even as that identify is 
simultaneously critiqued.  
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Bascombe draws attention to the possibility that the national holidays are 
celebrated not for their particular, accurate, historical occurrence – the death and 
resurrection of Christ, the signing of the Declaration of Independence, or the first 
Thanksgiving – but for the meaning invested in them at any given moment and in 
accordance with context. The very act of investing meaning in the days, of 
communicating with, reading, and rewriting the narratives surrounding them, 
assumes greater importance than the events the calendar-dates might originally have 
corresponded to; the collective investment in the national occasion is made in light of 
what that occasion has come to signify in present discourse.  The holidays realise 
their significance not in terms of an historical event itself, but in the resonance of an 
event in a contemporary (and ever-changing) context. One of Bascombe’s endeavours 
is to find his and his family’s particular relation to a national mythology that becomes 
most potent on these holidays – as though by positioning his family in accordance 
with the stationing that takes place on national holidays he might be able to alleviate 
some sense of personal unpredictability or instability.  
The holidays, like Frank’s own quest to negotiate the pitfalls of his life, 
represent a far larger attempt to fortify US national identity through a narrativising, 
rehearsing, and re-telling of stories about US nationhood. In his introduction to a 
history of Fourth of July celebrations Len Travers argues that the intense, ritualised 
behaviour and myth formulation that accompanies the development of national 
holidays is partly a process of encouraging political agreement, a sanctioning of the 
legitimacy of government and power through the employment and strengthening of 
various symbols. These symbols must constantly be re-negotiated and adjusted in 
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order to appeal to a majority and foster a sense of accord by what they envelop 
(Travers 4-5). In one sense the powerful appeal of these symbols and what they 
include or exclude might be seen to dominate or even dictate the subject positioning 
that individuals negotiate as they identify as Americans. The celebrations might be 
read as part of a national agenda or state agenda aimed at masking individualism, 
circumscribing behaviours, or encouraging compliance with a state regime. 
And yet Travers’s statement also allows for an alternative interpretation: if the 
rituals and behaviours that accompany the ‘myth formulation’ require the re-
negotiation and re-deployment of signs that envelop wider practices, the exercise of 
celebrating national holidays might also be seen as, alternatively, democratic. As 
‘being an American’ is expanded to include individual outliers – identities on the 
outskirts of the term ‘American’ – ‘America’ changes its signification and 
constitution. In as much as the performances fortify a national identity they also 
respond to demands for inclusion. Inherent in Travers’s description is the possibility 
that a failure to encourage this sanctioning and fortification might de-legitimise the 
government; where the individuals that comprise America no longer agree with the 
signification of the term ‘America’, the power of the signs the regime relies on would 
no longer have effect. If the term ‘Thanksgiving’ operated as the sign of some rigid 
and fixed referent, the capacity for the term to continue to appeal to a changing 
demographic might gradually diminish, and in turn gradually decrease the power of 
that sign’s appeal.  
In foregrounding the holidays as the subject matter of his novels Ford 
connects Bascombe’s personal ambiguities of identity with his sense of American 
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community. In The Lay of the Land Frank offers this cynical perspective on 
Thanksgiving: 
 
As everyone knows, the Thanksgiving “concept” was originally strong-armed onto poor war-
worn President Lincoln by an early-prototype forceful-woman editor of a nineteenth-century 
equivalent of the Ladies’ Home Journal, with a view to upping subscriptions. And while you 
can argue that the holiday commemorates ancient rites of fecundity and Great-Mother-Who-
Is-Earth, it’s in fact always honored storewide clearances and stacking ‘em deep ‘n selling 
‘em cheap – unless you’re a Wampanoag Indian, in which case it celebrates deceit, genocide 
and man’s indifference to who owns what. (Lay of the Land 33-34)  
 
The description follows Frank’s statement that although Thanksgiving “ought to be 
the versatile, easy-to-like holiday, suitable to the secular and religious,” it rarely is 
(33). In beginning with “as everyone knows” (33) Frank offers his opinion as the 
normative and collectivised opinion of “everyone” and yet in the following remarks 
Frank raises history, agricultural and harvest celebration, consumerism, and the 
indigenous North American Indian perspective. His “while you can argue” (33) 
appears to concede that other opinions are possible, and yet he rapidly undercuts any 
optimistic commemoration of “fecundity and Great-Mother-Who-Is-Earth” (34) by 
raising the overshadowing historical weight of genocide and the theft of Indian land. 
 In his cynicism Frank also mimics various voices: the abbreviated salesman-
speak of “stacking ‘em up n’s selling ‘em cheap,” or the reverential “ancient rites of 
fecundity” (34), employing all of them as if to show that whatever people are 
celebrating Thanksgiving for, that celebration has a reliance on an employed 
discourse, and is marked by a kind of linguistic identification with a certain group. 
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Frank’s stylistic parody has the potential to expose the voices (and the individual 
approaches to Thanksgiving that the voices represent) as imitated, contingent and 
constructed. But perhaps Frank’s mash of voices is more pastiche than parody 
(Jameson 114); his own subsequent concession that Thanksgiving is “strangely 
enough, a great time to sell houses” (34) suggests that Frank concedes to being just as 
self-interested in the particular value Thanksgiving has from his particular 
perspective as a real-estate agent. “Our national spirit,” concludes Frank, “thrives on 
invented gratitude” (35).  
 Frank proposes that Thanksgiving be taken for the invented celebration that it 
is, and then gradually reduces the importance of the holiday down to the specific, 
individualistic level:  “Contrive, invent, engage – take the chance to be cheerful...Get 
plenty of sleep. Leave the TV on (the Lions and Pats are playing at noon). Take B 
vitamins and multiple walks on the beach” (35). Frank’s employment of various 
voices associated with the celebration of Thanksgiving represents less a parody than 
an articulation of the new contingency of the national holiday’s spirit. The notion of 
an ‘authentic’ sentiment is replaced by the suggestions that no ‘authentic’ holiday 
spirit exists, and that in fact one celebration of the holiday is as valuable, as 
legitimate, as the next. 
 The idea that Thanksgiving is a kind of national and individual performance 
that rehearses an indeterminate national identity is raised again in Frank’s description 
of the Pilgrim Village Interpretive Center’s restaging of the first Thanksgiving: 
 
Inside the village they’ve installed a collection of young Pilgrims – a Negro Pilgrim, a Jewish 
female Pilgrim, a wheelchair-bound Pilgrim, a Japanese Pilgrim with a learning disability, 
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plus two or three ordinary white kids – all of whom spend their days doing tiresome Pilgrim 
chores in drab, ill fitting garments, chattering to themselves about rock videos…Every night 
the young pilgrims disappear to a motel out on route 1, fill their bellies with Pizza and smoke 
dope till their heads explode. (Lay of the Land 69) 
 
The inaccuracy of the historical re-staging is the result of a desire to reflect a 
contemporary and politically correct image of America, complete with a series of 
minority pilgrims. These minority pilgrims, while intended to show that America 
embraces distinct individuals, ultimately defeat the purported authenticity of the 
village, effecting a comical undercutting of the project itself. The restaging rejects the 
importance of any attempt at authenticity, instead embracing a new goal: 
manufacturing an inclusive narrative. The contrast between the historical village and 
the Pilgrims’ retreat to a motel to “smoke dope” also functions to undermine the 
accuracy of the historical re-enactment. While the project endeavours to show the 
importance of history to the identity of today’s America, the contrast between the 
pilgrims’ off and on-duty behaviour in fact exposes the differences between today’s 
reality and the potentially disputable distant past, as does the need to artificially 
import into the staging a series of individuals who were probably not part of the 
‘original’ Thanksgiving.  
 The historical accuracy and validity of the village is again challenged by 
Frank’s humorous speculation that various other groups might attempt to stage their 
own competing rendition of history: 
  
There’s even talk that a group representing the Lenape Band – New jersey’s own redskins, 
who believe they own Haddam and always have – is setting up to picket the Pilgrims on 
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Thursday, wearing their own period outfits and carrying placards that say THANKS FOR 
NOTHING and THE TERRIBLE LIE OF THANKSGIVING…There’s likewise a rumour 
that a group of [Revolutionary war battle] re-enactors will go AWOL, march to the Pilgrim’s 
defence and re-enact a tidy massacre in the front steps of the Post Office. (71)   
 
Despite the politically correct endeavours of the Interpretive Centre to 
embrace all of contemporary America, their display is reductive; while the 
celebration of early settler survival and struggle venerates one version of history, it 
obscures another, so that the redskins have to perform their own contestation of the 
Pilgrim display. Frank offers the humorous possibility of an unplanned re-enactment 
of a “tidy massacre” (71) which, although it would not be appropriate to a national 
day of celebration and consolidation, would offer a valuable history lesson by 
exemplifying the very contestability of historical truths. In the unplanned battles 
Frank jokes about, the historical players might more accurately reflect how the 
conflicts of the past manifest again in the contemporary conflict over how that past is 
discursively re-packaged – demonstrating that American history is far from univocal, 
and that national holidays might as much allow for the exposure of these myriad 
competing, conflicted voices as they encourage the suppression of it.  
In “Nostalgia Isn’t What it Used to Be: Isolation and Alienation in the Frank 
Bascombe Novels” William Cherneky considers Ford’s depiction of Bascombe’s 
identity in The Sportswriter and Independence Day and the significance of 
Independence Day to that identity. He argues that “the 4th of July is perhaps the 
nation’s only holiday that commingles the historical concept of national binding unity 
with personal freedoms” (167). Cherneky reveals Independence Day as, at least in 
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Ford’s depiction, conceptually oxymoronic – a collectivised celebration of 
individualism. In Independence Day Frank’s son Paul, aged 15, has recently been 
arrested for “shoplifting three boxes of 4X condoms (“Magnums”) from a display 
dispenser” (11), assaulting a Vietnamese security officer and calling her “a 
goddamened spick asshole” (11). He has also taken to barking and “making soft but 
audible eeck-eecking sounds” (13). Bascombe’s response is to take Paul on a road trip. 
His aim is to assist Paul in establishing his independence as an individual, even as the 
two connect by considering versions of what it means to be an American. For Frank 
this involves sporting halls of fame that celebrate national idols and pastimes, 
Emerson’s “Self Reliance” and a copy of The Declaration of Independence. Frank’s 
intention is to share his sense of how he identifies as an individual, and test the extent 
to which his son is willing to assume the same kinds of identifications. He hopes that 
during the trip he will be able to point out 
 
…that the holiday isn’t just a moth-bit old relic-joke with men dressed up like Uncle Sam and 
harem guards on hogs doing circles within circles on shopping mall lots; but in fact it’s an 
observance of human possibility, which applies uncanny pressure on each of us to 
contemplate what we’re dependant on…and after that to consider in what ways we’re 
independent or might be; and finally how we might decide – for the general good – not to 
worry about it all that much. (289) 
 
In contrast to his portrayal of Thanksgiving, the Frank Bascombe of 
Independence Day is reluctant to allow that the holiday can be reduced to pre-
packaged symbols and consumerist agendas. There is a marked optimism in his belief 
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that Independence Day provides, behind some of its more banal versions of 
celebration, some model of identity that he can pass on to his son as they connect. 
But the words Frank offers as his particular impression of Independence Day’s 
significance are undercut by the events of the novel (most notably his failure to 
achieve the envisioned connection with Paul) so that by the novel’s conclusion, when 
the national day arrives, Frank is willing to concede an ultimate contradiction: that 
“real independence must sometimes be shoved down your throat” (423). In this 
comment, and in Frank’s belief in a need to “contemplate what we’re dependant on” 
(289) Ford exposes the internal conflict discussed by Chernecky, namely the tension 
between an idealised collective – a national identity – and an ideal that celebrates 
individual endeavour.  Both national holidays are shown to be part of a national 
story-telling that prioritises identity and, in reflexively looking to the past, perform 
identity in a suitable contemporary restaging of history’s most acceptable elements.  
The national holidays that each of Ford’s three novels are set on draw 
attention to the indeterminacy of the days’ significations, while spatially the same 
theme is developed in Frank’s movement through suburbia.  In his essay on Ford’s 
short fiction collection, Rock Springs, the short-fiction theorist Michael Trussler 
refers to the constant mapping Ford’s characters tend to undertake, both 
geographically and temporally as they describe who and where they are (36). In Rock 
Springs Trussler finds a series of “discordant voices” (39) emerging through the 
collection as a whole, and as these voices are located in wider contexts and begin to 
compete with one another or encroach on the stories of others, Trussler sees a tension 
that demonstrates the characters’ disparities rather than their connections. “Ford’s 
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narrators and characters,” concludes Trussler, “also find temporality to be a force 
which disperses whatever frail sense of meaning they can create; to exist in time, for 
Ford, is to be severed from both self and community” (39). 
 In a footnote, Trussler remarks vaguely that “what is especially intriguing 
about The Sportswriter is that it is a novel that constantly debates with the short story 
as a form” (51) and briefly notes Frank’s previous work as a writer of neo-realist 
short fiction. The same attentions to geographic and temporal location that Trussler 
notes in Rock Springs are present in Ford’s novels. The markers of each of the 
holidays are significant features but Bascombe also constantly relates which 
highways he is driving on, the names of streets and suburbs, the names of the schools 
his acquaintances attended or where they grew up. In the later two novels location 
assumes a central role in Bascombe’s new career as a residential real-estate agent, 
functioning to mark out the identifications of various minor characters, and also as an 
allegorical tool in Bascombe’s philosophising and again in the friction between 
indeterminacy and stability. Whether to “exist in time…is to be severed from both 
self and community” (Trussler 39) is a statement true of the novels depends on how 
Frank envisions his own personality and his ability to communicate with those 
around him. Certainly Trussler’s formulation appears at first to disagree markedly 
with Brian Duffy’s argument that Frank’s sense of self can only be established by an 
acceptance of his own past (Duffy 158). Yet the arguments of both Trussler and 
Duffy can function alongside one another if, as I have argued, Frank’s identity is 
understood as an unstable process of re-negotiation: he connects with the community 
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as he endeavours to alter his sense of self to better suit its views, and his selfhood 
regards his past, but also attempts to envelop an ever-changing present and future. 
 As the instability of Frank’s subject position is painted as an allegory of the 
instability of how history is re-told, or in his movement through the suburbs and his 
sale of houses, his communications with others become instances of inter-subjective 
negotiation where language and mis-communication again displace and undercut his 
self-conception, and where failures of communication require that he recast his 
perception of himself.  
 As Frank works at buying and selling houses he demonstrates the 
indeterminacy of the suburban landscape, where houses are continually being 
relocated, where individuals are moving in and out of homes, and where foundations 
and locations are regularly under examination. Yet he also demonstrates how the 
settling of houses into the landscape, and people into those houses, is a process of 
stationing.  In The Lay of the Land Frank Bascombe climbs into a house that has been 
lifted five feet off the ground and set on girders, ready to be moved to a new location 
(604). It is the final scene in which Frank does any real estate business, and the 
trilogy’s final description of a house. “From here the community is briefly re-
visioned” (614) Frank says of the view from the elevated house.  He notes that “the 
view stresses the good uniformity of the houses” (614) and then goes on to describe 
those things that differentiate the properties, such as boats or statues in yards (614); 
he concludes that “No house has nothing [ie: no individual distinguishing objects], 
though the effect is to reinforce sameness” (615). Frank stresses sameness and 
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difference, noting that the desire to appear mildly differentiated has the effect again 
of creating similarity.4  
Inside the house Frank begins to understand why his co-realtor did not want to 
show the house to the buyer: “But if it is a good thing to see the familiar world from a 
sudden and new elevation, it may not be to see inside a house on girders, detached 
from the sacred ground that makes it what it is – a place of safety and assurance” 
(616). Removed from its context, and from its position on the landscape, the house 
loses its definition as a home. The house’s safety is contingent on its relationship to 
the houses around it, and taken away from its position within that structure the house 
loses some of its ability to signify those homely things the buyer is looking for. Frank 
describes the inside of the house as “still and dank as a coal scuttle and echoey and 
eerily lit” (617). Inside what would be a living room “picture-frame ghosts make it 
feel not like a room but a shell waiting for a tornado to sweep it into the past” (616).  
Just as Frank and the buyer are about to leave the house a fox appears, after a brief 
skirmish the fox runs past Frank and “out into the clean cold air of Timbuktu where, 
for all I know, Mike may believe the fox is me, translated by this house of spirits into 
my next incarnation on this earth. Frank Fox” (620). The episode is strange and 
unfamiliar, leaving Frank to conclude that the place is a “house of spirits” (620) – 
somewhere that escapes reality or rationality.   
In existentialist philosophy moments of angst and absurd awareness are often 
brought on by a heightened level of awareness or by some alteration of perspective. 
Albert Camus describes the moment at which familiar objects become unfamiliar due 
to a heightened state of awareness as a symptom of absurdity. It is a sensation where 
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the understanding of objects or situations is undercut by a realisation of the 
contingency of the orders that have given those objects or situations value:  
 
The primitive hostility of the world rises up to face us across millennia. For a second we 
cease to understand it because for centuries we have understood in it solely the images and 
designs that we had attributed to it beforehand, because henceforth we lack the power to 
make use of that artifice. (14) 
 
An extreme example of this sensation occurs in Jean Paul Sartre’s novel La Nausea 
(translated into English as The Diary of Antoine Roquentin) in which the novel’s 
narrator Roquentin, in contemplating the root of chestnut tree, comes to realise that 
the application of the word ‘root’ to the root in front of him does nothing to further 
his understanding of the root’s existence: “Oh, how can I put it in words? Absurd: in 
relation to the stones, the tufts of yellow grass, the dry mud, the tree, the sky, the 
green branches, Absurd, irreducible; nothing – not even a profound, secret upheaval 
of nature – could explain it. Evidently I did not know everything” (174). The “image 
and design” (Camus 14) of language is the order by which Roquentin has 
appropriated the root’s existence into his understanding of the world. When he 
becomes aware of the severing between this system and the objects he has applied it 
to Roquentin realises that “faced with this great wrinkled paw, neither ignorance nor 
knowledge was important: the world of explanations and reasons is not the world of 
experience” (174).  
 Unfamiliarity is presented as the symptom of absurd awareness – where, as 
the assumed objective order (for example, the stable relation of signs to their 
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referents in language) is undercut, the ability to make sense of and negotiate familiar 
objects falters and blind subjectivity takes the form of upheaval, confusion and an 
inability to locate one object in relation to another, or to invest those objects with 
their familiar meanings. Sartre’s treatment of absurdity in La Nausea is more taxing 
in its examination of the ordering system of language itself, where the ability to 
understand an object is demonstrated to be contingent on its reduction to the order of 
language.  Part of the issue of nausea is that it presents the extremity of absurdity as 
unbearable and potentially unsustainable. 
 Earlier on in The Lay of the Land, Frank loses the sale of a seaside property to 
his client Clare because the property’s foundations are cracked. Clare asks Frank if he 
can ask a “quasi-philosophical question” (420) that “pertains to real-estate” (420) and 
then goes on to draw an explicit analogy between the crumbling house and his fears 
about the instability of America itself (420):  
 
We’ve all of us manufactured reality so well, we’re so solid in our views, that nothing can 
really change. You know? … and don’t you think they’re not sitting over there in those other 
countries that hate us licking their chops at what they see us doing over here, fucking around 
trying to decide which of these dopes to make president …You think these people here…have 
foundation problems? We’ve got foundation problems. It’s not that we can’t see the woods for 
the trees, we can’t see the woods or the fuckin’ trees. (421)  
 
Clare’s character proposes that the reality he lives in, as a middle class American, is a 
manufactured structure. He feels, in considering America’s position in relation to the 
rest of the world, that the structure is under threat because of the way it has been 
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constructed and he draws a direct link between the house and his own philosophical 
quandary.  
Clare cannot make sense of anything, and in his version of the woods/trees 
saying he claims not just a loss of perspective, but a loss of value, meaning, and the 
very point of perspective. In examining the house from the outside, standing back to 
observe its foundations, and evaluating it in terms of its relationship to the land, Clare 
begins to worry about its structure and he fathoms a sense of absurdity that permeates 
his understanding of the structure of his community against the rest of the world. In a 
political sense Clare’s problem is that America’s self-image seems false, and yet as 
he begins to consider the problem of this image, and to attempt to perceive America 
from the perspective of other countries, he asserts that America has lost any sense of 
identity or value, that he can see neither woods nor trees, and that there is no 
alternative to America’s ‘false’ image other than confusion. 
Frank’s response to Clare is to humorously perpetuate the real-estate analogy:  
 
Clare’s problem is not really a philosophical problem. It just makes him feel better to think 
that it is. His problem with circumstances is itself circumstantial. He’s suffered normal human 
setbacks…it’s standard, a form of buyer’s remorse. If Clare would just take the plunge 
(always the realtor’s warmest wish for mankind), banish fear…then he’d be fine. In other 
words accept the Permanent Period as your personal saviour and act not as though you’re 
going to die tomorrow but – much scarier – that you might live. (423) 
 
Frank is less interested in the question of shaky foundations and more interested in 
how Clare might attempt to “take the plunge” – to decide to accept the ambiguity of 
his position and live on despite shaky foundations. His response reiterates the 
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allegorical relationship between selling real estate and establishing less literal forms 
of stability. 
In Independence Day Frank Bascombe’s main clients are the Markhams, a 
couple whom he is having trouble selling a house to. His discussion of their position 
reveals Frank’s awareness of the pervasive cultural fear that somehow moving to 
suburbia equates with the suppression of individual identity, yet it also demonstrates 
Frank’s awareness of the safety of positioning: 
 
 My own view is that the realty dreads (which is what the Markhams have, pure and simple) 
originate not in actual house-buying…but in the cold, unwelcome, built-in-America 
realization that we’re just like the other schmo, wishing his wishes, lusting his stunted 
lusts…And as we come near the moment of closing …what we sense is that we‘re being 
tucked even deeper, more anonymously, into the weave of culture…(Independence Day 57).  
 
He complicates the mental relationship the Markhams have to home-buying by 
suggesting that the Markhams feel like “pioneers” reclaiming the suburbs “from 
people (like me) who have taken them for granted all these years and given them a 
bad name” (58).  He then suggests the Markham’s have the usual “pioneer 
conservatism about not venturing too far – in this case a glut of too many cinemas, 
too-safe streets, too much garbage pickup, too-clean water” (58). On the issues of 
conformity presented by the idea of moving to the suburbs, Frank’s narration takes 
the tone of an ironic self-awareness. While joking that the Markhams hyperbolically 
figure themselves as “pioneers” but have a “pioneer conservatism” Frank again 
suggests that buying a house requires both a happy assumption of conformity and 
residual claim to individualism; he sees it as his job to reduce the anxieties the 
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Markhams have by stressing the “happy but crucial ways they’re not” like their 
neighbours (58).  
 Frank presents himself as having both a sympathy for and detachment from 
his conception of the suburban attitude. He sees the process of finding a house to be 
as much about situating oneself in a particular geographic space as it is a process of 
defining and even limiting one’s identity; his awareness extends both to the 
discomfort of purchasing a house and being “tucked even deeper, more anonymously, 
into the weave of culture” (57) and to the admission that the weave of culture allows 
for a form of subject-positioning that stabilises identity. Finding the Markhams a 
home is an act of placing them in the landscape and simultaneously reassuring them 
that their position remains a choice; their position has to be confirmed as a malleable 
contingency, not a finality. 
 Ford’s text utilises the metaphor of housing to demonstrate the contingencies 
of signification upon positionality and upon the relations between, in this case, 
houses. Yet the uncertainty of language also comes to represent a significant concern 
for Frank Bascombe both in how he uses terms to describe himself, and in how the 
order of his personal language comes into conflict with the language and 
communicative acts of the characters around him. In his relationship with Paul, Frank 
extends the structure of language as metaphor for the ordered relation he has to his 
son and illustrates how communicative and reciprocal value is lost when the bases 
from which people communicate are not shared. In The Lay of the Land, after an 
argument with Paul, Frank realises that the “fatherly syntax” – the way he has 
assumed his father-son relationship works – is not a structure or ‘syntax’ his son 
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shares. The breakdown of his relationship with his son is figured as a disjunction 
between systems, where his son has “placed himself outside” (592) of the order Frank 
has assumed: 
 
I have nothing available to say to him. He has placed himself outside my language base, to 
the side of my smothering fatherly syntax and diction, complimentary closes, humorous 
restrictive clauses and subordinating conjunctions. We have our cocked up coded lingo – 
winks, brow-archings, sly-boots double, triple, quadruple entendres that work for us, but that 
is all. And now they’re gone, lost to silence and anger, into the hole that is our “relationship.” 
I bless you. I bless you. I bless you. In spite of all. (592)  
   
The final repetition of “I bless you” in this paragraph rings with a futility given its 
context. The preceding statements suggest that Frank’s extension of sentiment cannot 
be received by his son; the words fall without the reassuring meaning they might 
usually be expected to have. Like the gutted and unfamiliar house at #118, the words 
fail to produce their conventional significations of safety and security because the 
foundation on which they build definition has been placed into question. 
 In the above passage Frank refers to the language games he and his son share 
– games frequently mentioned in Independence Day while Frank and his son travel 
the sporting halls of fame: “ ‘I’m all leers,’ I say, which makes him give me an arch 
look; one more of our jokes from the trunk of lost childhood, Take it for granite. A 
new leash on life. Put your monkey where your mouth is. He, like me, is drawn to the 
fissures between the literal and the imagined” (Independence Day 343). The personal 
jokes between Frank and Paul are dependant on their shared understanding of skewed 
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language. The fissure Frank refers to provides a source of pleasure where incongruent 
and misplaced uses of language sweep referential capacity into an imaginary territory 
where language shapes conceptions, rather than merely referring to objects. Here the 
possibility for pleasure relies on gaps between words and their possible connotations, 
words and their regular meanings, and familiar words made unfamiliar. 
 But as much as the pleasure of linguistic games springs from the malleability 
of signs, the difficulty of communication can also be figured as a disconnection 
fuelled by failures in the communicative capacity of language. Frank describes his 
relationship with his son by utilising the metaphor of language: either you are inside 
or outside the syntax of another. In doing so he conflates connection and mutual 
understanding with a shared understanding of language and depicts his own character 
as partially dependant on the capacity to communicate. While language, or the 
connotations of a national holiday, or the resonance of a home are painted by Ford as 
unstable and negotiable categories, Ford also examines the implications of these 
instabilities. In one sense malleability offers a sense of pleasure and allows for 
intimate and private inter-subjectivity and negotiation, while on the other, such 
indeterminacy is accommodated at the expense of stability.   
 
iii.  Inter-subjectivity or Death? 
 
 In discussing John Cheever’s “The Worm in the Apple” I presented his use of 
irony as ambiguously reliant on the approach of the reader. It is possible to argue that 
the narrator’s frustrated repetition of “happily” in the sentence “The Crutchman’s got 
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richer and richer and richer and lived happily, happily, happily, happily” (288) alters 
what is signified, forms a new sign, and raises the possibility of an alternative and 
entirely oppositional referent: unhappy. But in fact the communicability of the 
sentence is vastly complex: while it appears to imply ‘unhappy’ the reader might 
assume a deeply imbedded case of irony firing in fact, at the expense of the frustrated 
narrator himself (Donaldson “Suburban Sequence”). On this understanding the 
connotations of frustration and unhappiness depend on the reader’s understanding of 
what is being signified.  
 The reader’s decision to interpret the phrase as ironic, and to define the 
repetition of the words “happily, happily, happily, happily,” (228) as meaning to 
communicate something more than simply that the Crutchman’s are happy, relies on 
certain presuppositions about what John Cheever might mean, or about what the story 
ought to mean, and potentially on an array of cultural knowledge concerning both 
real suburban norms and features of suburban fiction. Indeed Timothy Aubry has 
argued that the “The Worm in the Apple” has the potential to draw the reader’s 
attention to their own unhappiness; he argues that if the reader shares the narrator’s 
assumptions and is skeptical about how the Cruthchman’s could ever be happy, the 
reader must themselves be unhappy (76).       
 A reader’s ability to justify their assumption that irony is at work in Cheever’s 
stories depends, like any other criticism, on their ability to legitimise a reading-
position that accommodates their interpretation. Richard Ford’s texts, infinitely 
layered with discrepancies in voice, supply a similarly complex task. Frequently 
critics avoid any discussion of the potential levels of irony present in Richard Ford’s 
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writing and this may be due to the difficultly of interpreting and attributing irony. Or 
perhaps avoiding the question of irony corresponds to a reluctance to read Ford’s text 
as unsympathetic toward his narrator; because irony is so often executed at the 
expense of the status of someone’s knowledge, to read for irony is to risk 
characterising Ford’s trilogy as an unsympathetic parody of Frank Bascombe (and, by 
extension, others like him). In Brian Duffy’s comprehensive study of Ford’s work his 
discussion of irony occupies less than a page, and offers the following conclusion: 
 
Ford almost unfailingly, simply gives full expression to his creation and allows his character 
to narrate his life and proclaim the pleasures of the suburban existence without directing the 
reader to the fault-lines in that ideology, while nonetheless exposing the values and meanings 
of that world to the harsh examination of experience. In this sense Ford is more disinterested 
scientist than ruthless ironist. (19) 
 
But asking how Ford manages to write “without directing the reader” is similar to 
asking how the reader identifies the potential discrepancies between the intended 
messages of a narrator, the position of an implied author, and indeed the reader’s own 
position. 
 While Duffy proclaims a lack of “ruthless irony” (19) he ascribes a certain 
quality to the text that other readers might readily disagree with; the extent to which 
readers do or do not classify Ford’s work as an ironic parody of Frank Bascombe, 
suburbanite, depends on their own subject-position and the values that underpin how 
they read. Although there is no simple way to define how the comic gaps between 
Frank’s understanding of a situation, and a reader’s understanding might arise (firstly, 
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and most obviously because no two readers can be assumed to read identically) it is 
possible to reframe irony as not essentially dependant on a level of superior 
knowledge or on an ‘objective’ perspective of someone else’s ‘subjective’ experience, 
but rather, as contingent on a set of shared inter-subjective assumptions pre-
conditioned by social norms or expectations (for instance, what might reasonably be 
expected of a reader given certain presumptions about the social norms affirmed and 
assumed in contemporary American or Western liberal democracies).  
 This reframing of irony’s effects reflects the wider model of reading presented 
by the work of this thesis: the replacement of an objective goal with an emphasis on 
understanding the effect and importance of inter-subjectivity, re-negotiation, and the 
vagaries of signification. The communicative effect of irony, much like the language 
games engaged in by Frank and his son, can be read as a skewing of signification that 
relies ultimately on shared understandings and an acute awareness of context. Irony is 
thus acknowledged as contingent, and also afforded the agency affiliated with that 
contingency: if existentialism and post-structuralism promote an understanding of 
identity (both collective and individual) as discursively framed, then points of 
slippage, mistaken significations, and adjustments in the relation between signs and 
referents become shorthand instances of ‘mutation’ in which signification has the 
potential to change. In this light, irony’s potential lies in its ability to displace a 
linguistic norm, or alter the signification of a sign in order to re-define its referent and 
potentially distort, adjust, redefine or expand discursive availability. The success or 
(to employ the metaphor of evolution) ‘survivability’ of this new signification relies 
eventually on whether it persists under interrogation – or on whether others agree 
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with and accept its communicative capacity.  But arguments about irony’s capacity 
are by no means simple.   
  Sören Kierkegaard wrote of irony: “if what is said is not my meaning or is 
the opposite of my meaning, then I am free both in relation to others and in relation to 
myself” (Kierkegaard 209). Because the speaker takes no ownership of the potential 
significations of their utterance, the onus for interpretation relies, Kierkegaard 
suggests, on others, and the speaker abdicates responsibility for their communicative 
act and its implications. In Irony’s Edge Linda Hutcheon discusses what she terms 
the “transideological” quality of irony (29) and demonstrates how the Hegelian and 
Kierkegaardian position “on irony as negation” anchors one side of a longstanding 
debate over irony’s effects (28). Hutcheon surveys the vast history of claims about 
irony’s impact; on some accounts irony is said to function only within the 
establishment to bolster the superiority of one group over another; on others irony is 
“subversive and oppositional” and full of the “power that lies in the potential to 
destabilise” (29).  
 In light of this transideological quality, Hutcheon seeks instead to approach 
irony from a more specific, contextual perspective. She asks what it is that irony 
relies on in order to succeed and how the firing or misfiring of an ironic statement is 
context-dependant (3). She ultimately argues that irony, rather than having a specific 
power, rather than being offered at the expense of some or other lack, and rather than 
being “consensus making” is in fact the “effect of consensus” (92): 
 
In ironic discourse, the whole communicative process is not only ‘altered and distorted’ but 
also made possible by those different worlds to which each of us differently belongs and 
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which form the basis of the expectations, assumptions and preconceptions that we bring to the 
complex process of discourse, or language in use. (89)  
 
The vital relationship between a potentially ironic statement and an audience is 
positioned, within Hutcheon’s formulation, as dependant on a kind of inter-
subjectivity: shared assumptions and sets of cultural knowledge pre-determine 
whether the audience will interpret the utterance or performance on the same basis, 
and share a common understanding or interpretation of it.  At one level, the linguistic 
jokes shared by Frank Bascombe and his son are marks of an intimate relationship 
where their mutual understandings of discourse is reflected in their ability to ‘get’ one 
another’s jokes. In fact, at its most extreme their ‘getting’ of one another’s jokes and 
implied shared history constitute all of the communicative value of phrases that might 
otherwise be empty. 
 By feeding the necessity of a shared subject position into the discussion of 
irony it is possible to muddy the hierarchical distinction between the reader outside of, 
or ‘above’ the text, and the character inside it. This model embraces the kinds of 
rejections of objectivity orienting my readings of both John Cheever and Richard 
Ford. While to ‘get’ irony might in some cases be assumed to rely on superiority of 
either knowledge or perspective, Hutcheon’s work suggests that it is possible that 
‘getting’ irony depends on a shared discourse, a kind of horizontal exchange or a set 
of pre-determined cultural norms and suppositions about discourse, or a process of 
‘reading sideways’.  
  Reading sideways represents a marked refusal to presume that readers are 
always ontologically superior to the subjective limitations and discursive frameworks 
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of the characters they read about. In my earlier reading of Cheever’s “The Swimmer” 
a form of reading sideways revealed itself in the argument that the reader is complicit 
in the suburban ordering – the evaluative assumptions – that underpin Ned’s 
formulations of his success, as well as the disappointment he finds on coming to learn 
that he has not met the standards this order requires. Reading from within certain 
discursive assumptions, and refusing the possibility of escaping them perhaps fuels 
the kinds of critical frustrations expressed by readers who find Cheever and Ford’s 
work dissatisfying. To read sideways is not to assume that the text has no valid point 
to make, or that there is no relevant distance between reader and text. Rather it is to 
propose that neither readers nor writers can assume a straightforward ontological 
superiority to the views of the fictional characters, or to the limitations of the fictional 
world. Conceived of spatially, the relevant gap between reader, text, author and critic 
exists beside or alongside rather than above or below.  
 Repositioning the reader in this way is not a relativist gesture of defeat; it 
does not claim that any and all readings of a text are as legitimate as the next. Instead 
it forces a perpetual self-aware interrogation of the position of the reader and insists 
that all claims made by a reader about the ‘meaning’ of a text are also attentive to the 
very scaffolds that inform those readings. The illusion of an objective distance can be 
just as detrimental to the process of criticism as the acknowledgement of a total 
inability to access objective essences. This point is precisely elaborated in the 
disagreement between Butler and McKinnon on the constitution of the female subject 
in pornography; it also reflects the concerns that underpin debates about the worth of 
Rortian irony.   
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 Richard Rorty’s conflation of irony with a philosophical rejection of claims to 
objective truth prioritises the role of language in figuring discussions about subjective 
agency and contingency. However, Rorty’s specific use of the term ‘irony’ is, as he 
himself has admitted, potentially misleading:  
 
As for ‘irony’, Laclau is certainly right that this term is not a suitable description of moral 
courage. Yet it seemed a reasonable choice for describing what I called, in Contigency, Irony 
and Solidarity an appreciation of the contingency of final vocabularies. I admit, however, that 
the word does have overtones of what Laclau calls ‘offhandish detachment’, so perhaps it was 
a bad choice. Still, now I’m stuck with it.  (Critchley 74) 
 
 Rorty seeks to demarcate his advocacy of irony (and his use of the term) from 
the apparently flippant quality often attributed to it. Partly this connotation is the 
result of claims (for example in Kierkegaard’s statement “I am free both in relation to 
others and in relation to myself” (209)) that irony posits an ability to escape a 
situation, or to position oneself as superior to the confines of discourse.  Linda 
Hutcheon writes that “irony is seen by some to have become a cliché of 
contemporary culture…this position is usually articulated in terms of contrast: the 
‘authentic’ or ‘sincere past’ versus the ironic present of the ‘total ironist’”(28). 
 To be a total ironist under this negative conception is presumably to refuse to 
postulate ideals that challenge social norms or promise to rectify social injustices; to 
be a total ironist is to reject the concept of truth altogether, and to reject the 
responsibility for and ownership one’s vocabulary. Rorty’s concerns about the 
connotations of his use of the term probably feed from his resistance to any 
perception that irony reflects an abdication of responsibility for one’s vocabulary.  
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The potential to criticise both white American male neo-pragmatists and American 
‘mainstream’ (ie: non-‘minority’) writers such as Ford for a certain quality of 
political detachment reflects a formulation of irony as flippant, morally ambiguous, 
detached, self-preserving, relativist or apologetically, politically quietist. If it is 
difficult to claim either that Ford is being ironic at the expense of suburbia, or that he 
is sympathetically treating his character, then one of the implications might be an 
argument that Ford refuses any responsibility for his voice or for either a critique or 
defence of suburban mores. 
 If values are acknowledged to be subjective and negotiable, one implication is 
that those already in possession of the most powerful or privileged positions in 
society perpetuate the ‘vocabularies’ most beneficial to them even while displaying 
an ironic detachment that allows them to offer no specific endorsements or criticisms 
of a culture and ideology from which they benefit (Fesenstein 3,6). While it seems 
radical to suggest that the transformation of vocabularies could revolutionise cultural 
norms, Rorty can be accused of generally maintaining a status-quo where Western 
liberal Christian or Eurocentric values pretend malleability or refuse responsibility 
even as they perpetuate their dominance and even as they form communities that 
alienate or ignore the needs of non-conformists and minorities. Such oppression is 
seen to re-inscribe precisely the authoritarian, racist, sexist, colonialist or hegemonic 
regimes supposedly rejected by liberal democracies.  
 And yet this field of debate again rehearses the familiar arguments about the 
implications of rejecting objectivity or static notions of ‘truth’. In confronting Judith 
Butler, Jacques Derrida, Camus, Sartre and Rorty, essentialists fearfully and 
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anxiously repeat the question of how such a rejection allows for any form of agency, 
and ask how it avoids a collapse into moral relativism or the absolute rejection of 
social and political accountability. It is the same anxious question that underpinned 
the demands made of John Cheever to offer a specific moral position regarding 
suburbia. Cheever’s critics suggested that his stories re-affirmed suburban values 
even as they pretended at an ironic critique of suburbanites; while Richard Gilman 
and John Aldridge provide for early examples of this concern, Lars Andersson’s more 
recent “The Politics of Conformity in White and Cheever” also concludes that while 
“The Housebreaker of Shady Hill”  “resembles in some respects the form of realist 
fiction so popular in American literature, it ultimately endorses an affirmative view of 
suburbia that lacks the subversive analysis of society common to many forms of 
realism” and argues that Patrick White’s “The Night the Prowler” provides a more 
radical example of suburban fiction that “fails to affirm the status quo in the manner 
that Cheever’s story does” (440).   
 Timothy Aubry (whom Andersson draws on to support his argument) also 
explores the concern that “Cheever’s fiction does not merely describe a crisis of 
masculinity; it also functions to alleviate anxiety about masculinity” (72) and argues 
that Cheever’s stories functioned, on their earliest publication, as forms of ‘self-help 
literature’ for suburban fiction readers who were themselves anxious about their 
suburban existences (77). Yet Aubry further extrapolates on the importance of 
reading Cheever’s work without assuming that an alleviating or sympathetic 
treatment of suburbia must necessarily be approached negatively: “Cheever is 
sympathetic to the rituals suburban men employ to affirm their sense of self; he does 
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not believe such measures to be mere evasions, but recognizes them as important and 
complicated strategies for sustaining identity in an increasingly bewildering social 
world” (71).   
 One potential response to essentialist concerns about agency is to admit the 
absurd without assuming defeat. In “Restaging the Universal”, her contribution to the 
collection Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, Judith Butler continues to pursue 
the question of political intention. The question continues to preoccupy those asking 
how to formulate a conception of agency from within a post-structuralist, post-
modern, or existential concession to contingent and subjective limits. For Rorty the 
pragmatic answer is that ‘irony’ provides a moderate amount of (sideways) distance 
or dis-identification from normalised significations (both of vocabulary and self). For 
Slavoj Žiźek the whole process of identification is in fact mandated by a lack, an 
ultimate “failure of fully recognising oneself in one’s socio-ideological identity” 
(103). The whole notion of a universal, all encompassing ideal is made impossible by 
the quality of being-for-itself necessitated by the very definitions of democracy, 
universality, and subject-positioning:  
 
Universality becomes ‘actual’ precisely and only by rendering thematic the exclusions on 
which it is grounded, by continuously questioning, re-negotiating, dis-placing them, that is, 
by assuming the gap between its own form and content, by conceiving itself as 
unaccomplished in its very notion (102).   
 
Similarly, “not only does the subject never fully recognise itself in the interpellative 
call: its resistance to interpellation (to the symbolic identity provided by interpellation) 
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is the subject. In psychoanalytic terms, this failure of interpellation is what hysteria is 
about” (115). It might be added that in existentialist terms this refusal of the static, 
this failure to identify, this displacement and ambiguity of signification, this ever-
present gap between how society is envisioned (being-in-itself) and its living, 
constantly changing actuality (for-itself) is what absurdity is about. While for Žiźek 
the “reference to universality can serve precisely as a tool that stimulates questions 
and renegotiations” (102), for existentialists it is equally and precisely the absence, 
the distinct space between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, that provides both 
angst and the motivation to go on in pursuit of the necessary and the necessarily 
unattainable.  
 Ford’s novels provide various instances of disjuncture or collision between 
the perspective of his character and the point of view of an implied reader. One of the 
great features of Ford’s writing is his exploitation of these gaps to build comic effect 
and establish ironic potential; while the gaps function as devices they also form some 
of the very subject matter of his novels, recalling again Ann Carson’s statement, 
“where the mind reaches out to know, the space of desire opens and a necessary 
fiction transpires” (171); as discussed earlier the ‘necessary fiction’ of Frank 
Bascombe’s gap is a kind of perpetual desire to narrate his way through the gaps. 
Frank attempts to explain and overcome his gaps by uniting the depiction of himself 
with potential perceptions of himself, even as he appears to acknowledge the 
contingency of his strategies to do so. Frank’s failure to gain perspective on his own 
situation is something that he frequently draws attention to in his narration and in his 
awareness of the potential space between his self-image and the perception others 
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have of him. At one point in The Lay of the Land he admits that his desire to find his 
sense of self ultimately “portended an end to perpetual becoming” (76). The desire to 
station his sense of identity as one solid thing exists in the face of his fear that his 
sense of himself might be fundamentally at odds with the world’s view of him: 
 
…it portended that I say to myself and meant it, even if I thought I said it every day and 
already really meant it: “This is how the shit I am! My life is this way” – recognising, as I did, 
what an embarrassment and a disaster it would be if, once you were dust, the world and 
yourself were in a basic disagreement on this subject. (76)  
 
Frank fears the gap between his self-perception and the perception the rest of the 
world has of him. But the statement’s use of the pronoun ‘you’ directs Frank’s fear 
outward. The mistakes Frank makes in analysing himself are mistakes the reader is 
equally capable of making. Hutcheon might argue that for the audience to understand 
Frank’s fear of an ironic deficiency in his own self-knowledge, they must also 
understand how anyone might become the victim the same form of irony. 
 In The Lay of the Land Frank tells the reader that his daughter Clarissa is 
worried her life is becoming “undifferentiated” (176) and quotes Clarissa, who has 
said that she feels she is living in boxes or “in linked worlds inside a big world” (176).  
Frank offers a sceptical evaluation of his daughter’s desire to get outside of the boxes 
or move “around the boxes, or over them, or some goddamn thing like that” (177) 
and undercuts her theory by using a casual and dismissive tone: 
 
“Pre-visioning,” she calls this brand of self-involved thinking, something apparently hard to 
do in a boxed-linked world where you’re having a helluva good time and anybody’d happily 
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trade you out of it, since one interesting box connects so fluidly to another you hardly notice 
it’s happening because you’re so happy – except you’re not … possibly you had to go to 
Harvard in order to understand this. I went to Michigan. (178) 
 
Frank consistently uses inverted commas in discussing Clarissa’s terms for her 
project, as if making it clear that the terms are not ones he would use; he uses words 
like “apparently” and “Clarissa seems to think” to establish a tone of suspicion; he 
terms her theory “self involved thinking”; he reduces the idea to a contradiction by 
noting that “you” might be too happy to have a perspective on yourself, and so be 
unhappy.    
 Finally Frank suggests that perhaps he is not qualified to understand 
Clarissa’s theory because he only “went to Michigan” (178). Because this line 
follows his largely negative description of her “pre-visioning”, it seems supportable 
to infer a tone of insincerity or sarcasm: while Frank, if taken literally, might appear 
to mean that he is not smart enough to understand his daughter’s ideas, it is possible 
that he actually means the line to be delivered ironically, at the snide expense of his 
daughter’s intellectualising, rather than at the expense of his own ignorance. Frank’ 
audience shares in the ironic connotations of his statement if they make these 
assumptions about how his statement is structured, contextualised, and delivered. Or, 
as Linda Hutcheon might argue, Frank’s audience must have a shared understanding 
of the ‘rules’ of his discourse – those punctuating markers of derision or of not 
meaning what he is saying – in order to be able to share in or support any claims 
about the statement’s ironic implications.  
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 But the reader has to further contextualise Frank’s discussion against what 
they already know about Frank’s own philosophising. A moment later Frank 
positions his own perspective as seemingly clearer than Clarissa’s: “I don’t, in fact, 
think I am [surviving difficulties] too successfully, though the Permanent Period is a 
help” (178).  Frank, like his daughter, has his own philosophical and intellectual 
approach to life in which he figures the periods of his life as having a certain pattern. 
In Independence Day he discusses life during what he calls the “Existence Period” 
(Independence 94) while the older Frank who narrates The Lay of the Land believes 
he has reached the “Permanent Period”. These are categories he uses to define his 
experience of the world, and in doing so he propounds an intellectualised life 
philosophy, just as Clarissa does. This opens the potential for a reader to take a 
differing perspective on Frank than the picture he presents of himself, and introduces 
a further possible level of irony to his discussion of Clarissa.   
 And yet to understand this level of irony is also to mirror and pattern the irony 
Frank implies at the expense of Clarissa’s boxed-life philosophy. When Frank 
dismisses his client Clare’s “pseudo-philosophical question” about America’s 
foundations  (Lay of the Land 420) as “not really a philosophical problem” (423) or 
when he casually and dismissively describes Clarissa’s boxed-life philosophy he 
pretends a superiority to these perspectives; the superiority is then undercut by the 
revelation of his own philosophical approach. If the reader infers, by implication, an 
apparent ironic jibe at Frank, they might also be argued to assume the same form of 
presumed superiority that Frank assumes in relation to Clarissa and Clare. In this way 
the text builds a self-reflective mirror between Frank’s assumptions and the reader’s, 
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and the irony in fact exposes a level of shared subjectivity, rather than a level of 
superiority in knowledge.  
 Nevertheless, Frank’s willingness to present his own life-philosophy suggests 
his potential to be sympathetic to the desire Clarissa has to gain a less subjective 
perspective on her own life. In fact a paragraph after his dismissal of Clarissa’s “pre-
visioning” he considers, “the way illness focuses life and clarifies it, brings all down 
to one good issue you can’t quibble with. You could call it the one big box, outside 
which there isn’t another box” (179). Here Frank appears to have sincerely applied 
Clarissa’s metaphor, and he demonstrates his understanding of the idea that a person 
might desire a change in their perspective. A box with no boxes outside of or behind 
it suggests that there is some more ‘authentic’ or ‘real’ or ‘less subjective’ 
perspective to desire. 
 Illness and the prospect of death threaten the ultimate limit for Frank – a box 
beyond which there are no other boxes – where stasis assumes its import as the point 
at which the potential to change apparently ceases. What permeates Frank’s story, 
and ultimately competes with all of his subjective-renegotiations and acts of 
communication is the spectre of death. In The Sportswriter Ford confronts the suicide 
of an acquaintance, throughout the trilogy he continues to be haunted by the death of 
his son Ralph and in the final novel he faces the possibility of his own death due to 
prostate cancer. The Lay of the Land begins with a short prologue entitled “Are You 
Ready to Meet Your Maker” in which Frank Bascombe asks himself this question. 
He describes a newspaper article about a professor who is shot while administering a 
test. The professor, when asked “Are you ready to meet your maker?” answers “Yes. 
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Yes, I think I am” (2) before a student shoots her, and then himself. Frank’s answer to 
this question, he suspects, would have been “You know, not really, I guess not. Not 
quite yet” (4). In light of the story Frank claims to have begun trying to remind 
himself of “the most sensate ways that I was alive” (5).  
  When Frank asserts that the scariest prospect Clare has to confront is the 
prospect that “you might live” (423) he confronts the very same problem that Albert 
Camus presents, in “The Myth of Sisyphus” as the ultimate source of absurdity: 
 
A world that can be explained even with bad reason is a familiar world. But, on the other 
hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and light, man feels an alien, a stranger. His 
exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a 
promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly 
the feeling of absurdity… it can be seen, without further explanation, that there is a direct 
connection between this feeling and the longing for death. (6) 
 
Without the nostalgic presumption of a reified past in which the world is made stable 
(here Cheever’s narrator from “Goodbye My Brother” resurfaces) and without the 
pursuit of a stable goal projected as an achievable future state, the prospect of 
existence seems futile. Yet Camus’ point is that the decision to go on living and to 
maintain a state of constant self-awareness is itself a purpose: “people have played on 
words and pretended to believe that refusing to grant a meaning to life necessarily 
leads to declaring that it is not worth living. In truth, there is no necessary common 
measure between these two judgements” (8). 
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 To posit only the limited alternatives of either angst or death is to impose a 
sham form of choice. In the same sense, to propose, as Lukács does, an entitlement to 
“guess at a rejection of socialism behind the fashionable condition of angst” (64) 
falsely presumes that angst is synonymous with a rejection of responsibility or 
agency. As Slavoj Žiźek writes in “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, Please!” 
individuals have the capacity to refuse the “false alternative today’s critical theory 
seems to impose on us: either class struggle (the outdated problematic of class 
antagonism, commodity production, etc.) or ‘postmodernism’ (the new world of 
dispersed multiple identities, of radical contingency, of an irreducible ludic plurality 
of struggles)” (91).  By the end of The Sportswriter trilogy Frank’s own proximity to 
death, rather than creating apathy, is united with his decision to choose to make a 
political statement.  
 Throughout The Lay of the Land he has faced the prospect of death from 
cancer, but he confronts death more immediately when, toward the end of the book, 
he is shot: “…the boy shoots me. In the chest. And that, of course, is the truest 
beginning to the next level of life”. Frank then describes his recollection of his 
journey to the hospital in an ambulance. During the trip he decides “when I am turned 
loose from this current challenge, I am going to sit down and write another letter to 
the president” (697). The letter will not be a self-interested and particular letter about 
gun control (697).  Instead it will contain advice for the President and his potential 
successor: 
 
I’ll say that it’s one thing for me, Frank Bascombe, to give up on the Forever Concept and 
take on myself the responsibilities of the Next Level – that life can’t be escaped and must be 
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faced entire. But it’s quite another thing for him to, or his successor…insofar as they have our 
interests at heart they must graduate to the Next Level but never give up the Forever Concept. 
I have lately, in fact, seen some troubling signs, to that I will say there is an important 
difference worth considering between the life span of an individual and the life span of a 
whole republic, and that….(698) 
 
At this point Frank’s train of thought is interrupted by a paramedic and he never 
completes his statement about the difference between individuals and republics. Nor 
does he precisely define the Next Level and The Forever Concept. It is possible that 
by Next Level Frank is referring to his daughter Clarissa’s box metaphor, and a new 
ability to climb outside his personal box – a new perspective. But later in the chapter 
he mentions Clarissa again, relates how she has returned to her old life and old 
relationship and says “she may have decided that “the big swim,” the “out in the all 
of it” were just mirages to keep her from accepting who she is, and that the smooth, 
gliding life of linked boxes may not be the avoidance of pain, but just a way of 
accepting what you can’t really change” (719).  
 The Next Level appears to contain the sense of a change in perspective, as 
well as the threat of some relinquishment or sacrifice of the Forever Concept. To 
“graduate to the Next Level but never give up on the Forever Concept” (698) is to 
assume a place of paradox. The imprecise Next Level accepts the limitations, the 
realities, the strange inconsistencies and unpredictable qualities of life and insists that 
“life cannot be escaped” (698) while the Forever Concept echoes the notion of some 
perpetually unattainable goal, as well as the sense that life is worth pursuing, or that it 
goes on indefinitely, or that there is some right and true value that unites and 
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motivates actions even as it seems adjustable, or even as it continuously eludes 
human conception.  
 The final image of The Lay of the Land is one of Frank on a plane to the 
Mayo clinic, where he will be receiving a further course of treatment for his cancer. 
He looks down on the land. “It is nearly four. We pass, lowering, lowering over farms 
and farmettes and farm-equipment corrals, single stores with gas pumps along Route 
14 where Clarissa and I walked and talked and sweated last August” (724). He 
continues to describe the land, his attempt to “establish the land on a more human 
scale” (724)  and remarks that “It is, of course, only on the human scale, with the 
great world laid flat about you, that the Next Level of life offers its rewards and good 
considerations” (724).  
 The plane lands, providing the final moment of action in the novel, and the 
novel’s concluding sentence “A bump, a roar, a heavy thrust forward into life again, 
and we resume our human scale upon the land” (726). To be part of the land, to lay 
the land flat, and to experience life as context dependant, subjective, limited, is the 
inevitable quality of existence. Even as Frank goes from being positioned above the 
land, over and outside of its setting, to being back on it, the indeterminacy of his 
position is not something that ends. The reader is still unsure, as is Frank, of whether 
he will survive, or of what will happen to Frank or the members of his family in the 
years following. The land is of a human scale, but it is by no means static. The sense 
of Frank being lowered back into its formation, and back into a shared subjectivity 
with others echoes too the sense in the final sentence of Independence Day: “I feel 
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the push, pull, the weave and sway of others” (451); it is a sentence conveying at 
once motion and interrelation, indeterminacy and inter-subjectivity. 
 In Frank’s letter to the president he plans to catalogue all of his characteristics: 
 
I am a citizen of New Jersey, in middle age, with wives and children to my credit, a non-drug 
user, a non jogger … a citizen with a niche, who has his own context, who does not fear 
permanence and is not in despair, who is in fact a realtor and a pilgrim as much as any…I’ll 
write that these demographics confer on me not one shred of wisdom but still a strong 
personal sense of having both less to lose and curiously more at stake. (698) 
 
 Frank’s listing of his particular demographic allegiances, as a person from 
New Jersey, as a husband, a father, a non-drug user, a non-Christian (697) are all 
specific marks of identity that he acknowledges have no impact on his ability to have 
a voice about America – there is no inherent wisdom associated with any of these 
traits. His characteristics, he suggests, both are and are not important; the conflicting 
sense that he has at once something and nothing to lose echoes a fundamentally 
existentialist approach to selfhood. 
 In existentialist terms, as he makes himself in the world, Bascombe chooses 
his values and aspirations. He simultaneously acknowledges that these choices are at 
any point changeable, disposable, and negotiable. Bascombe accepts those aspects of 
himself that are inevitable – that he is middle aged, that he has already made the 
choice to marry and have children – while asserting that these facts are not important 
except in that they offer “something to lose”. In fact they comprise a sense of what he 
values about himself. Bascombe’s position is one both of freedom in his potential to 
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alter who he is, and subjective restraint in terms of the facticity that limits his 
available choices. Frank ultimately confronts the existentialist position that man must 
“always make his less-than-absolute choices within the limited perspective and the 
prejudicial atmosphere of his situation” (Solomon 317)5. Frank’s voice, and his right 
to offer his comments directly to the president, is something that stems purely from 
his being. He is “A pilgrim as much as any” (697) continually re-creating the moment 
of America’s beginning and existence, continually resituating himself on the 
landscape and participating in its history.    
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Conclusion 
 
Writing about the suburb as a fictional space extends beyond the literal 
consideration of ‘fictions about suburbia’. Stories about the suburbs are also 
intimately connected with the way the suburb has been discursively constructed. A 
small part of the intention of this thesis has been to examine how conceptions about 
the suburb have affected how critics read Cheever’s suburban stories. But the 
suburban model raises a much wider critical concern about subjectivity and identity 
itself; it traces out and restages the divergence of the desire for satisfaction, and the 
resistant fear that such satisfaction must be accompanied by conformity, in-
authenticity, disempowerment and stasis. In existentialist terms, the will to both 
refuse and conform to a suburban ideal is a microcosmic expression of the inevitable 
angst-filled desire to become (and to resist becoming) a being-in-itself.  Richard 
Ford’s work aptly demonstrates how this conflict can manifest as a fundamental 
indeterminacy. It can be argued that his texts rehearse a desire to maintain identity, 
and a further self-awareness problematically predicated on a constant interrogation of 
that identity.  
Refusing to postulate suburban identification as total, and as opposed to 
authenticity and consciousness, necessitates an inquiry into the potential malleability 
of the relationship between the individual and the patterns from which they draw their 
sense of self.  Finding some measure by which to identify and to create value (even if 
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that measure is contingent) is a central motivation at the heart of Ford’s work. Before 
Ford, this form of desire lent John Cheever’s stories part off their peculiarly nostalgic 
and ambiguous tone. Those critics who essentialise their own measures of what 
literature ought to do lament that Cheever’s stories fail to meet their terms for what 
makes a text an appropriately worthy piece of social inquiry. Cheever’s texts fail to 
conform to their standards in the same way that Cheever’s suburban characters fail to 
conform to certain suburban measures of success. Frequently the response of 
Cheever’s characters is to attempt to find new orders, new measures and new 
standards from which to derive value and meaning – even if those measures seem 
arbitrary, collapse under scrutiny, or ultimately become self-defeating.  
Critics are engaged in an analogous process: both characters and readers try to 
stabilise or prioritise identity, ideology, vocabulary, meaning, or interpretation. A 
further endeavour of this thesis has therefore been to build new models by which to 
read Cheever and to apply those models to Ford; I aimed to disengage the texts from 
readings that demanded a suburban critique, and to demonstrate how their subject 
matters can be read in less reductive terms. In Ford’s case the concessions to 
contingency, the limitation of perspective, and the refusal of traditional forms of 
closure, never prevent Frank Bascombe from offering his voice. Ford’s novels 
explicitly engage issues surrounding American politics, nationhood, and the 
relationship between state and individual. Like his own character Frank, who chooses 
to write a letter to the president, Ford commands the right to a voice that does is not 
defeated by (and does not depend on) any assumed identification he might have with 
a white, heterosexual, American male demographic. Any criticisms that Ford is not 
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radical enough, or that he does not speak for a real America, or that his voice has fled 
to a kind of self-apologetic safety by light of its contingency, only rehearse the same 
forms of criticism once directed toward Cheever. The identifiable fault in the practice 
of Cheever’s earliest critics was not their willingness to posit an ideal to aspire to, but 
rather, their failure to admit the contingency of their own ideals. One of those ideals 
proposed a place figured as free from conformist constraint and free from the suburbs; 
the other, the ideal social text, constrained their own conception of what makes for 
adequate social critique. 
Jonathan Franzen’s somewhat infamous Harper’s essay “Perchance to 
Dream” (Later re-written and published as “Why Bother” in his collection How to be 
Alone) considers among other things, the purported death of the social novel. He even 
refers nostalgically to the days when people like John Cheever and James Baldwin 
graced the covers of Time Magazine, were read by his father, and were considered 
important. One of the great ironies of Franzen’s essay is that he was at the time of its 
publication writing his own social novel, The Corrections which would go on to be a 
best-seller. Perhaps more interesting is Franzen’s use of the familiar suburban/urban 
metaphor to articulate his argument about the state of the white American male 
novelist:  
 
Much of contemporary fiction's vitality now resides in the black, Hispanic, Asian, Native 
American, gay, and women's communities, which have moved into the structures left 
behind by the departing straight white male. The depressed literary inner city also remains 
home to solitary artists who are attracted to the adversity and grittiness that only a city can 
offer, and to a few still-vital cultural monuments (the opera of Toni Morrison, the orchestra 
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of John Updike, the museum of Edith Wharton) to which suburban readers continue to pay 
polite Sunday visits. (“Perchance to Dream”) 
  
Here culture, ethnicity and sexuality are identity issues figured as urban and 
gritty and as the “literary inner city”. Supposedly the “departing straight white male” 
novelist has fled to the relative safety of the suburbs in a pattern that mirrors 1950s 
ex-urbanisation. Franzen co-opts the familiar signification of the suburbs as a place 
without real weight. The suburbs are the cleaned out and irrelevant space of (obsolete, 
culturally irrelevant bourgeois) white male novelists; they continue to signal 
debilitating places of safety, stagnation, and unconscious silence. Yet his very own 
novel The Corrections and the stories of writers like Cheever and Ford testify to the 
alternative claim that the suburb is a setting like any other, where identity is still at 
issue, and where novelists can write from.  
In the work of both Cheever and Ford the suburban setting assumes a 
metaphorical association with the patterning issues surrounding identity and subject 
positioning. The simplicity of positing a suburban image as purely inauthentic is 
undone by both authors as they demonstrate that human angst and anguish – qualities 
of consciousness and self awareness – are qualities exhibited in the kinds of longings, 
desperations and dissatisfactions that motivate their characters. In Cheever these 
motivations lead to various substitutions of one order for another, one act of narration 
or explanation or imagination for another. In Ford these motivations lead Frank 
Bascombe to go on narrating, to go on seeking that sense of his meaning in life, his 
identity, the unification of his perspective of himself with the perspective others have 
of him. Both writers have a careful and deliberate concern for tone, and a specific 
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awareness of language as a source of pleasure and comfort, as well as an apparent 
awareness of the gaps of language – the potential for irony, for multiple meanings 
and connotations. Essentially the quality of self-awareness underpins all of their work 
as the texts not only make demands of their characters to meet the sources of their 
identification, but also potentially necessitate a cautious awareness among readers of 
how their own reader-positions, ideological assumptions, or desires affect their 
understanding of irony and their appreciation of the literature at hand.  
 Although Richard Ford frequently gives interviews and frequently comments 
on where his writerly instincts and interests lie, he refuses to deny the infinite 
complexity of narratives. In an interview he refers to an essay by Richard Blackmur: 
[Blackmur] makes the argument – lost now among critics – that critical categories, 
critical exclusivities – are really only provisionally useful, and that eventually after 
you’ve used one (Freudianism, for example) and ruled a book off with its strictures 
and looked at things closely, you must put the book back together again, restore it to 
its great complexity, because that’s how it truly exists. It’s possible to delude oneself 
into thinking that the book anatomized is the book put into its truest light. Well, it’s 
not. (Walker 140) 
Does Ford by implication then suggest that literary criticism is futile, or that 
attempting to explain a text or its significance and meaning is aimless?   
    
 To posit a single reading of a text as ‘the authentic’ reading, or ‘correct’ 
interpretation is to commit a kind of Camusian philosophical suicide and to act in bad 
faith. Equally, to surrender in light of the sheer volume of a text’s interpretive 
capacities and refuse to read at all is to approach another form of theoretical and 
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arguably unhelpful ‘suicide’; while one reading may not exhaust all possible 
interpretations, it can make certain claims to validity by logically justifying and 
defending its position in relation to given, if subjective, understandings and 
assumptions about context, discourse, and signification. To accept the weakness of 
critical perspective, and the constant and unbridgeable gaps between reader, text, 
author, and fictional world, and then to go on reading despite this, is to assume a 
relatively absurd yet arguably vital, inevitable, inescapable practice. Absurdity, as 
David Galloway says, requires “a shift in emphasis from attainment to performance” 
(10). Frank Bascombe is a character constantly maintaining the act of narration, 
engaged in a performance, evolving and struggling with no obvious objective goal in 
sight other than perhaps the struggle for existence itself. In response to his work, 
Richard Ford’s readers perform acts of reading, of criticism, of interpretation and of 
reinterpretation. Each reading of a text – a claim about its ironic capacity, about its 
political worth, its voice – is not a relativistic and worthless act but rather, something 
contingent on the ability of a reader to take what is available to them, analyse it, and 
at once assess precisely what aspects of their own reader-position influence, orient, 
scaffold, and sustain what might always be a sideways approach to the literature. 
For those (often Marxists-oriented) critics who demanded a social critique or 
escape from the values popularly associated with suburbia (conformity, materialism, 
in-authenticity) understanding the benefits of such an approach demands a different 
ideological perspective. Disposing of the premise that there is some authentic, 
essential, more real, more stable and less-subjectively, socially constrained ideal is 
one of the efforts made by critics like Judith Butler. In an attempt both to concede to 
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what is perceived as the unavailability of essences, and also to liberate subjects from 
the reductive binaries of either/or (free will/determinacy, un-conscious/conscious) 
critics have to surrender certain measures; the measure of a text’s worth by the extent 
to which it dramatises suburban escape provides just one such unsustainable measure. 
By reading these authors for what they offer, and the uses they make of the 
suburb as a setting, rather than by reading them against a certain pre-determined 
conception of the suburb, or against what the form of a novel ought to be, or of how 
characterisation ought to work, the interest both authors have in the anxiety of 
subjectivity is evident. This anxiety can be positioned as one of the very ‘subject’ 
matters of their texts. Where the texts prioritise self-awareness in the use of nostalgia, 
conflict, competing voices, irony, or plays on perspective they reveal themselves as 
relevant to the kinds of socio-political and cultural concerns that shape contemporary 
trends in current debate about the nature of agency. The suburb can, on this reading, 
be understood as a particularly apt physical and geographical metaphor for what is 
seen as a vital human struggle between the desire for the safety of stasis, and the 
understanding of this stasis as untenable.  
And yet to simplistically conclude that Richard Ford’s trilogy is an absurd 
work of art remains as problematic as it does for all of John Cheever’s stories. Part of 
the source of absurdity is distance, unfamiliarity, and a failure to engage in the 
system from which objects derive value. Cheever’s heroes can only be classed as 
absurdist if the reader themselves refuses to grant any value to the systems the 
characters create; the reader’s position in relation to the text – their wilful rejection of 
an invitation to engage in an inter-subjective extension of sympathy – must be what 
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determines whether or not the text can be termed absurd. Frequently fiction allows 
the reader to maintain a distance between themselves and the world, a kind of 
objective gaze on the fictional landscape; a reader who admits that the sensation of 
objectivity is an illusion, or who engages with the subjective limitations experienced 
by characters in the text, might understand the absurdity of the reading process itself. 
And yet, despite absurdity, the reader might choose to go on. A reader who undoes 
and refuses initial readings, or who demonstrates that there can be no one true reading 
of the text (though there may be some basis for evaluating one reading against 
another) admits to the contingencies of their critical position and pragmatically 
perseveres. 
 In “The Myth of Siyphus” Camus never identifies a specific example of an 
absurd work of art. He considers Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov and 
concludes that it is not “an absurd novelist addressing us, but an existential novelist” 
(111). Franz Kafka’s work is also considered existential but not absurd. Of Kafka, 
Camus concludes: “his work is universal (a really absurd work is not universal)” 
(136). On Camus’s terms the fact that Ford and Cheever both end their stories, or that 
the characters appear to continue to hope for goals, or to turn (particularly in 
Cheever’s case) nostalgically to a lost or unreal past, gives rise to the argument that 
within the hermetically sealed confines of the text, absurdity is not sustained.  
Perhaps Camus’ difficulty in identifying an absurd work lay precisely in the 
problem of the relation between reader and text; to say that a text ‘is’ absurd is 
illogical; absurdity can only reside in the reader’s interpretation and never as a set 
quality of the text. It cannot depend on the stable, unchanging and finite marks of ink 
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on a page, and must instead form somewhere in the discursive space surrounding the 
printed object – in the gaps formed between reader, text, and author.  
In Cheever’s story “The Fourth Alarm” (Stories 645-649) a man attends a 
theatre production in which his wife strips naked, simulates copulation with other cast 
members, and asks the audience to join in forming a naked “love pile” on stage (646). 
The man happily removes his clothes, but he cannot bring himself to leave his car 
keys and wallet unattended. The rest of the audience begins to chant “put down your 
lendings. Lendings are impure” (648) but the man cannot do it: “I held my valuables 
in my right hand, my literal identification. None of it was irreplaceable, but to cast it 
off would be to threaten my essence” (649). He gets dressed, goes outside into a 
blizzard, and remembers with relief that he has snow-tires. In this moment of 
practicality he concludes: “I seemed not to have exposed my inhibitions but to have 
hit on some marvellously practical and obdurate part of myself. The wind flung the 
snow in my face and so, singing and jingling the keys, I walked to the train” (649). 
At this moment the man makes a choice. On some readings his decision to 
cling to his material possessions and “literal identity” could be criticised as 
materialist, conformist, or a rejection of an opportunity for liberation. Alternatively, 
the story provides for a more optimistic reading. While the man realises that his 
valuables are “not irreplaceable” and while he realises the insignificance of them as 
materials, he also proclaims a practical dependence on them, suggesting his own 
pragmatic acceptance of a need to yield to practical demands. The final paragraph is 
potentially a triumphant declaration of identity, safety, and a choice to acknowledge 
what is important to him. While the “love heap” makes light of man’s dependence on 
 150 
 
his belongings, his practical success in having snow tyres equally makes light of the 
impractical love-heap of people who might, thrust into the blizzard, have no way to 
get home.  
Preserving a distance or dis-identification from the narrator might provoke a 
sense of absurdity on the part of the reader. His “dumb show” (Camus 15) seems like 
an absurd or helpless display. Alleviating this sense of absurdity depends on 
removing the comparative distance, the sense of being ‘above’ the text, and engaging 
or sympathising with the character’s motivations; it requires an admission that his 
limitations are not radically distant from our own. This is not equal to a complete 
assumption of the subjective limitations and the subject-position of the character in 
the text; it is not a ‘choice’ to ignore the issues surrounding identification and 
interpellation, or a choice to wilfully conform; rather it is a case of inter-subjectivity: 
it assumes the ability to engage, participate, exchange – from only a relative distance. 
The practical snow-tyre, that thing that serves to alleviate but never defeat absurdity 
is a rejection of the debilitating nausea of any absolute concession to angst. As is 
Frank Bascombe’s decision to write a letter to the president. As is the choice to 
engage in, and expand the scope of, the critical dialogues established through all acts 
of interpretation. 
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Notes
                                                 
1Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is largely motivated by the idea of resisting the assumed 
facticity of gender; of showing that while biological gender may be a mark of facticity it is only a 
limitation in so far as people accept socially and culturally constructed relation between gender and 
sex – or in a Sartrean sense, in so far as they resist the compulsion to occupy the being-in-
itself/object-position of being gendered ‘female’.   
 
2
 Schrift argues that the real gain made in Butler’s move toward post-structuralism was distancing 
herself not from the existentialist account of consciousness, but from the “constraining existentialist 
understanding of difference as essentially hierarchical” (22). I feel this claim is supported by the 
reference Butler makes to Sartre in the opening preface to the first edition of Gender Trouble. Sartre, 
says Butler, maintains the “radical dependency of the masculine subject on the female “Other” ” 
(GT vii) and Butler seeks to undo this mascualine/feminine binary and therefore sets out to reject 
Sartre. 
 
3
  Mackinnon deliberately stresses the point that the ‘real’ relations between genders are constituted 
by pornography. She does so as part of a discussion (in reliance on Andrea Dworkin’s Pornography) 
on the social construction of sexual and gender relations by pornography (Mackinnon 198), in which 
she writes “Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not 
distortion, reflection, progression, rejection, fantasy, representation or symbol either. It is sexual 
reality” (198). Mackinnon goes on to argue that pornography has had to become increasingly 
desensitising and increasingly violent in order to perpetuate its appeal: “Making sex with the 
powerless “not allowed” is a way of keeping “getting it” defined as an act of power, an assertion of 
hierarchy, which keeps it sexy in a social system in which hierarchy is sexy” (201). The distinction 
between an insistence that pornography is not ‘some elsewhere’, and the insistence that pornography 
keeps having to reconceptualise itself in order to maintain its appeal as an elsewhere (a fantasy of 
violent dominance) reveals part of the inconsistency of Mackinnon’s argument; an inconsistency 
that Butler’s argument helps to reveal and adjust.  
 
4
 This comment might be aligned with a larger argument surrounding signification: any attempt to 
escape the ordered system of subject-position – to act alternatively – only successfully draws such 
an alternative action back into the logical system the individual attempts to resist. On one 
understanding this inability to escape the order suggestions that no “original” or “authentic” 
alternatives to the system are available, while on the other, the fact that the actions can be made to 
signify suggests in fact, an ability to alter the terms and logic of the system itself, that is, to exercise 
agency.  
 
5
 The position is one held by the French existentialist philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Robert 
Solomon notes that Merleau-Ponty had a significant influence on Sartre’s work, and that in his later 
career Sartre came more fully to accept the impact that facticity has on the radical freedom of choice 
that Sartre envisioned.  Solomon quotes Sartre on the topic: “In a recent interview Sartre has said of 
his earlier ideas, “little by little, I found that the world was more complicated than that.” In 1970 he 
finds it “absolutely incredible” that he believed that “whatever the circumstances, and whatever the 
site, a man is always free to choose to be a traitor or not…”” (317). Merleau-Ponty’s position (and 
Sartre’s later revision of his own) can more clearly be aligned with subsequent developments in 
French post-structuralism, and more particularly to Judith Butler’s assertion that gender is a choice 
made within the given limits of discourse.  
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